Illinois State University

ISU ReD: Research and eData
Theses and Dissertations
7-10-2020

“When Two Elephants Fight, It’s the Ground that Suffers”: A NeoMarxist Rhetorical Deconstruction of the United States’ Rhetoric
of Power in Resistance to United Nations Treaties
Divine Narkotey Aboagye
Illinois State University, divineaboagyenarkotey@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd
Part of the Communication Commons, and the Rhetoric Commons

Recommended Citation
Aboagye, Divine Narkotey, "“When Two Elephants Fight, It’s the Ground that Suffers”: A Neo-Marxist
Rhetorical Deconstruction of the United States’ Rhetoric of Power in Resistance to United Nations
Treaties" (2020). Theses and Dissertations. 1265.
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/1265

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more
information, please contact ISUReD@ilstu.edu.

“WHEN TWO ELEPHANTS FIGHT, IT’S THE GROUND THAT SUFFERS”:
A NEO-MARXIST RHETORICAL DECONSTRUCTION OF THE
UNITED STATES’ RHETORIC OF POWER IN RESISTANCE
TO UNITED NATIONS TREATIES

DIVINE NARKOTEY ABOAGYE
246 Pages
In this thesis, I present a Gramscian rhetorical reading of American antagonism to the
International Criminal Court, a crucial agency of the UN. I probed the rhetoric of power in
resistance concerning the discourse of international treaties by showing how both the United
States and the United Nations have become global hegemons. From the foregoing, I uncover
American resistance to the constitutive force of United Nations treaties by paying attention to
post-Cold War American presidents. By using a neo-Marxist lens and analyzing a key foreign
policy accord – the International Criminal Court – that spans the presidencies of Clinton, Bush,
Obama, and Trump, I locate how the United States offered conflicting foreign policy visions,
particularly concerning resistance to international treaties. I contend that the United States,
through its post-Cold War presidents, resists UN treaties because of their “common sensical”
nature, their constitutive force, and ideological imbalance with the global hegemonic power of
the United States. I conclude that U.S. hegemonic retreat from international agreements does not
translate to mean U.S authority wanes; but ultimately, a rhetorical ploy to solidify its powerful
status globally to become “a shining city on the hill” for other countries by disentangling its
interests from a competing hegemon like the United Nations (Bulmer-Thomas, 2018).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The United States will provide no support in recognition to the International Criminal
Court. As far as America is concerned, the ICC has no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no
authority. The ICC claims near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of every country,
violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process. We will never surrender
America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy. (Trump,
2018, para. 53)
This thesis concerns American Presidents and their relationship with the United Nations (UN)
and its agencies, specifically regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC). Therefore, I
explore American presidential rhetoric about the UN, its agencies, and treaties. On September
25, 2018, President Donald Trump addressed the United Nations General Assembly. In a fiery
speech, President Trump echoed his administration's opposition toward multilateral institutions.
Trump’s extreme rhetoric on foreign policy and international relations were not new
developments. He maintained a consistent rhetorical disposition in his foreign policy inclination
on his campaign platforms, Twitter, and television interviews.
To Donald Trump, the president of the United States of America should be “somebody
that can take the brand of the United States and make it great again...We need -- we need
somebody -- we need somebody that literally will take this country and make it great again. We
can do that” (Trump, 2015, para 53). By premising his campaign on a radical “America First”
ideology with emphasis on foreign trade deals “which he believed are not in American interests,”
he advanced an economic ultra-nationalist rhetoric (MacDonald, 2018, p. 401). More
importantly, his “America First” ideology was paramount in his foreign policy presentations
regarding multilateral organizations (MacDonald, 2018). Trump, in numerous interviews and
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speeches, and most commonly in his “tweets,” highlighted that the “United States is no longer
winning in international affairs” (pp. 401-402) and that “Making America Great Again” demands
pulling out of international accords that are not in the best interest of the U.S.
MacDonald (2018) states that “presidents come from different backgrounds and possess
distinct ideological visions of the world, which can lead them to pursue different policies” (p.
405). Another scholar of political science and international affairs emphasizes that presidents'
dispositions toward international affairs and foreign policy issues are formed before their
elections (Saunders, 2011). This is clear regarding President Trump before his election, after the
election (before being sworn into office), and during his presidency. President Trump has
maintained vicious rhetoric in his pronouncements against multinational institutions and
international agreements—most especially, the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (McDonald,
2018).
MacDonald (2018) further notes that Trump repudiated the very institutional foundations
of historical American leadership. In Trump’s interview with the New York Times after receiving
the nomination to lead the Republican party, Trump heaped a scathing attack on the United
Nations. He mentioned that America gains “nothing out of the United Nations” (Trump, 2016a).
After being elected as President, awaiting his inauguration, Trump scorned the United Nations
on Twitter. Trump hinted that the “United Nations has such great potential but right now it is just
a club for people to get together, talk, and have a good time. So sad!” (Trump, 2016b). Because
the United States played an important role in the formation of the United Nations, it is surprising
that an incoming president would launch a brutal attack on a global organization that serves as a
symbol of American global influence. Hence, an incoming president's pronouncements about
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such an important body in world affairs demand a critical appraisal. However, Trump is not the
only president to oppose international treaties and multilateral institutions: other post-Cold War
American Presidents have charted similar paths. Trump seems simply to be continuing with this
“tradition.” This thesis will, therefore, deconstruct post-Cold War American presidents’ realist
and idealist rhetorical orientations and how they resist international treaties, primarily focusing
on the International Criminal Court.
Waśko-Owsiejczuk (2017a, 2018), an international relations scholar, maintains that
President Trump made important decisions in U.S. foreign policy just within a year into his
administration. This relatively remarkable achievement is closely tied to the U.S. global
monopoly and hegemonic power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War (Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2018). Since most international relations are driven by realism and/or
idealism (Hariman & Beer, 1996; Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2018), it is important to rhetorically
examine U.S. defiance to international accords. However, a basic understanding of idealism and
realism is first necessary.
Idealists identify international relations as a sphere of potentiality where progress is
realized through multilateral collaboration, harmony of interests, and altruistic behaviors
(Boucher, 1995; Czaputowicz, 2008; Kurki & Wright, 2007). Realists postulate that the world is
inundated with threatening circumstances where violence and misfortune are inevitable
components. In this view, countries are in constant competition with one another (Crawford,
2005; Guzzini, 2003; Morgenthau, 1967). This competition ushers in relationship crises between
countries, most notably, countries against multilateral institutions – such is the current
conundrum between the United States and UN agencies and the UN General Assembly as a
whole. Thus, as Zając (2006) contends, “American realists doubt the effectiveness of the
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international law system and believe that only the U.S. can effectively guard its interests, without
cooperation with any other country” or institution (p. 16).
Closely tied to realism is American exceptionalism— the notion that the U.S. leads
global affairs because of its democracy, rule of law, and unilateralism (Greene, 1993; Lipset,
1996; Madsen, 1998; Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2018). As a result, the U.S., according to Trump, is
not prepared to participate in bureaucratic measures that might derail its efforts and the
advancement of its “American First” ideology. Since unilateralism undoubtedly has impacted
U.S. foreign policy (Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2018), especially during the post-Cold War period, it
explains, “American engagement in the world that minimizes and excludes, where possible, the
participation of other governments and organizations. Unilateralists do not accept the
compromises necessary for the smooth functioning of alliances and oppose the transfer of serious
power to international organizations” (Haass, 2004, pp. 116–117). Thus, President Trump's
“America First” philosophy ushers in a unilateral perspective that guides American foreign
policy rhetoric in the 21st century.
From this perspective, unilateralism contrasts with multilateralism. Multilateralism
“stresses international cooperation with various stakeholders.” Unilateralists, on the other hand,
“while open to support from allies during military operations, are skeptical about cooperating
with other stakeholders in international relations, preferring independent decision-making”
(Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2018, p. 85). This means that the U.S. commitment to international affairs
should take place on her own terms and in agreement with her own interests (Zając, 2006).
Waśko-Owsiejczuk (2018) further adduces that an independent approach to foreign and security
policy must be accomplished with realistic and philosophical thought. Krauthammer (2002) also
endorses this position. According to him, “The essence of unilateralism is that we do not allow
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others, no matter how good their intentions, to stop us from realizing the essential interests of
ensuring the security of the U.S. and the free world” (p. 45). Given the strategic position of the
UN as a global body, with several agencies that serve the interests of all member countries, it
becomes an intriguing rhetorical atmosphere to investigate this crisis in relations. Accordingly,
Trump has an enormous rhetorical burden to negotiate and navigate, especially regarding foreign
policy, which is contentious and divisive in American politics (Zompetti, 2017). As Harris
(2018) notes, Trump’s “America First” disposition to foreign affairs seems to be in stark contrast
with his predecessor’s dedication to what Trump calls an “unjust and injurious international
system” (p. 611). Hence, for Trump, a new and desirable foreign policy vision is the one that
advances American supreme interests only.
Trump’s U.S. national security doctrine also details his emerging logic of political
realism that will guide U.S. foreign policy and the ongoing adoption of a unilateral approach to
international relations. The doctrine constitutes a rhetorical text since it foregrounds persuasive
tenets to govern American foreign policy. Waśko-Owsiejczuk (2018) explains that the doctrine
puts U.S. national interests first; advocates resignation from unfavorable international
agreements; presents an assertive attitude of the USA toward other countries and organizations;
calls for the eradication of threats to U.S. security at their source; demands an increased
capability to respond to potential threats; and establishes an open rivalry with other powers in
order to maintain the American international positions. Trump’s actions mirror Morgenthau’s
(1967) conception that every country should be self-sufficient and must be directed by its own
well-being and advantages in relations with other countries. While this thesis will not specifically
discuss these international relations theories and how they inform American foreign policy
decisions, they are necessary to mention. Most importantly, they articulate the rhetorical
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framework that guides the conduct and posture of U.S. presidents in post-Cold War foreign
policy. Notably, U.S. presidential resistance to international treaties, since Bill Clinton, is very
profound, especially regarding the Rome Statute — the treaty that established the ICC.
In 1998, negotiations for a world judicial body resulted in the drafting of the Rome
Statute, a move sponsored by the United Nations. This thesis, therefore, investigates American
antagonism to the International Criminal Court, a crucial agency of the UN. The ICC has been
hailed by the international community as a crucial landmark formulation to help safeguard
international human rights and to punish war crimes in a bid to prevent world atrocities and other
notorious crimes committed by nation states, individuals, and groups of people. During the
negotiation stage for the creation of the court, the U.S. registered its opposition to this global
juridical body. The resulting strained relationship between the U.S. and the ICC straddled the
administrations of Clinton, Bush, Obama, and presently Trump. Thus, American noncooperation
and iconoclasm to the International Criminal Court represent a clash of two hegemonies. While
American defiance to other international treaties such as the Paris Accord, the Human Rights
Council, and many others are essential texts for rhetorical analysis, American opposition to the
ICC is a denser and more nuanced situation. The UN-U.S. relationship, in particular, offers a
potent rhetorical context to identify competing ideological and material influences and how these
dynamics impact the relationship between the two bodies. As I will establish, the United States
and the UN are global hegemonies — a situation that creates ideological tensions, which has
implications for foreign policy rhetoric, diplomatic rhetoric, and international relations.
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric is important given the nature of this discourse.
According to Aristotle (1926), rhetoric is “the faculty of discovering the possible means of
persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever” (p. 1355). Because American presidents have
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significant powers, they can persuade various audiences, and they are able to define the interests
of the nation (Neudstat, 1962; Zarefsky, 2004). For Bitzer (1963), rhetoric is “the grand art of
communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes” (p.
xiv). Bitzer further illustrated that “any instance of written or oral discourse which aims to
inform, convince, and please, move, or persuade and which has as its communicative substance
some passion, idea, sentiment, disposition, or purpose is an instance of rhetorical discourse” (p.
xiv). In this direction, Bitzer’s explanation resonates with Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric.
Bitzer further conceives that “the materials of rhetoric consist of all the principles, concepts,
rules, techniques and means by which discourse of nearly every kind of may be managed and
thereby improved” (p. xiv). Thus, American presidents' opposition to international treaties are
inherently rhetorical as they aim to change the normative frameworks that govern the world and
establish America as a global superpower.
While many studies have examined U.S. presidential rhetoric (Stuckey, 1990; Tulis,
1987; Windt, 1987; Zarefsky, 1986, etc.), only a few have examined U.S. presidents and their
rhetorical disposition toward multinational institutions (Barnes, 2015; Carney, 2017). It thus
appears that rhetorical examinations into the activities of the UN and its agencies, appear
lacking, and this constitutes an intellectual oversight that merits our attention in contemporary
times. While some studies have examined the rhetoric of treaties (Stuckey & Ortega, 2019), less
attention has been given to how post-Cold War U.S. presidents rhetorically resist UN treaties.
Consequently, in this critical exploration, I probe U.S. presidential rhetoric concerning
diplomatic affairs and international relations. I analyze how both the United States and the
United Nations have become global hegemons. Specifically, I uncover the American resistance
to the constitutive force of United Nations treaties by paying attention to post-Cold War
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American presidents. I contend that the United States, through its post-Cold War presidents,
resists UN treaties because of their “common sensical” nature, their constitutive force, and
ideological imbalance with the global hegemonic power of the United States. Given the changing
rhetorical dynamics since the end of the Cold War, Trump’s latest discursive opposition to UN
hegemony is not only the culmination of the preceding presidents’ policies, but it also bares
significant risk as we move forward in the 21st century. I use a neo-Marxist rhetorical approach
to uncover the rhetoric of resistance and power as used by the United States in opposition to the
International Criminal Court. I argue that the actions of post-Cold War American presidents
against the ICC are latently revolutionary since they seek to topple the international hegemony of
the UN and establish the United States as a “winning candidate” in all frontiers of international
politics as it promoted itself as the most powerful nation on earth.
In what follows, I uncover the frontiers of presidential rhetoric and examine presidential
power as an essential characteristic of American rhetorical presidency and their utility to foreign
affairs and foreign policy authorizations. Foreign policy rhetoric, American exceptionalism, and
the rhetoric of American soft power also explain how the UN functions as a rhetorical institution.
Finally, the review of literature discusses the rhetorical character of the Rome Statute that
established the International Criminal Court.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
I know that men are won over less by the written word than by the spoken word, that
every great movement on this earth owes its growth to great orators and not to great
writers. (Hitler, 1925)
Rhetoric functions in a series of institutional settings as a technology of deliberation. …
Rhetoric allows for a governing apparatus to make judgments about what it should
govern, how it should govern, as well as offering mechanisms for evaluating success or
failure. … Rhetorical practices create the conditions of possibility for a governing
apparatus to judge and program reality. (Greene, 1998, pp. 22 – 23)
In his groundbreaking essay, “Another Materialist Rhetoric,” Greene (1998) identified rhetoric
as a “technology of deliberation” that helps us examine the “organizational and historical
dynamics of a governing apparatus” (p. 21). In this direction, rhetoric recognizes how power
operates through discourse and the mechanism through which the subjectivities of audiences are
represented in the formulation of judgments and to “program reality” (p. 22). Rhetoric’s
constitutive character, therefore, privileges us to see how this technological vehicle of
deliberation composes ideas through “ideological or identity forming discourses” are persuasive
and also “trapped in contradiction” (Charland, 1989, p. 134). As a result, a “persuasive discourse
requires a subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an identity and within an
ideology” (p. 134). Greene’s (1998) reading of Althusser becomes crucial to our understanding
about how rhetoric and discourse intersect with ideology. Greene posits that “ideology has
material existence” (p. 26) because ideologies interpellate subjects by positioning them in
discourse (Althusser, 1971; Charland, 1989). Althusser used the word “interpellate” to express
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how ideology influences people’s thought so that they become subjects to the dominant order,
through a process he calls “interpellation or hailing” (1971, p. 174). Consequently, this process
of “hailing” socializes subjects into an ideology or a system of ideas (Althusser, 1971). In this
direction, Charland (1987) elucidates that “interpellation occurs at the very moment one enters a
rhetorical situation” since one must be conditioned as an “interpellated subject and exist as a
discursive position in order to be part of the audience of a rhetorical situation in which
persuasion could occur” (p. 138). Following this conception, it becomes crucial to understand
how nations are constituted into a globalized community. From this perspective, how
international institutions and powerful nations exercise dominance becomes very important to
study.
In this chapter, I advance the rationale for studying post-Cold War U.S. presidential
discourse regarding foreign policy and multilateralism. This thesis, more specifically, examines
American resistance to the rhetoric of United Nations treaties. Because discourse plays a role in
constituting nations, guiding foreign policy choices, and constructing relations with multilateral
institutions, I focus on how the United States (through post-Cold War presidents) navigates its
authority around the globe as a world superpower. Since American presidents have the power to
define issues (Zarefsky, 2004) for Americans and the world as a whole, I explore how
presidential political and constitutive rhetoric help create – and interpellate – a role in this power
and resistance discourse.
To accomplish this, I first explore how the United States exacts its power in the world
through its foreign policy enactments. I then touch on presidential rhetoric and the presidential
power as critical elements in American foreign policy discourse. Additionally, the constitutive
nature of the United Nations makes it a rhetorical institution (Barnes, 2015). With this in mind, I
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examine the United Nations as a rhetorical institution and also examine the rhetoric of its
treaties, particularly the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court. Because
the United States has repudiated this global body for decades, I examine literature on the
rhetorical struggle between the United States and the International Criminal Court. Finally, I
make the case that an ideological critique of American resistance to the rhetoric of United
Nations treaties is crucial to our understanding of hegemonic formation, international diplomacy,
foreign policy enactments, and presidential rhetoric.
General Rhetorical Examinations of U.S. Foreign Policy
The practice of American foreign policy and international relations, according to Beer
and Hariman (1996), has always “involved skillful use of persuasive discourse” (p.1). This
means that rhetoric is very important, yet its significance has gone unnoticed or unexplored in
foreign affairs and international relations, especially with respect to how the rhetoric of power
operates among relationships between countries and intergovernmental organizations. However,
scholars have advanced the nexus between rhetoric and foreign affairs more generally
(Bostdorff, 1994; Medhurst et al., 1990; Wander, 1984; Windt, 1991).
Wander (1984), in his article, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” seeks to
contextualize the nature and rhetoric of American foreign policy as falling under the broad
prisms of prophetic dualism, technocratic realism, and nationalism. Wander formulates that a
thorough
understanding of the rhetoric of American foreign policy must take into account the
ceremonial nature of such rhetoric; its functions in domestic politics; and its relation to
facts and events beyond language employed, matters on which the lives of tens of
millions, if not the whole of humanity now depend. (p. 340)
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Wander further argues that locating foreign policy debates by searching for arguments provides
adequate justification in contexts for groups and parties “engaged in a struggle for political
power” (p. 341). Advancing the notion of prophetic dualism as underlying the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, Wander argues that prophetic dualism “divides the world into two camps,” one
that operates on the axis of moralism and one that acts in direct opposition. What “involved
‘religious faith, the faith of our fathers,” etc. was not so much “prophetic dualism” but the axis of
moralism, since it is likely that the rhetoric proposed some other force “in direct opposition” to
“religious faith.” Prophetic dualism, referencing the Eisenhower-Dulles administration’s action
in Vietnam, involved “religious faith, the faith of our fathers, the ideals of freedom,
individuality, a militant God and the existence of evil in the world” (p. 344). Prophetic dualism is
the belief that there is the existence of good and evil. The U.S. embodies the “good” and rival
nations/people, “evil.” The Christian history of the U.S. regarding prophetic dualism and how
that therefore frames American perspectives about its importance (e.g., Russia seen as the devil,
ergo the US is god term). Additionally, prophetic dualism serves as “a form of argument” that
“calls for overwhelming support” (p. 345) for governmental action in external affairs, since
prophetic dualism constrains debates but rather privileges the exercise of authority. An example
is President Bush’s (2001) “You’re either with us or against us” speech after 9/11. Going by the
dictates of prophetic dualism, therefore, had potential damaging consequences for presidents in
power since it left little space for compromise especially during the American conflict in
Vietnam. Wander posits that, while dualism “forms an important element in the worldview of the
right-wing in American politics, it must also be understood as part of a cluster of images, themes,
grammatical forms, and emotions making up the culture of war in the twentieth century” (p.

12

347). In this view, prophetic dualism grants moral authority to American presidents to embark on
missions that seek to secure America from external threats and aggressions.
Concerning technocratic realism, Wander (1984) argues that, when protecting American
interests in international affairs, “negotiation becomes possible over areas of mutual interest—a
retreat from the horrors of nuclear war, for example” (p. 349). To Wander, a “tough expert is
what is needed, one whose mind is unclouded by violent and dangerous emotions; one who is
wise, analytical, precise” (p. 349). Thus, technocratic realism “could be adapted to explain
hostile actions in international affairs and justify a moderate course of action” (p. 350). In this
way, American technical know-how and assistance to the rest of the world in military affairs and
strategy could be clearly justified and explained.
Regarding nationalism, Wander presents that the rhetoric of American foreign policy is
premised on “nations.” According to Wander, the U.S. the personification of the United States as
“an Actor with a sense of purpose, an important mission in a world of nations, and a moral and
spiritual center raising it above all other nations ... forms the essential story out of which reasons
are given in support of foreign policy” (p. 353). This, therefore, informs the U.S. role in the
world as the world’s most powerful nation. In other words, America’s authority in the world
grants it the moral authority to pursue actions that exclusively serve its interests.
The above theoretical incursion into the nature of American Foreign policy lends
credence to Medhurst et al. (1990), who read cold war discourse rhetorically. To these scholars,
rhetoric serves as the center for debate and analysis of cold war as the defining moment for
America’s foreign policy. Edwards (2008) supports this assertion based on his reading of
Medhurst et al. (1990). Edwards (2008) argues that “for over forty years, the Cold War
structured America’s foreign policy universe as contest between the United States and the Soviet
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Union, characterized as much by a war of words, as by physical confrontation” (p. xi). In
Bostdorff’s (1994) reading of the rhetoric of American foreign policy, “American Presidents
have always convinced the public that foreign crises exist” and that U.S. intervention is crucial.
Bostdorff further argues that, “because foreign locales are so distant and knowledge of them is
far removed from most Americans’ daily lives, presidents must persuasively advance claims of
crisis in order to prompt public support” for moral and justified actions (p. 1).
Closely tied to nationalism and American interests in foreign policy discourse is the
concept of “American exceptionalism.” Edwards (2018) explains that the “rhetorical precepts
and narratives of American exceptionalism are the primary source of intervention that politicians
use to make arguments concerning U.S. role in the world” (p. 177). Alexis de Tocqueville
(1835/2013) is on record to have first used “exceptional” to describe America in 1835 (Edwards,
2008). Edwards (2008) contends that “American exceptionalism is the distinct belief that the
United States is a unique and superior nation that has a special role to play in human history” (p.
5). Edwards (2006, 2008, 2018) further reports how notable personalities, such as John
Winthrop, opine that the United States represents “a new Israel” and “a city upon a hill” that
serves as an exemplar to world. Thomas Paine also charged that the United States has the “power
to begin the world and the world over again” (as cited in Edwards, 2008, p. xx). Additionally,
Streich and Marrar (2014) summarize the dimensions of American exceptionalism as follows:
American Exceptionalism assumes the United States is unique along several dimensions.
First, historically, the United States is thought to have established a new, democratic, and
egalitarian nation in 1776 in contrast to the feudalistic hierarchies of Europe. Second, it is
thought of as having been “blessed” with abundant land, natural resources, and the
protective buffers of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Third, the United States is assumed
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to represent political ideals such as liberty, democracy, and justice as well as economic
ideals of free markets and free trade. Fourth, it is seen as an “immigrant nation” whose
diverse citizens accomplish great things because of a shared commitment to hard work,
“can-doism,” optimism, innovation, and fair play. And fifth, the United States is thought
to have a duty (perhaps even a divine mandate) to be proactive in global politics not just
to defend its interests but to spread its economic and political ideals around the world. (p.
3)
From this perspective, American exceptionalism defines how America sustains its status in the
world and how it influences the international order (Edwards, 2008; Hunt, 1998). The presidents
of the United States, according to Edwards (2008), Baritz (1985), and McCartney (2004),
articulate this vision of exceptionalism in two distinctive ways: the mission of exemplar and the
mission of intervention. These have formed essential elements of American foreign policy
vocabulary (Edwards, 2008) and what Stuckey (1995) calls, “foreign policy dramas.” Edwards
argues that the rhetorical equipment for America’s uniqueness is that it should engage in things
that arrogate the U.S. to be “a beacon for others to emulate” (p. 7). These activities, according to
Edwards, are “perfecting American institutions, increasing material prosperity, integrating
diverse populations into one America, and continuing to strive for more civil rights” (p. 7). When
these happen, the U.S. becomes a model for other nations as well as fulfilling its destiny to
influence global affairs (Edwards, 2008).
Gilmore (2014) offers another exciting view of the rhetoric of American exceptionalism.
According to him, a primary theme that emerges in the invocation of American exceptionalism is
the fundamental impression and belief that the “United States is a single country” (p. 2420) that
is different from other countries (Edwards & Weiss, 2011; Heitala, 2003; Lipset, 1996; Madsen,
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1998). America is also defined as superior (Gilmore, 2014). Shaffer (1991), for instance, notes
how the United States victory in World War II promoted the United States as an international
hegemon. In this vein, Ronald Reagan (1981) acknowledged that Americans “have fought
harder, paid a higher price for freedom, and done more to advance the dignity of mankind than
any people who ever lived” (para. 47).
As America refines its domestic rhetorical and material attributes, it becomes a symbol
for other nations. This presents the United States with the moral obligation and the rhetorical
authority to fulfill its destiny to influence world affairs (Edwards, 2008). This mission of
exemplar commanded, directed, and rejuvenated American thought regarding its unique position
in the world in the 18th and 19th centuries (Edwards, 2008). For instance, in his Farewell Address,
President Washington noted,
the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our
commercial relations to have with them as little as political connections as possible … It
is our true policy to steer clear and permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign
world. (as cited in Edwards, 2008, p. 8)
Edwards further explains that Thomas Jefferson upheld Washington’s dictate on foreign affairs.
Thus, Washington and Jefferson established the foundation for the United States to have the
prerogative to choose whether or not to interfere in the political affairs of other nations. In this
direction, “the mission of exemplar,” according to Edwards (2008), “continues to be a source of
rhetorical invention when debating and defining America’s role in the world” (p. 8).
The mission of intervention has also established an American worldview and place in the
world. Whereas the notion of exemplar suggests the United States should stand out among
nations, an ideal for them to emulate, the notion of intervention suggests that the United States
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must heighten its exceptionalism through active participation in world affairs not only in
economic spheres but also in the political, cultural and social realms (Bostdorff, 1994; Edwards,
2008). For this, Edwards posits that adherents of interventionism endorse America’s active
involvement in international affairs since the “America’s exceptionalism heritage” mandates it to
“take responsibility of leading the world in continued progress and defending those who
subscribe to similar ideals” (Edwards, 2008, p. 9). Consequently, this action privileges the
United States as not only acting egoistically in its own interests, but also the interests of the
world because, quite simply, America’s interests should be the world’s interests (Edwards,
2008). To Edwards, proponents of this mission have been 20th century American presidents such
as Woodrow Wilson, FDR, and Harry Truman. Yet, it was Theodore Roosevelt and the SpanishAmerican War that established the defining moment for interventionism, according to Edwards.
However, this emerging philosophy (interventionism), led to conflict between exemplarists and
interventionists. For instance, President Woodrow Wilson faced “domestic opposition to
America joining the League of Nations” (p. 9). Accordingly, World War II endowed America
with responsibility to protect and safeguard “freedom and peace from the specter of threats,
including the rise of Soviet communism” (p. 9). In order words, World War II enabled the U.S.
to devise a strategy to combat the scourge of communism.
From this account, President Truman employed the U.S. interventionist principle. He did
this by declaring that “the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their
freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall
surely endanger the welfare of our own nation” (cited in Ivie, 1986). Edwards also explains that
“this duty to defend the freedom gave the United States justification for asserting its leadership
role in the Cold War” (2008, p. 10). Edwards observes that the interventionist role espoused by
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American presidents spanned over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century leading to
the creation of “a stable and peaceful global order” (2006, p. 5). All Cold War presidents were
adamant supporters of interventionist policies, with post-Cold War President Ronald Reagan’s
incursion into Grenada and George H.W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq as examples. According to
Edwards, (2008), afterWorld War II, presidents blended the missions of exemplar and
intervention in forging America’s leadership in world affairs. Edwards (2006) describes how the
mission of exemplar grants America the opportunity to confront its enemies abroad, while
intervention privileges “American institutions to be renewed and flourish in our continuing
expansion of equality through civil rights and greater economic opportunities for all” U.S.
citizens (p. 26). Thus, when America improves its domestic situation, it allows the U.S. to
execute its exemplar mission in order to satisfy the maxim: “to be strong at home, you must be
strong abroad” (p. 26).
Following Stuckey’s (1995) examination of competing American foreign policy visions,
foreign policy is also expressed in dramatic forms since “each drama brings a unique
interpretation of the American role in world affairs, and each interpretation entails both
ideological and practical consequences” (p. 215). Stuckey maintains a foreign policy drama has
enormous persuasive power “to the extent that it appears to present an accurate picture of events
as well as a plausible plan for action. Accordingly, presidents will be seen as successful foreign
policy actors to the extent that they espouse a persuasive drama” (p. 215). In addition to the
above, dramas also provide “vocabularies of motives” (Ivie, 1974, p. 327) that encourage moral
action.
Given this view, Stuckey (1995) agrees with Hollihan (1986) that American foreign
policy is shrouded in both rhetorical and dramatistic frames. Thus, there are three dramas
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according to Hollihan that are imperative in understanding American foreign policy: The Cold
War, the New World Order, and Power Politics. Concomitantly, Stuckey (1995) opines that these
“dramas continue to animate discussions of American foreign policy” (p. 215). From Stuckey’s
perspective, the Cold War drama presents a strong case of pragmatism and moralism reflecting
the American discourse that countered or balanced the Soviet Union — pitting good versus evil.
Stuckey posits that, “in choosing to ‘fight’ evil through a war, however cold, the range of action
is limited to options that are implied by the war metaphor” (p. 216). This metaphoric logic
propelled the United States to confront the Soviet threat and fight against Communists. In this
fashion, persuasive appeals underlying the drama of the Cold War reflect Wander’s (1994)
aforementioned notion of “prophetic dualism.”
The Cold War, then, was a “rhetorically constructed ideological reality that was first
accepted within the ruling circles of government, then publicly conveyed through major speeches
and writings to Americans who generally accepted it as the reality of both foreign and domestic
politics” (Hinds & Windt, 1991, p. 5). In this regard, the Cold War provided a rhetorical
opportunity for American presidents to engage the world by advancing U.S. democratic
evangelism against the scourge of Soviet Communism (Prasch, 2016). In fact, the Cold War
drama was pitted against a “‘hot’ counterpart in a contest” (Medhurst, 1990, p. 19). According to
Medhurst (1990), the Cold War is
a contest between competing systems as represented, for example, by the Soviet Union
and the United States. It is a contest involving such tangibles as geography, markets,
spheres of influence, and military alliances, as well as such intangibles as public opinion,
attitudes, images, expectations, and beliefs about whatever system is currently in
ascendancy. The contest, in other words, is both material and psychological in nature.
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The currency of Cold War combat—the tokens used in the contest—is rhetorical
discourse: discourse intentionally designed to achieve a particular goal with one or more
specific audience. While the weapons of a hot war are guns, bombs, missiles, and the
like, Cold War weapons are words, images, symbolic actions, and, on occasion, physical
actions undertaken by covert means. For the most part, however, Cold War is a matter of
symbolic action, action intended to forward the accomplishment of strategic goals—
social, political, economic, military, or diplomatic. (p. 19)
The overarching goal of the Cold War, according to Medhurst, is to prevent World War III and
to serve as a ploy for world Super-powers to maintain and possibly enlarge their spheres of
political and ideological influence in what Zompetti (2017) describes as jockeying “for global
hegemony” (p. 308).
Since the Cold War drama offers a weak persuasive vehicle (Stuckey, 1995), the
invocation of a New World Order, to use George H. W. Bush’s (1990) phrase, brings more
sophistication to “a complicated moral universe in which at least potentially equal moral actors
attempt to manage conflict so that confrontation can be avoided. International law and the right
of all people to self-determination are important elements in the New World Order rhetoric” (p.
216). Stuckey agrees with Hollihan (1986) that the New World Order drama is hackneyed, since,
like the drama of the Cold War, it is heavily premised on moral asseverations. However, in
reiterating Wander’s (1994) technocratic realism that underwrites the U.S. foreign policy
enactment, Stuckey (1995) clarifies that the drama of power politics signals a different thinking
in foreign policy decisions. Since power politics is largely influenced by American self-interest,
it forecasts a “world of equally self-interested pragmatists” (p. 217). Hollihan (1986), in this
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manner, agrees that the international relations objective of the power politics model is for
America to realize the benefits of avoiding conflict. Thus, Stuckey (1995) suggests that
These three paradigmatic dramas (Cold War, Power Politics, and the New World Order)
all entail specific orientations towards the means and ends of American foreign policy.
To the extent that any one of these can be said to dominate foreign policy rhetoric, certain
rhetorical as well as political practices will follow. Since the fall of the Soviet Union,
however, no one drama has proved definitive. The result has been something of a
rhetorical jumble, in which neither the intention nor the goals of American foreign policy
have been made clear. This jumble bas been evident in the foreign policy rhetoric of both
George Bush and Bill Clinton. (pp. 217-218)
From this perspective, it becomes clear that, without a comprehensive justification and reason for
American “conquest” and presidential action in foreign policy decisions, an ambiguous vision
results, which will lead to the creation of diverse foreign policy ideologies. Thus, rhetorical
devices can be used to maintain American foreign policy visions successfully in global politics.
Soft Power and American Foreign Policy
Closely related to American exceptionalism in foreign policy is Joseph Nye’s concept of
soft power. Nye, in his book, The Future of Power, defines soft power as “the ability to get
preferred outcomes through co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction”
(2011, p. 16). Hayden (2012), when discussing Nye’s notions, charges that soft power
encompasses the means to achieve desirable results based on nation’s resources, which Nye
identifies as culture, political ideas, and foreign policy legitimacy.
The concept of soft power has been acclaimed as very important in explaining foreign
policy objectives (Ikenberry, 2011; Richardson, 2012), particularly for the United States. Leslie

21

Gelb, in her comprehensive treatise, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American
Foreign Policy, argues that “persuasion, good values and leadership won’t — by themselves —
cause foreign leaders to do your bidding. ... To me, soft power is foreplay, not the real thing”
(2009, p. 219). Therefore, this means that even though soft power subtly helps communicate
American power and exceptionalism to the world, it has several limitations since it cannot
influence decisions made by other countries, or in our contemporary era, intergovernmental
organizations. Reading the concept of soft power rhetorically, Hayden (2012) establishes how
soft power is reflected through public diplomacy and planned communications infrastructure in
countries such as Japan, Venezuela, China, and the United States. Concerning the United States,
Hayden dissects how American foreign policy-makers are evolving the infrastructure of foreign
policy by incorporating very deliberate communication strategies to establish relations with
foreign publics and other audiences.
Hayden’s Rhetoric of Soft Power, according to Professor Zaharna of American
University, fills “a gap in the comparative public diplomacy literature by illustrating how
different visions of soft power can produce different diplomacy practices, programs and goals”
(2012, n. p). Thus, since the United Nations constitutes a rhetorical scene (Barnes, 2015; Carney,
2017) that permits countries to effectively present desirable images of their countries while
simultaneously engaging in public diplomacy efforts to establish desirable images abroad, soft
power in foreign policy decisions is crucial. Walker (2015) opines that “public diplomacy can
reasonably achieve as a purveyor and creator of international influence,” and that the rhetoric of
public diplomacy leads to “wholly different forms of persuasive discourse to achieve U.S.
foreign policy objectives” (p. 44). More specifically, Walker (2014) examines how soft power
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diplomacy establishes constitutive rhetoric — how language and discourse create a shared
identity (Sloane, 2001).
By performing rhetorical critiques of treatises surrounding the America-India 123
agreement, Walker (2014) observes that the end of the Cold War regenerated the purposes of
U.S. power—from hard power to soft power—which informed U.S. foreign policy making and
diplomatic tradecraft. He also carefully underscores the role of American presidents in the
forging of desired foreign policy aims based on U.S. interests. Walker, therefore, advances our
understanding of how the rhetoric of soft power in public diplomacy is crucial toward American
foreign policy objectives. For rhetorical critics, Walker’s study benefits our appreciation of the
role of rhetoric in public diplomacy and foreign affairs.
Presidential Rhetoric, Foreign Policy, and International Treaties
If one must speak—and speak about particular things — in order to truly become “the
president,” then the institution of the Presidency is rhetorical in material ways that
exceed the traditional notion of Presidential leadership that is manifested in attempts to
persuade the public. Becoming the President … is a way of becoming a rhetorical
subject.… [and] relies on speech as a rhetorical technology to transform an individual
that occupies a constitutional role into a rhetorical subject known as “a President.”
(Greene & Frank, 2019, pp. 129-130, emphasis added)
The role of American presidents in foreign policy is made clear in news reports, government
documents, and Congressional resources. Hence, it is imperative to understand the role of
presidents as well as the power that makes them crucial elements in foreign policy discourse.
Understanding the power of presidents, the rhetorical presidency, and the nature of presidential
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rhetoric is fundamental to carefully locate the components of presidential rhetoric in foreign
policy and international affairs discourse.
Edwards (2006) maintains that the Constitution obligates presidents to establish foreign
policy objectives. For instance, Article II of the Constitution mandates the president as the
“commander-in-chief” of the armed forces. This, according to Edwards, gives him the “power to
appoint ambassadors and ‘make treaties’ with other nation-states” (p. 7). Hence it behooves the
president to lead the government in forging “foreign relations, a constitutional mandate which
creates a number of foreign policy roles for the president —commander-in-chief, chief diplomat,
and especially in the last century, world leader” (p. 7). This position is supported by Rosati
(1993) and Rossiter (1956), as well as Snow and Brown (1997). Edwards (2006) explains that, as
“American involvement in international affairs grew, so did the president’s dominance in foreign
policy making” (p. 7). This explains the power the Constitution grants to American presidents to
lead the government in foreign relations.
Richard Neustadt (1960), in his book, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership,
shows how the President of the United States wields enormous power. In a critical investigation
of the Truman and General Eisenhower’s administrations, Neustadt posits that the
president of the United States has an extraordinary range of formal powers, of authority
in statute law and in the Constitution … Despite his “powers,” he does not obtain results
by giving orders--or not, at any rate, merely by giving orders. He also has extraordinary
status, ex officio, according to the customs of our government and politics …. Despite his
status, he does not get action without argument. Presidential power is power to persuade.
(Neustadt, 1960, p. 10)

24

Bostdorff (1994) presents that Chief Executives (American Presidents) use “language to give
birth to an issue, to encourage us to believe that no issue exists, and to convince us that some
issues are more urgent and deserving of our attention than others” (p. 4). Saunders (2011) notes
that presidents have their agenda set even before they are elected. Hence, they “persuade us to
conceive of ourselves in ways compatible with their views of government and the world”
(Campbell & Jamieson, 2008, p. 8). Presidents also “define political realities” for the citizenry
(Prasch, 2016, p. 7). Thus, a president’s “prominent position and his access to the means of
communication” accredit him to define a situation and to “shape the context in which events or
proposals are viewed by the public” (Zarefsky, 2004, p. 611). Accordingly, the pervasive power
in defining issues and constructing discourse become one of the main tasks for American
Commanders-in-Chief. Kenneth Burke (1966a) also realizes this when he argues in his Grammar
of Motives that “to tell what a thing is, you place it in terms of something else. This idea of
locating, or placing, is implicit in our very word for definition itself: to define, or determine a
thing is to mark its boundaries, hence, to use terms that possess, implicitly at least, contextual
reference” (p. 24). Thus, presidential power affords American presidents the ability to establish
various priorities and visions for the country.
For this reason, the President, as the interpreter-in-chief uses the Office of the President
to help define issues and establish importance to the relevant issues concerning the Executive
(Stuckey, 1991; Zarefsky, 2004). Barney (2019) also characterizes the President as the
“Cartographer-in-Chief” because presidents have thought and articulated through maps; they
view the world in terms of geostrategic interests such that certain countries and regions are more
or less important to the United States simply by the nature of where they exist cartographically.
Prasch (2016), for instance, investigates how American presidents connect to foreign audiences
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by invoking the rhetoric of place to establish rhetorical objectives in line with American
interests. By crafting a rhetorical theory of deixis (words that require context for their meaning),
Prasch argues how U.S. presidents have “invoked place as a rhetorical strategy” (2016, p. v),
although few rhetorical scholars have examined how rhetors utilize the symbolic and physical
infrastructure of a speech’s location or its audience to serve the materiality of persuasion. Prasch
presents that scholars have paid little attention to “how speakers can invest certain spaces or
places with shared values, cultural identities, and political ideologies through speech” (p. 11). By
analyzing Cold War presidential discourse and focusing on presidents Truman, Kennedy, and
Reagan, Prasch advances how speeches elicit symbolic meanings, formulate topoi, and constitute
relevant visions of the United States in world affairs, and also how the rhetoric of place
strengthens presidential ethos as the embodiment of morality and leadership over the world
super-power.
In a recent scholarly endeavor, “Reading the Presidency in Situ,” Prasch (2019) advances
the notion of place and presidential speechmaking, which Prasch identifies as “in situ” (p. 47),
meaning “place, situated, present” (p. 46). Prasch argues that “although critics cannot recreate a
particular moment of utterance, scholars … must account for how rhetorical discourse …
harnesses the material and the symbolic elements of the speech setting as a means of evidence”
(p. 46). Therefore, performing an analysis of presidential rhetoric in situ is profoundly an
embodied experience as well as an exchange that is both material and symbolic. On the concept
of the rhetorical situation, Prasch (2019) offers that understanding U.S. presidential rhetoric in
situ enables the critic to analyze the rhetoricity of place as one of the cardinal elements of “the
rhetorical situation and consider how speakers utilize their environment… to address various
exigencies, audience, and constraints bound up in that location” (p. 47).
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Studying presidential rhetoric in situ, according to Prasch, also enables critics to
understand the varied ways that place functions rhetorically. This is because, when presidents
situate their rhetorical performances in particular settings, they articulate the rhetoricity of that
place and construct arguments that reinforce symbolic associations and boundaries of that place
Thus, Prasch (2019) argues that “these resonances condition the means of persuasion available to
the President” (p. 48). Another dimension of the rhetoricity of place is that “when U.S.
presidents invoke place as a rhetorical strategy, they demonstrate their innate understating of
U.S. political culture by situating their rhetorical act in a place that offers a powerful means of
enthymematic proof for their argument” (p. 48). For example, in my analysis, I will show how
Presidential discourse at the United Nations may differ from speaking at the White House Rose
Garden. Consequently, in articulating foreign policy that resists international norms, American
presidents employ unique rhetorical strategies to persuade and to advance the interests of the
U.S. As a result, speaking in situ offers presidents the opportunity to make enormous rhetorical
adoptions that intensify and reinforce new meanings to that particular place. Moreover, the
embodied nature of presidential rhetoric in situ, according Prasch, makes that location salient and
memorable to the U.S. public. In other words, when U.S. presidents give speeches in specific
locations, especially given the iconic symbolicity of those places, the places certainly make the
rhetoric more memorable.
The next dimension of the rhetoricity of place intertwines spoken discourse with the
material ramifications of the rhetorical act. This is because presidential speech is ephemeral and
continues to reverberate even after delivery. Thus, presidential speeches extend “beyond the
immediate geographical location and moment in time” because they are circulated through
mediated channels (Prasch, 2019, p. 50). Finally, analyzing presidential speeches in situ enables
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rhetorical critics to establish how rhetors employ language to enact the materiality of rhetorical
situations. Thus, according to Prasch (2016b), using the concept of in situ enables scholars to
consider the situational elements of the historical moment and context for persuasive reasons.
Since the United Nations becomes a scene for rhetorical acts and performances, it affords
presidents the chance to articulate their foreign policy visions in a symbolic and situated
location. Moreover, the United Nations and its agencies are in a “place” to perform specific
rhetorical duties. Consequently, speaking of and about the UN and its agencies carries rhetorical
force that could even change deliberations and operations at the UN and its agencies, such as
when American presidents resist treaties and refuse to sign strategic pacts.
The idea of a rhetorical presidency, according to Medhurst (2008), did not occur until
1981 when James Caesar and his colleagues introduced the concept. To be sure, scholars have
studied the rhetoric of presidents for decades. However, its initial conception, according to
Medhurst, was a construct introduced as a way of postulating and appraising the use of rhetoric
by Presidents in an effort that confines presidential appeals to general audiences and helps
preserve the original Constitutional parameters of the presidency. Since then, many studies and
books have been written about American Presidents. However, Medhurst (2008) argues that
many scholars have misinterpreted what rhetoric means in terms of presidential discourse. He
suggests that rhetoric has been limited to the spoken word and thus ignores other means of
symbolic ideas crafted to persuade specific audiences. Additionally, Medhurst observes that, in
terms of the exercise of presidential rhetoric, rhetorical discourse should not be solely interpreted
to mean it is assigned to mass audiences — because audience size and the composition of the
audience may have no influence regarding rhetoric in practice. In other words, the audience size
and the type of audiences are inconsequential when compared to the substantive content of the
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symbolic act (i.e., substance over form). Furthermore, Medhurst intimates that rhetoric goes
beyond the scope of deliberative address and that the functions of presidential rhetoric are
enormous given its ubiquitous nature. Describing the essence of rhetoric as a cardinal tool in the
hands of presidents, Medhurst concludes:
Rhetoric is best conceived as a natural capacity that all human beings, even presidents
possess. As with other capacities, some people are more blessed than others with that
natural ability, or with specialized rhetorical education, or with multiple opportunities to
practice their persuasive skills. As a natural capacity, rhetoric is neither moral nor
immoral. It is, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, amoral. It is a capacity that can be used
for good or evil, used well or poorly, employed effectively or ineffectively. (Medhurst,
2008, p. 3)
Therefore, Medhurst provides the platform to view how crucial presidential rhetoric is to
governance and to the democratic process. However, Medhurst’s position may not apply to the
contemporary political climate. For instance, in current presidential rhetoric, Trump often makes
grandiose statements on Twitter mostly to persuade his followers. As a result, the contemporary
political climate emphasizes a rhetoric premised on a particular platform, such as Twitter, which
promotes form over substance (Bratslavsky et al., 2019).
Windt’s influential essay in 1986 also describes the rhetorical presidency. As such, any
discussion about the concept of presidential rhetoric is not complete until we examine Windt’s
contribution to this literature. Windt notes that presidential rhetoric occupies a distinct subfield in
rhetorical studies. According to him, “presidential rhetoric is concerned with the study of
presidential public persuasion as it affects the ability of a President to exercise the powers of the
office” (Windt, 1986, p. 103). Therefore, this means that, even though the president has the
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Constitutional mandate to govern, the ability and the skill to persuade is crucial to the success or
failure of presidents. Because presidents must present and define issues to the citizens,
presidential rhetoric studies how presidents’ profit, preserve, or lose public backing (p. 103). For
Windt, inquiries into presidential rhetoric usually fall under four categories: studies of single
speeches, movement studies, genre studies, and miscellaneous research that encompass the
examination and critiquing of how “presidents use rhetoric to exercise power” (p. 106). In his
conclusion, Windt (1986) offers rhetoricians directions for critiquing presidential rhetoric. First,
rhetorical scholars should understand the nature of presidential rhetoric. The presidency is a
unique institution that is different from other political offices. Therefore, how presidents
persuade is a unique – and vital – component to U.S. government. Second, we need to investigate
the nature of presidential ethos. Understanding the nature of the office and the expectations of it
better informs critics on how to examine the personalities and distinct rhetorical styles of the
Executive. Third, rhetoricians should explore the distinctive rhetorical periods during an
administration that offer presidents multiple rhetorical scenes and opportunities.
Moreover, we must pay attention to presidents and their mediated contacts. In addition to
the above, we must be aware of the “rhetorical differences” (Windt, 1986, p. 111) that exist
during campaign periods and governing periods. For Windt, understanding these dynamics
would expose us to the fact that “presidential power rests on persuasion,” but “persuasion in
campaigning is quite different from persuading in governance which will enable us to identify
‘ideological commitments’” (p. 112) during these phases. Finally, Windt presents that we should
understand the “nature of contemporary political language and how the creation of words and
phrases affects our perceptions of issues, politicians” (p. 112), and political discourse.
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Stuckey (2010) claims that another way of looking at the “rhetorical presidency” is to
view the discourse about the institution of the American presidency. To her, scholarship
centering on both the rhetorical presidency and on presidential rhetoric reifies the concepts as
profoundly formal. Furthermore, Stuckey argues that presidential rhetorical scholars are
preoccupied with ascertaining the extent of the rhetorical presidency with an inclination “toward
the requirements, limitations and opportunities provided by the executive as an institution” (p.
39). However, Stuckey notes that “there is widespread agreement that whatever the specific
history of the rhetorical presidency, presidents in the contemporary era are quite willing to go
over the heads of Congress and to attempt to mobilize the public as a routine means of
governance” (p. 40). This willingness is integrated in the institution, and, therefore, people begin
to wonder whether presidential action destructs the constitutional order, perilous for democracy
or simply, a waste of time (Edwards, 2006; Hart, 1987; Jamieson, 1988; Tulis, 1987).
Consequently, presidential speech is, at least potentially, a potent force and a noteworthy
“political resource” that needs to be comprehended and utilized judiciously (Stuckey, 2010).
While the preceding studies on American presidential rhetoric are important, none of
them addresses the relationship between presidential rhetoric and international bodies, such as
the UN. Thus, I focus on American presidents’ disagreements with an international treaty,
particularly one that relates to the United Nations. I will try to uncover, through an ideological
analysis, the variances in ideology and the quest for dominance that exist between the United
States and multinational institutions such as the United Nations and its agency, the International
Criminal Court. The long-standing impasse that exists between agencies of the United Nations
and the U.S., I will argue, is because of what Gramsci (1971) calls “common sense” renderings
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that underline efforts of the United Nations to coalesce all nations under one umbrella,
notwithstanding their individual sovereign power.
U.S. Presidential Rhetoric and International Treaties
Ortega and Stuckey (2019) advance a new research agenda for scholarly endeavors in
presidential rhetoric by criticizing the traditional scholarly incursions in presidential rhetoric.
Studies on presidential rhetoric, hitherto, analyzed persuasive campaigns by focusing on “texts
produced by or on behalf of the president with particular focus on presidential speeches” (p. 65).
Ortega and Stuckey emphasize that solely examining presidential speeches ignores the ways in
which the presidents harness resources preserved for the entire presidential institution. By
focusing on the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, the authors establish that rhetorical
expeditions coordinated by the composition of both institutional and non-institutional actors
available to the presidency proved successful by necessitating public opinion formation,
generating the constitution of the public, and, as a result, inducing congressional action.
Despite the utility of their study, it is conspicuously silent on the rhetoric of the treaty
itself and how the treaty invited American response. Moreover, the study, although investigating
the rhetoric and international treaties, does not address how the United States as the world
superpower resists treaties. Thus, an ideological rhetorical examination through the reading of
presidential resistance, I believe, will offer us a heuristic approach by theorizing about
presidential power, presidential rhetoric, and the rhetorical presidency.
My study is also motivated by this observation from Mary Stuckey (2010). Stuckey’s
2010 essay on presidential rhetoric, published in the Review of Communication, also desperately
urges scholars to interrogate presidential rhetoric more deeply:
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The question is not whether the president can exercise cultural power, but what that
cultural power may mean for presidential power and under what circumstances the
former can be parlayed into the latter. This observation brings me to my final point: the
question of presidential power and how it intersects with presidential rhetoric. The
presidency may have always been rhetorical, but it has certainly not always been as
powerful vis-à-vis other political institutions as it is now. We may debate the question of
whether there is a modern presidency or not, and we may argue over what precise
changes may be inherent in making such distinctions, but we do not do nearly enough
work that analyzes the connections between the exercise of presidential power and the
exercise of presidential rhetoric. (2010, p. 49)
In this direction, my project attempts to shy away from a “purely personal and individual” study
of presidential rhetoric, but rather will embrace the “understanding [of] presidential persuasion
as administrative and institutional” (Stuckey, 2010, p. 65). This new scholarly endeavor enables
a critical reading of the presidency in situ that corresponds with prevailing cultural contexts and
the discursive formations within a particular historical moment. This undertaking has the
potential to provide rhetoricians with deep analytical frameworks and nuanced interpretations of
presidential discourse and actions.
The Rhetoric of the United Nations
Understanding the global role of American Presidents is crucial since the United States is
the most powerful nation on earth. Carney explains that, “because the world is interconnected,
presidents make decisions that affect other parts of the world, for good or ill” (Carney, 2017, p.
16). This is because, although presidential power is invested in the nation-state, American
presidents engage in issues of both national and global character (Carney, 2017). Following
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World War II, and especially during the Cold War, the U.S. contributed greatly in forming
universal standards to change the destiny of the world. Thus, there was the need for cooperation,
and a powerful country like the U.S. was to lead such efforts.
Mingst, Karen, and Lyon (2017) note that “the establishment of the United Nations in the
closing days of World War II was an affirmation of the desire of war-weary nations for an
organization that could help them avoid future conflicts and promote international development”
(p. 2). This becomes crucial because, as Lyon (2016) explains, the urgent quest to understand the
ways and means humans cooperate is a very “essential puzzle of our time” (Lyon, 2016, p. xi).
Accordingly, in the 2016 book, US Politics and the United Nations, Lyon remarks that, after
World War II, the “United States helped create the United Nations to promote cooperation and
address threats to international peace and security” (p. xi). Additionally, the attainment of
international peace and security requires the “ability of the United States, as a leading global
power, to work with other nations,” making the “U.S.-UN relationship an essential aspect of
global governance” (p. xi).
Mingst et al. (2017) describe how the United Nations has performed a central role in
shaping the world for more than seventy years. Formed after World War II, the United Nations
apparatus was built on the failures of the League of Nations, which was created at the end of
World War I. The League of Nations experimented with international unions, diplomacy
meetings, and dispute settlement apparatuses. Hence, its failure to prevent World War II was
enough justification for the cessation of the League of Nations and, in its stead, the formation of
the United Nations by the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941 in a “joint declaration by U.S.
President Franklin Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill calling for
collaboration on economic issues and a permanent system of security” (p. 24).

34

While the United Nations was officially formed on 25 April 1945 by fifty nations, it is
the United States that, upon approval of the Senate, ratified the Charter to become the very first
member of the United Nations on July 28. Consequently, other countries followed the lead of the
U.S. to ratify the Charter. As Mingst et al. (2017) maintain, it took only three months after the
United States acceptance and ratification of the Charter for the UN to officially become an
international organization. This demonstrates how influential the United States efforts were to
forming this international body. In fact, some scholars acknowledge the instrumental role of U.S.
presidents in forming the United Nations. For instance, the United Nations was established when
President Roosevelt was in power. The UN headquarters is located in New York, and its
presence on American soil alone is enough testament to the importance of this institution to the
U.S. In fact, the U.S. Constitution also grants authority to presidents to make foreign policy
decisions and to negotiate treaties on behalf of the country (Barnes, 2015; Carney, 2017).
Accordingly, the United Nations represents an essential channel for U.S. presidents to advance
the foreign policy objectives of the country. Obviously, since the UN is a decisive foreign policy
venue, this means the U.S. President must also engage rhetorically and substantively with the
international body.
As an international organization, the UN has a structure that encompasses the General
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, the
International Court of Justice, and the Trusteeship Council. However, the UN General Assembly
(UNGA) is distinctive as it is the powerful component on top of the hierarchy and “the general
debate arena where all members would equally be represented” (Mingst et al. 2017, p. 27). While
the General Assembly has many functions derived from the Charter, chapter 13 mandates it to
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develop international law and also to enact multilateral treaties. Carney (2017) summarizes the
role of the United Nations members as follows:
The United Nations seeks to attain “universal” peace and to achieve “fundamental
freedoms for all.” Of course, the member states of the United Nations are the arbiters of
what constitutes “universal peace” and “fundamental freedoms” despite their aspirations
that these purposes be for all of humanity. The UN Charter both acknowledges and calls
forth a global consciousness, setting into action guidelines for participation on the global
scale. (p. 77)
Given the influential role that the various organs of the UN play in world affairs, scholars have
identified the UN as a rhetorical institution (Barnes, 2015). Other scholars of the rhetoric of
inquiry, such as Markovits (2004), read other international organizations such as the World Bank
rhetorically. However, for this thesis, I shall turn my attention to the rhetoric of the United
Nations. According to Barnes (2015), “The United Nations ... is distinctly rhetorical and often is
either defended or attacked as the world’s greatest debating society” (p. 72). Barnes further
asserts that “the institution [UN] could not have been created, would not function and could not
tackle global issues without rhetoric” (p. 72). Consequently, the United Nations constitutes a
rhetorical agency whereby “presidents through public address can assert themselves as global
leaders interested in crafting international policies that are responsive to global issues and
audiences” (p. 72). As a rhetorical institution, the United Nations operates through a constitutive
rhetorical force that concretizes all countries in its ideology hence, enabling it to orchestrate
treaties and draft resolutions “that constitute international law, established external international
organizations,” such as the International Criminal Court among many others (Charland, 1989, p.
72).
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Barnes (2015) agrees with Thomas Farrell’s (1995) conception of rhetorical culture.
According to Farrell, a rhetorical culture exists when “a symbolic environment is created within
which issues, interests, positions, constituencies and messages are advanced, shaped and
personally judged” (p. 282). The United Nations constitutes an operation through its various
organs, which establish
vestiges of power become sites for rhetorical analysis because each engages in the
sharing and creation of symbols through communicated messages to complete their work.
The formation of international law is not possible without a text being proffered,
interpreted, and deliberated upon – both within the diplomatic corps of individual nations
and amongst all nations in the General Assembly – and without the Secretary General
making recommended changes. At each level and throughout an evolving context,
nations attempt to persuade each other to support particular agendas and issues. And the
individual civil servants 74 are often judged competent by their ability to secure passage
of – or stymie when interests conflict -- particular initiatives as they arise on the agenda
of the General Assembly or Security Council. (Barnes, 2015, pp. 73-74)
Consequently, the United Nations is a perfect example of a rhetorical institution. In the first
place, Barnes identifies the presence of a forum as an essential character of a rhetorical
institution. This is because the General Assembly and the Security Council function as fora for
“constituting international political response … and the invention of international law” (p. 74).
Barnes argues that the United Nations produces and circulates rhetorical artifacts such as
“speeches, published opinions, images” (p. 74) that are essential to its purpose. These rhetorical
texts, produced in the “rhetorical forum provide[s] a provisionally constrained context and an
avenue of mediation among discourses that might be self-confirming” (Farrell, 1995, p. 282).
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Therefore, the “United Nations as rhetorical institution then provides new explanatory ground for
the levers of international politics while preserving a central role for the critic” (Barnes, 2015, p.
75).
As a second justification, the United Nations functions as a rhetorical institution because,
as Farrell describes, “A forum helps to stabilize rhetorical practice. By allowing topics to be
classified as open for discussion and by encouraging advocates and their constituencies to exert
some public influence, rhetorical forums lend a weight to rhetorical occasions” (Farrell, 1995, p.
284). From this perspective, Stuckey’s (2015) idea of “routinized rhetoric” (p. 45) becomes
central to our discussion. Stuckey (2015, p. 45) claims that “presidents have a wide range of
predictable opportunities like the State of the Union Address and the annual speech at the United
Nations General Assembly” (p. 45). Presidents do not want to miss such rhetorical and kairotic
openings since the incentive for success at such historical moments is enduring. Because the
president only addresses the General Assembly once every year, from the time of President
Reagan’s tenure, the United Nations becomes a rhetorical opportunity for presidents. Because
presidents address the UN and also articulate matters of urgency, the president responds to
kairotic moments that help define decision making at UNGA. Kairos, means a “unique” moment
and therefore, expresses “that what is said must be said at the right time” (Poulakos, 1983, pp.
40-41).
Because much importance is given to a presidential speech (or rhetoric from the
American executive branch), speeches on the floor of the General Assembly are instruments that
could serve as hubs for facilitating diplomacy. Here, it is noteworthy how persuasive presidential
discourse that represents the president’s office satisfies my description of presidential rhetoric.
While strong arguments could produce positive political results, weak reasoning could result in
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political backlash on the floor of this important stage. For example, Zarefsky (2007) comments
how Colin Powell’s delivery on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was clearly a failure
(Zarefsky, 2007) when he addressed the UN on the subject. In this direction, presidential rhetoric
is not only limited to discourse articulated by the president alone. Presidential rhetoric involves
the discourses produced key individuals in a presidential administration as well as discourses
expressed and articulated in an administration’s reports, national strategy documents, and so on.
This also lends credence to political analysis since “strong arguments are likely to produce
positive political results while weak reasoning can contribute to international backlash” (Barnes,
2015, p. 74).
The third feature of the UN as a rhetorical institution is “the degree to which institutional
doctrine can be leveraged to justify specific courses of action or the reconstitution of the
institution. That is, the institution itself provides inventional grounds for argument to the rhetor”
(Barnes, p. 76). Since the president acts as the spokesperson of the nation, the Constitution’s
mandate to the president to define foreign policy issues (Zarefsky, 2004) help “presidents play
their role as the symbolic as the well as the real head of state” (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p.
5). Since the UN’s Charter “permits varying levels of discretionary power in rhetorical action
and provides varying degrees of rhetorical effect” (Campbell & Jamieson, 2008, p. 5), the United
Nations Charter is habitually invoked to “justify policy and ground international law” (Barnes,
2015, p. 77).
As a rhetorical institution, the United Nations is also defined by the presence of a
rhetorical community. Barnes argues that without a community, there would be no business that
would necessitate the creation of rhetorical artifacts. Since “people participate in rhetorical
visions” (Bormann, 1982, p. 53), they function in a “rhetorical community” (Barnes, 2015, p.
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77). To this end, “the operation of interpretive communities then works to bolster the case for the
United Nations as rhetorical institution because the United Nations in this context functions as a
meta-interpretive community – it is the location where overlapping interpretive communities
convene to engage in deliberative politics” (Barnes, 2015, p. 78). Consequently, these
communities share and express meaning with each other and, as such, the UN is a vital location
for such meanings to be generated.
The last character of a rhetorical institution that Barnes identifies is that of power within
the United Nations. Since the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly are sites
of power, they can sanction member states and engaging in various important work for the
collective good of member countries. Barnes concludes:
On the question of power, realists contend that it is not rhetoric that moves nations to
action, but power. Here, the realist argues the large state powers constituting the Security
Council only use the UN to achieve their interests. …the U.N. remains a location from
which the great powers seek to increase their leadership to achieve their interests, even in
the realist framework, a consequence is that rhetoric matters. Rhetoric is necessary to
chart a path for leadership, it is necessary to articulate policies designed to achieve one’s
interest, and it is necessary to simultaneously defend those policies and encourage others
to join the actor in support of those policies. (Barnes, p. 80)
Thus, like Windt (1986), Barnes emphasizes the importance of rhetoric as a key tool for the
success of presidents and their contacts with domestic, diplomatic, as well as foreign audiences
and institutions.
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Presidential and Political Rhetorical Examinations at the United Nations
Some scholars have examined U.S. presidential rhetoric as it relates to the United
Nations. Barnes (2015) suggests that “presidential public address at the United Nations provide a
richer theoretical underpinning for accounts of globalization and its impact on the modern
presidency” (para. 1). Barnes’ analysis hazards three particular problems he perceives in some
other domain: conceptualizing increasingly pluralized audiences, the matter of ascertaining how
non-American institutions (like the United Nations) shape and are shaped by “American
rhetorical productions, and the difficulties in gauging presidential rhetorical efficacy” (Barnes,
2015, para. 1). By focusing his analysis on the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, George H.W.
Bush and Bill Clinton, Barnes (2015) argues that presidential rhetoric at the UN operates in a
specific sphere of cosmopolitanism that helps presidents to “constitute a universal audience
nonetheless ideologically sympathetic to American goals” (para. 1). Barnes (2015) explains that
United States presidents use the General Assembly to interpellate a “global audience supportive
of a cosmopolitan agenda which in turn is pre-structured to support the interests of the United
States” (para. 1). By interpellation, U.S. presidents use the UNGA to concretize the identities of
less powerful countries and position them as subjects. The strong influence of the U.S. in global
affairs, therefore, allows it to shape deliberations and influence how international organizations
might concede to ideologies and structural changes that impact these institutions.
In an effort to understand globalization and the rhetoric of international institutions,
Carney (2007) engages the concepts of globalization and universalization with respect to how
U.S. presidents define the U.S. as a global superpower. According to Carney (2017), U.S.
presidents use the “UN to inform the global imaginary through a universalization of the trope
‘democracy’” (pp. 77-78). Carney elucidates how “Presidents Clinton and Bush universalized the
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trope of ‘democracy’ through the symbolic work of their speech setting at the UN—which is
most often before the UNGA” (p. 78). The two presidents, according to Carney, universalized a
“particularly American understanding of these terms that benefits the U.S. and its allies” (p. 31).
Carney further presents that the
setting and the speeches themselves construct a global imaginary in which the U.S. is a
participant, leader, and arbitrator of what it means to be ‘democratic’ and works with
other nations; all the while, the frequent disregard of the UN’s recommendations by U.S.
presidents shows the instrumentalism of their participation. (p. 79)
First of all, it is crucial to underscore that the role of the United States in the formation of the
League of Nations as well the United Nations cannot be underestimated. United States
presidents, as previously discussed, have been at the forefront of mobilizing U.S. citizens and
other countries to support a common course. For example, Carney claims that “Woodrow Wilson
delivered the last speech of his Western Tour, in which he traveled the U.S. to persuade the
people to support the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations” (p. 81). As Carney
documents, like Woodrow Wilson, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and their
predecessors all worked toward the stability of the United Nations.
The Two Global Hegemons
While a hegemon lies at the core of where power resides in a culture (Germino, 1990),
Gramsci uses the word “hegemony” for both the negatively connoted, power-hungry hegemony
in the status quo and the budding cultural transformation emanating from the subaltern. In this
way, Gramsci articulates how there is a central, monolithic hegemony, but that hegemony is
constantly being challenged and resisted by other socio-cultural forces that, if successful, may
become a new hegemony in their own right. Additionally, in International Relations theory,
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many scholars (e.g., Gill, 1993) argue there is a singular hegemony in the post-Cold War period
(the U.S.), but during the Cold War there were rival hegemonies (i.e., rival superpowers).
According to Gill (1993), there are also regional hegemonies – hegemons that do not rise to the
level of a global superpower or global hegemon, but they do have enormous power vis-à-vis their
neighbors on a regional scale. When thinking about hegemony and hegemons in this way, we can
articulate both the U.S. and the UN as rival hegemons, or at the very least, the UN could be a
challenging power that has the potential to obtain a hegemonic status.
From this perspective, the United Nations and the United States are global hegemons that
interpellate people and allies by constituting their identities through and by ideology. Thus, the
United States, even though it played a key role in the formation of the United Nations, has
frequently been at loggerheads with this international organization, especially since the 1960s.
Mingst et al. (2017) note that, since the foundation of the UN, no state has been more aggressive
in criticizing the UN than the United States. These scholars maintain that the United States has
long conveyed “mixed messages” (p. 73) regarding its support for the UN. Hence, Howard
(2010) remarks that “relations between the United States and the UN have oscillated between
periods of friendship and friction” (p. 485). Mingst et al. (2017) posit that, from the “1960s to
mid-1980s, however, the United States were much more ambivalent about international
institutions in general and about parts of the UN system in particular” (p. 74). The United States
began to withdraw from major international treaties. This include the ILO in 1978 and UNESCO
in 1994. However, the U.S. made a U-turn in 1980 and 2003 to rejoin the ILO and UNESCO
respectively (Mingst et al., 2017).
However, relations between these two global hegemons continue to be precarious. Mingst
et al. (2017) present polarized domestic politics between the Democratic and Republican fronts
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in the United States as one of the factors for this impasse. Mingst et al. posit that “opposition to
the UN and to US participation … has long being a core point for American conservatives” who
believe that the “US should mind its own business internationally” (2017, p. 76). This has also
led to the United States vetoing key decisions of the UN, especially since the 1970s (Mingst et
al, 2017). It is also noteworthy that the United States did not exercise its veto powers until the
1970s, a situation Mingst et al. describe as “reflecting its early dominance” (p. 37). They further
argue that since the 1970s the United States utilized its veto more than any other permanent
member, “most frequently on resolutions relating to the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
defense of Israel” (p. 37). Recently, for example, the United States has withdrawn from very
significant treaties. This includes the Paris Accord (U.S. Department of State, 2019) and the
Human Rights Council (Allen & Edwards, 2018). Since the establishment of the International
Criminal Court in 2002, the United States has still yet to ratify the treaty.
This suggests that the Unites States and the UN are in a battle for supremacy. Resistance
on the part of a single nation state to a global body such as the United Nations gestures to a
rhetorical crisis that invites critique. While rhetorical scholars have produced important work on
the US and its foreign policy rhetoric -- including the Cold War and foreign policy after 9/11,
among many others -- no study has investigated the rhetoric of resistance between the United
Nations and the United States. The UN has influenced its 193 member countries since 1945.
Accordingly, it has been instrumental in the past in terms of reducing poverty, malnutrition,
maintaining (peacekeeping missions), and environmental protections. (United Nations’ website).
As such, its global reach impacts virtually every aspect of global stability and quality of life. As
a rhetorical scholar interested in the rhetoric of power in resistance, I see the tension between the
U.S. and the UN as a tussle between two competing ideologies. As a result, through its
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presidents, the U.S. serves to resist the common sense of the UN, most especially treaties that the
U.S. sees as not advancing its interests and would not advance and honor its principle of
exceptionality.
Therefore, I take the charge to explore the United States opposition to the International
Criminal Court. Because it is a body that investigates war crimes of its member countries, it
remains a key rhetorical institution that invites discourse.
As Barnes (2015) argues, the “influence of realism on American presidents” as well as
the subject of selecting advisors and experts for “influential positions regarding foreign policy,
make it likely that those presidencies will consider the institution of the United Nations to have
little significance relative to U.S. interests” (p. 47). Because of this, Barnes (2015) postulates that
when the United Nations passes a resolution that is not in the interest of the United States, “a
contrary decision now might be misinterpreted as a lack of confidence in the UN … or in the
possibility of peaceful resolution of present problems” (Barnes, p. 91). Hence, the U.S. is likely
to resist any decision or resolution passed by the United National that it feels violates its interest.
In this direction, Johnson (2010) argues that the United States withdrawal from
UNESCO, a key agency of the UN, meant that the future of the UN — a global body — was in
jeopardy. Because of that, UNESCO had to build an argumentative infrastructure to woo
American participation back into UNESCO. As I will show in my thesis, the United States is
another global hegemon that operates under the concept of American exceptionalism especially
in relation to foreign policy and public diplomacy. Carney (2017) maintains that since the UN
was formed, “U.S. presidents have continued to spend time and energy shaping messages to the
UN. They have exerted influence over and through the United Nations since its creation, which
is evidenced by the centrality of presidential messages in the agenda of the UN” (p. 83). In
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addition, Carney (2017) claims that “each institution — the U.S. presidency and the UN—
garners global authority from the other, with U.S. presidents at the forefront of some of the UN’s
most effective resolutions and activities, for good or for ill” (Carney, 2017, p. 83). It could,
therefore, be inferred that the historic contribution of U.S. presidents in the formation of the UN
ascribes a moral authority on them to shape the structural functions of this global body.
Rhetoric of the International Criminal Court
In the prospect of an International Criminal Court lies the promise of universal justice.
That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realization. We will
do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you … to do yours in our struggle to
ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights
with impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they,
too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who
violate those rights will be punished. (Annan, 1997, p. 366)
The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute on July 17, 1998, when
120 states adopted it. According to the official website of the ICC, the ICC “investigates and,
where warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international
community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression” (The
International Criminal Court, n.d., para. 1). The ICC has been created as an independent body of
the United Nations. Driscoll, Zompetti, and Zompetti (2004) charge that despite the “kind of
consensus that underpinned the creation of the ICC … the court has been controversial” (p. 14).
From the beginning, the United States resisted the International Criminal Court. Driscoll et al.
(2004) note how the head of the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference explained his “no” vote
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to the senate committee on foreign relations immediately after the July 1998 conference as
resting primarily on protecting American sovereignty.
In fact, Amman and Sellers (2002) report that “the United States has not ratified the
treaty establishing a permanent criminal court, and it is highly unlikely to do so” (p. 381).
Although President Clinton signed the Statute on the last day permissible by the agreement, his
signature was necessary to allow American participation in the conversations about the direction
and operations of the treaty; the only way to have a voice in shaping the substance of the treaty
was to sign the Rome Statue, which served as a precursor and preparation document for the final
crafting of the actual treaty (Amman & Sellers, 2002). Thus, by signing, a state could participate
in deliberations regarding matters relating to the International Criminal Court (Amman &
Sellers, 2002; Myers, 2001). President Clinton, on the day he signed the Statute, hinted that he
did so in order for the United States to engage in further discussions concerning the world
judicial body. Clinton claimed, “I will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the
treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied”
(Clinton, 2000, para. 6). President Clinton ushered in a historical moment that would define his
predecessors’ foreign policy options, especially as related to the United Nations, its agencies, and
treaties. President Clinton’s discourse, as well as subsequent presidential rhetoric and resistance
to the United Nations, offers us a significant rhetorical act that must be critiqued, deconstructed
and analyzed. This is because, as an agency of the United Nations and as a rhetorical institution,
the International Criminal Court’s constitutive rhetorical force is obvious.
Foreign policy vocabulary has also been shaped by propaganda. Parry-Giles (2002)
argues that “propaganda production and psychological strategy represented key instruments...in
Cold War operations” (p. xvii) that spanned the administrations of both Presidents Harry Truman
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and Dwight Eisenhower. The invocation “war of words” that represented a rhetorical tactic for
the two presidents was a crucial propaganda aspect of foreign policy decisions. The
dissemination of Cold War propaganda messages, according to Parry-Giles, propelled the Cold
War into an ideological limelight. One strategy was the presidential “bully pulpit,” or “public
platform” (p. xvii), whereby the president, instead of going to Congress, “sidesteps the institution
and engages in public discourse for support. The other strategy was covert means of
communication” (p. xx) through mass communication channels to fight the cold war. As a result,
the “peacetime propaganda program” (p. 6) led to militarization, eventually snowballing into the
institutionalizing of a top-secret CIA-sponsored propaganda strategy noticed throughout
Truman’s presidency.
However, Edwards (2006, 2008) argues that Clinton changed the foreign policy
vocabulary when he became president after the Cold War. President Clinton followed his
predecessors by affirming and reordering America’s foreign missions and assignments. Since
President Clinton became president at a time of intense globalization, Cold War principles were
unable to guide and shape American foreign policy. According to Edwards, President Clinton’s
description of globalization as the “central reality of our time” formulated “a world where all
humans are clearly fated to live,” and therefore globalization posited a challenge to “America’s
foreign policy station” (Edwards, 2008, p. 34).
Edwards (2006, 2008) also adduces that President Clinton was preoccupied with
managing the changes that globalization produced by rejuvenating America’s domestic order and
by strengthening America’s role as the world superpower. Thus, Clinton expressed his mission in
three distinct but mutually reinforcing ways. The first was that, for Clinton, the U.S. needed to
revolutionize its thinking about domestic and foreign policy matters. Second, Clinton ossified the

48

notion of America as exemplar by pressing Americans to embrace economic reforms and the
renewal of the American community. By so doing, Americans could create a perfect nation, to
serve as an example to other countries. Third, by affirming American exemplarity, and
strengthening America’s position as the world superpower, Clinton’s three strategies “provided
rhetorical support for continuing America’s role as global leader” while harnessing the imprints
of “globalization so it could build a better future” (p. 35).
Edwards (2018) also remarks that Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric is crafted in a narrative
inconsistent with the “post-World War II consensus of maintaining and extending U.S.
globalism” (p. 176). Edwards argues that President Trump’s foreign policy vision before the
2016 election focuses on four cardinal areas. The first is Trump’s quest to reject globalism, while
instead promoting Americanism. In this vein, Edwards claims that Trump reproached expresidents and especially his main contender, Hillary Clinton, on their multilateralism as one of
the main setbacks for American economic, social, and political progress. Citing statements that
Trump made in his interview on foreign policy decisions, Edwards highlights Trump’s vicious
rhetoric. According to Trump, “After the Cold War, our foreign policy veered badly off course.
We failed to develop a new vision for a new time. … our foreign policy began to make less and
less sense. Logic was replaced with foolishness and arrogance, which led to one foreign policy
disaster after another” (Trump, 2016, n.p). He even repudiated the Clinton’s administration’s
globalist logic as inimical to the genuine interests of the United States. On this point, Edwards
argues that Trump’s foreign policy vision was similar to that of John Quincy Adams, who
championed the exemplarist worldview.
The second aspect of Trump’s foreign policy vision, according to Edwards (2018), is to
revise U.S. Trade policy. According to this objective, Trump would oversee the massive

49

revocation of numerous trade deals with countries such as France and pulling the U.S. out of
strategic pacts signed under erstwhile governments. One of Trump’s signature actions regarding
trade policy was his withdrawal from NAFTA, which no doubt was motivated by his disdain
toward the Clintons. Additionally, Edwards surmises that Trump “pledged to renegotiate
NAFTA, pull the United States out of the TPP negotiations, and threatened massive tariffs
against China and other countries if they did not reform their trade policies” (p. 184) and pledged
to revive American exceptionalism steeped in protectionist policies akin to those of Presidents
Lincoln and Washington.
The third area Trump emphasizes, according to Edwards (2018), is to control U.S.
borders. Edwards argues that Trump uses metaphors to emphasize how the U.S. immigration
system allows the influx of immigrants who, in turn, cause mayhem. Trump described Mexican
immigrants as criminals and other potential perpetrators of heinous crimes. Donald Trump also
chided Hillary Clinton and derided her stance on Syrian refugees. Edwards explains that Trump
proposed to secure the borders from an invasion in order to pursue an “America first” ideology.
Although this move was controversial, Trump viewed strict border policies as a vital step to
making America great again.
The final area that forms the basis of Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric is the notion that
American foreign missions are the cause of chaos (Edwards, 2018). Trump argued, according to
Edwards, that “U.S. policy about when and where it committed military forces was incoherent at
best and chaotic at worse” (p. 187). Thus, Edwards claims that the consequences for Trump’s
vicious rhetoric is that it undermines U.S. fundamental foreign policy visions of the past 75
years. To Edwards, America’s attempt to persuade other countries to adopt democracy, in
Trump’s logic, deprives the United States of its exceptionality. Hence, it is only an America first
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policy that will help restore the United States as the world’s superpower. Thus, Edwards avers
that Trump’s stance could weaken America’s support for international actions, which further
portends grave consequences for the United States as a world superpower. Hence, Edwards’
(2018) analysis shows that Trump’s foreign policy discourse involves divisive and extremist
rhetoric that has the tendency to cause irreparable damage to the United States. For instance,
Trump’s order to the military to kill Iran’s Top General, Qassem Soleimani was condemned by
the Democrats. Trump’s emphasis on unilateral action, however, is not unique to his presidency.
Conclusion
In this thesis, I invoke the American presidency as a global position, the functions,
actions, and responsibilities of which transcend ceremonial and rhetorical closures to actual
material significance in a global New World Order. The review of literature established that
there is much rhetorical examination of U.S. presidential discourse and presidential rhetoric.
Further, rhetorical examination of foreign policy endeavors has also received significant
attention, particularly with respect to Cold War discourse. The review of literature also suggests
that less scholarly work has occurred regarding the rhetoric of treaties, except for Stuckey and
Ortega (2019).
But for Barnes (2015) and Carney (2017), there is less scholarly attention to the rhetoric
of international organizations. The materiality of discourse has been explored but with limited
applications to the role of discourse regarding U.S. foreign policy as it relates to UN treaties.
From previous scholarly work, we know that the UN is an important rhetorically constitutive
body, American presidential discourse frames U.S. foreign policy objectives, and the ICC is a
vital treaty worth examining. Since the current literature does not connect these contentions and
does not explain the ideological and rhetorical tension between the U.S. and the UN, a rhetorical
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examination with respect to a specific United Nations treaty becomes crucial. As we will see,
Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power and the rhetoric of foreign policy, as well diplomatic
endeavors, becomes pivotal if we are to interrogate ideologies inherent in international treaties
and presidential rhetoric concerning world politics.
Therefore, an examination of U.S. resistance rhetoric to UN treaties not only becomes
significant but is crucial to the world in terms of diplomatic and international relations efforts
and the exercise of American exceptionalism. A recognition of the common sense of
multilateralism becomes an essential component if we are to understand the impact of rhetoric on
international negotiations. By using a neo-Marxist lens and analyzing a key foreign policy accord
that span the presidencies of Presidents Clinton, George Bush, Obama, and Trump, I aim to
locate how the United States has offered conflicting foreign policy visions, particularly with
respect to resistance to international treaties. I also seek to examine the discursive frames and
argumentative structures that provide the United States the leverage to influence global decisions
within its foreign policy objectives. Thus, a Gramscian analysis of American foreign policy
discourse is significant if we are to understand how foreign policies are ideologically framed and
how resistance rhetoric helps us to envision desirable futures for the world.
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CHAPTER III: METHOD
In the previous chapter, I discussed America’s foreign policy rhetoric and presidential
rhetoric. I also underscored that the United Nations is a rhetorical institution that constitutes all
countries of the world as ideological subjects. Concurrently, the literature review also discussed
the rhetoric of the UN treaties, especially the Rome Statute that established the International
Criminal Court. The constitutive nature of the UN and its status as a rhetorical institution ushers
in a battlefield of ideologies — specifically, how the U.S. opposes and flouts treaties of the
United Nations, which synecdochally represents the various ideologies around the world. I also
advanced that the UN and the U.S. are both global hegemonies and therefore, resist each other in
many ways. In this direction, I will lay the basis for an ideological critique through a neo-Marxist
ideological deconstruction of the United States’ resistance to UN treaties. In doing this, I first
explore the basic tenets of ideology -- Marxism and Neo-Marxism and advance how Gramsci’s
ideas will help in analyzing the rhetoric of resistance in terms of the hegemonic struggle between
the United States and the UN. I also draw a link between rhetoric and ideology and establish the
basis for an ideological rhetorical interrogation. Finally, I introduce the key texts and the practice
of close textual analysis and close reading as the approaches to deconstructing the U.S. resistance
to the rhetoric of UN treaties.
Ideology
Ideology is, perhaps, the most dominant concept in every social, political, economic, and
historical discourse. Due to this unique conception, Lichtheim (1965) surmises that the concept
of ideology has been misconstrued by those who use it. This is partly due to its amorphous nature
— ideology has no univocal definition. Sartori (1969) characterizes ideology as a “typically
dogmatic, i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics" (p. 402). Foss (1996) sees ideology

53

as “systems of representations that a group deploys to make sense of and define the world or
some aspect of it” (p. 294). Eagleton (1991) tells us that the difficulty in defining ideology “is
not because workers in the field are remarkable for their low intelligence but because the term,
‘ideology’ has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with each
other” (p. 1). Eagleton further clarifies that ideology “is a text, woven of a whole tissue of
different conceptual strands, traced through by divergent histories” (p.1). Following this,
Eagleton summarizes existing definitions of ideology. Ideology, then to Eagleton (1991), is the
process of production of meanings, signs, and values in social life; a body of ideas
characteristic of a particular social group or class; ideas which help to legitimate a
dominant political power; systematically distorted communication; that which offers a
position for a subject; forms of thought motivated by social interests; identity thinking;
socially necessary illusion; the conjuncture of discourse and power; the medium in which
conscious actors make sense of their world; action-oriented sets of beliefs; the confusion
of linguistic and phenomenal reality; semiotic closure; the indispensable medium in
which individuals live out their relations to a social structure; the process whereby social
life is converted to a natural reality. (pp. 1-2)
Eagleton’s burden of harnessing the various views concerning ideology articulates how the
conjuncture of discourse and power operates through a medium that causes how rhetors see the
world. This also expresses how individuals, institutions, and states fashion their existence in this
universe. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, I will utilize Eagleton’s (1991) definition above.
Despite these renderings of ideology, appreciating the origins of the concepts of ideology
can help clarify some of the inconsistencies and ambiguities in its definition. Many scholars
concede that the term, “ideology” was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 (Beyer et al., 1988;
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Drucker, 1972; Gerring, 1997; Kang, 2018; Kennedy, 1979; Knight, 2006; Lewins, 1989;
Lictheim, 1965; Roucek, 1944; Schmid, 1981; Staude, 1969; Weis & Miller, 1987). Ideology, to
these scholars, is the science of ideas based on Desttut’s historical conceptual thought. As
Hawkes (1996) elucidates, “The new discipline of ideology” accordingly, claim to be nothing
less than the science to explain all sciences “in order to “study relations between ideas, as well as
to identify their origins” (p. 61). However, Napoleon Bonaparte saw the study of ideology as a
threat; therefore, he perceived that “‘idéologie’ involved a thoroughgoing skepticism towards all
authoritative knowledge which must issue continuous chaos and ‘lead to the rule of bloodthirsty
men’” (as cited in Hawkes, 1996, p. 61). Napoleon, therefore, “foresaw a permanent revolution”
if the ideologues (Desttut and members of his institute) “pursue their millennial aims” in order to
prevent how his ideas were “continually unmasked, invalidated, and replaced by new ones.” As a
result, he called them “dreamers” and “windbags” (Hawkes, 1996, p. 61). Hence, an ideological
examination of the rhetoric of power in resistance is crucial to rhetorical scholarship too
(especially the analysis of the struggle between the U.S. and the UN), since, according to
McKerrow (1989), such examination helps us to “demystify” discourses of power and
domination. There is also the need to understand the nature of ideology through the lens of Marx
and his readers (Althusser and Lukács) and the neo-Marxist, Antonio Gramsci.
Althusser’s (1971) definition of ideology stems from his reading of Marx. He defined
ideology as “the ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real
conditions of existence” (p 162). From his theorization of ideology, two theses emerge. The first,
according to Althusser, is the “illusory affiliation of individuals to their vision of a material real
conditions of existence” (p. 162). That is, our view of the world has no relation to a reality, but
rather is based on illusions. Althusser’s second thesis of ideology is that “ideology has material
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existence” (p. 165). According to Althusser, the material conception and existence of ideology
constitute an apparatus because ideology equals “an imaginary relation to real relations” (p. 167).
In this vein, ideology emerges from actions that are governed by rituals within the material
existence of ideological state apparatuses. Here, Althusser opines that the world is organized
such that we are premeditated to respond to iron-clad formations and bureaucratic practices or
red-tape measures that reify a system of ideas.
Thus, the United Nation’s system represents an ideological state apparatus that governs
within a set of ideas since countries come to endorse and abide by the dictates of the UN through
its agencies such as the International Criminal Court. Althusser differentiates between
ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) and repressive state apparatus (RSA). Ideological state
apparatuses, according to Althusser (1971), operate by engineering consent among individuals
and group of people. Repressive state apparatuses operate through threats of force and potent
articulation of power. An RSA represents typical authoritarian regimes, who maintain power
through repression, coercion, and blunt power. To Althusser, those governments are easy to
recognize and do not require much investigation in order to understand that their citizens comply
through fear. ISAs, on the other hand, are more difficult to understand because regimes that use
them maintain control and power through the legitimacy and consent given by their citizens,
much like Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which I will discuss later. This occurs by the ideology
that the government proffers that persuade the populace of the system’s apparatus. As an
example, the UN can be considered an ISA since its ideology of serving the world’s interests
becomes accepted and endorsed by its member nations.
Althusser formulates that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects. According to
Althusser (1971), “The category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all
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ideology has the function (which defines I) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects” (p.
168). What this means, according to Charland (1987), is that discourse permits us to recognize
the salient effect of rhetoric in the “production of ideology” (p. 133). In other words, ideology
operates through systems and rhetoric that constructs our conceptions of reality and thus
constitute our subjectivity or identity. Also, this means that, although there is a concrete reality,
rhetoric provides the meaning to that reality and describes the relationship between the subject
and ideology as they relate to that notion of reality. Consequently, Charland primes us to
understand that ideological and identity-forming rhetoric are caged in contradiction since
rhetoric requires a “subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an identity and within an
ideology” (p. 134). Hence, we can appreciate how the UN interpellates nations as subjects
through an ideology that seeks to maintain world peace, eliminate extreme hunger, and make the
world a better place.
Similarly, contrasting rhetoric to the globalist ideology of the UN might be constituted by
ideologies of national sovereignty (e.g., “America first”), national exceptionalism, or arrogated
national interests. Althusser continued that ideology operates in such a way that it “recruits
subjects among the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise
operation...called interpellation or hailing” (Althusser, 1971, p. 174). As I will show in the
analysis, the constitutive function of the United Nations and its agencies imprint a certain
derived authority over member countries in such a way that, despite member states’ sovereign
powers, they are obliged to curtsy to the dictates of the UN and its various treaties and
resolutions. Thus, by assenting to those treaties, member states are continually tied to
conscientiously adhere to the details of these treaties and resolutions without exception;
otherwise, their constituted identity as “UN-member nations” becomes jeopardized. According to
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Kang (2018), Althusser’s work constitutes a pivotal moment in the problem of ideology by
intellectualizing ideology as a comprehensive element of society. Thus, ideology is not a naïve
error, false consciousness or deception, but rather a system of depictions and representations of
images, myths, ideas, or concepts (Kang, 2018).
Marx was an economic determinist and structuralist. According to Stoddart (2007), the
notion of ideology emerged in the work of Marx and Engels (1989). Thus, ideology refers to how
society as a whole adopts ideas by acceding to the interests of the dominant economic class. For
Stoddart (2007), Marx’s conception of ideology is premised on a “historical-materialist
perspective, which asserts that material reality is the foundation of social consciousness” (p.
195). Here, substantial certainty about these ideas sets boundaries on the beliefs that may arise as
desirable in a particular historical moment. According to Marx, the base, or the economic
structure, is supported through the superstructure, which is comprised of various social and
cultural organizations and relations that reinforce the base in society, such as media, schools,
rituals, etc. Although Marx’s critique of capitalist society lays an important foundation for our
understanding of how power operates in our current neo-liberal and globalized climate, his
theories are still predicated on a structuralist and economically determinist notion of social
relations. One political theorist who challenged these premises was Antonio Gramsci, whose
ideas are best suited for this current project.
Antonio Gramsci
I argue that a neo-Marxist framework through the lens of Gramsci is crucial to analyzing
the U.S. rhetorical resistance to UN treaties, particularly the Rome Statute that established the
International Criminal Court. In doing this, I uncover key Gramscian concepts such as
hegemony, common sense, subaltern, and intellectuals that will provide the foundation to my
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deconstructive critique of the discourse of power and hegemony in American resistance to the
rhetoric of UN treaties.
During the first World War, Gramsci wrote about the social, political, and economic life
of Italy as well as international events. Subsequently, he was arrested and sentenced to twenty
years in jail because he was seen as a threat to the fascist government (Bates, 1975). Gramsci’s
long and miserable confinement, coupled with his malformation of the spine, led to his death in
1937. His confinement also resulted in one of the most significant contributions to twentiethcentury Marxist thought, namely the concept of “hegemony” as a cultural and political
theoretical thought (Bates, 1975; Hoare & Smith, 1971). In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci
established the link between politics and culture as well as an approach to ideology, power, and
social changes, which separated him from the orthodoxy of economic determinism found in
Marxism (Hoare & Nowell-Smith, 2005). Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks further illustrated issues
of fascism in Italy and the appropriateness of communism and socialist ideas (Gramsci, 1971).
According to Bauer’s (2018), Gramsci’s burden in the Prison Notebooks was also to
encourage the utilization of “Marxist philosophy to areas outside of the economy, primarily
focusing on social determinism and hegemonic forces in relation to subaltern populations”
(Bauer, 2018, p. 37). Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks supported neo-Marxism since he introduced
concepts that would shape the Western implementation of socialist thought and policy in a way
that broke from certain key Marxist principles. Gramsci has been credited with several concepts:
hegemony, the subaltern, common sense, historical bloc, war of position and war of maneuver,
among others. Many of these concepts will influence my ideological examination of the U.S.
rhetoric of power in resistance to United Nations treaties, particularly the Rome Statute. In the
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following sections, I will conceptualize these Gramscian concepts and how they will inform my
ideological examination of the rhetoric of power in resistance.
Hegemony
Economic determinism expresses that human nature is determined by forces of
production within a social structure “Gramsci offered a corrective measure to Marx insistence on
economic determinism as the primary site of power, oppression, and resistance” (Soddart, 2007,
p. 200). Stoddart (2007) carefully articulates that ideological systems operate to unify people into
networks that oppress and subordinate them. Hence, Stoddart's reading of Marx reveals how
Marx’s work ignores certain crucial elements that Gramsci addresses in his Prison Notebooks,
making Gramsci’s concept of hegemony an important reformulation of the concept of ideology.
While Gramsci conceptualized hegemony as an ensemble of power and oppression, the word was
first used by communists, especially Vladimir Lenin, to explain how the bourgeoisie exercise
power over the working class (Andersen, 1976). Gramsci (1971) defined hegemony as
“‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual’ and moral leadership’” (p. 57). According to Gramsci (1971),
“a social group dominates antagonist groups which tend to 'liquidate,' or subjugate, perhaps even
by armed force” (p. 57). Thus, the hegemony “subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises
power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well” (pp. 57-58).
What Gramsci wanted to establish here is that the hegemon continually centralizes and
perpetuates power over the dominated groups.
In this way, Gramsci’s definition of hegemony will inform my analysis of how the United
Nations, as a global intergovernmental organization, concretizes power and tries to maintain its
control over its member countries through treaties. Gramsci’s definition of hegemony raises the
obvious conception that “the leadership of a complex formation of any ideological persuasion
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engages in two complementary practices” (Kurtz, 1996, p. 106). According to Kurtz’s discussion
of Gramscian hegemony, the domination function of the hegemony employs force and coercion
against those who oppose its authority and power. In the other vein, the hegemony uses
“intellectual devices” (Kurtz, 1996) to disseminate its ideas of morality to gain the support of
those who oppose its power to sustain the support it enjoys and consent to its rule – a position
that also enhances our understanding of how Althusser’s conception of ISAs and RSA’s operate.
Therefore, the hegemony always wants to obtain consent to legitimize its authority. Maintaining
“ideological unity” in order to win the approval of the governed or the dominated social groups
becomes something of great interest to the hegemony and requires persuasion – i.e., rhetoric – to
secure such consent (Gramsci, 1971, p. 328). The hegemony, according to Kurtz (1996), has
several features. Based on Gramsci’s formulation, the hegemony signifies the property of
different organizations of people and agents (Gramsci, 1971) such as a structure, a practice, an
apparatus (pp. 146, 261, 264), and a unity of opposing structure (pp. 137, 170, 239, 263). What
this means is that the hegemon is able to initiate contact among the cultural levels that embodies
the national culture (Urbinati, 1998). Owing to this, the hegemon ensures that everyone is
represented under its influence.
The hegemony may also constitute a social category that characterizes a distinct sociopolitical, cultural or ideological formation (Gramsci, 1971). To this end, the hegemony, as Kurtz
(1996) tells us, works through an organization of agents – mostly, if not always, in civil
society—through which it exercises both intellectual and moral leadership that reinforces
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and its political project. Thus, we can analyze the role of the
political-ideological superstructure in the political processes. An analysis of hegemony grants
neo-Marxists, that is Gramscian Marxists, a conceptual foundation to counteract the emphasis by
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conventional “Marxists on the ontological primacy of the economic base” (Kurtz, 1996, p. 107).
This is because, Gramscian Marxist are primed to look at the struggles between two competing
ideologies. It helps then, to carefully analyze the rhetoric of power in resistance—a case of the
U.S. resistance to UN treaties.
Common Sense and Good Sense
In his discussion of how the hegemony exercises its power and influence over the masses,
Gramsci conceptualized sensuo commune or common sense as the way the hegemony maintains
its control and influence. Zompetti (2012), in his reading of Gramsci, (1971), sees common sense
as “the everyday, unquestioned beliefs of members living in a particular culture” (p. 369) that
form the ideological perspectives of people. For Stuart Hall, common sense
is not coherent: It is usually ‘disjointed and episodic,’ fragmentary and contradictory. Into
it, the traces and ‘stratified deposits’ of more coherent philosophical systems have
sedimented over time without leaving any clear inventory. It represents itself as the
‘traditional wisdom or truth of the ages,’ but in fact, it is deeply a product of history, ‘part
of the historical process.’ It is the already formed and ‘taken-for-granted’ terrain. (Hall,
1996b, p. 431)
According to Gramsci, “Common sense takes countless different forms. Its most fundamental
characteristic is that it is a conception fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in
conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is”
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 419). Because the hegemon exercises its authority predominantly without
coercion but rather by consent, the hegemon can enforce its rule by “articulating practices” that
construct “cultural perceptions so that the subaltern feel they are included in the superstructure”
(Zompetti, 1997, p. 73). Zompetti (1997, 2012) further explains that the hegemony, through its
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common sense conceptions, warrants and reinforces the conditions established by the hegemony
onto the subaltern so that they feel included, even if in a marginal way, within the larger
hegemonic culture; the subaltern conception of the world that frames this notion of inclusion
emanates from common sense. Thus, common sense is the set of dominant, unquestioned beliefs
from which the hegemony derives its power. This thesis uncovers how the United Nations
establishment gains authority and how it operates based on Gramscian’s logic of common sense.
While the world needs action on certain global issues – such as conflicts, climate change, and
refugees – the articulatory model of the UN, through its agencies, suggests to countries what
policies they must implement, regardless of the sovereign power of these nations. Crehan (2016)
offers that, in any given historical moment, “there will be multiple narratives, some closely
connected and overlapping, some conflictual and contradictory” that constitute “a solid,
emotionally persuasive core against which we test what both happens to us, and how others
explain the world to us” (p. 47). The hegemony works in subtle ways by creating a “culture with
illusory benefits and superficial democratic ideals,” and it is able to “co-opt any resistance or
incorporate the resistance into part of the overarching universal, or hegemonic, philosophy
through common sense” (Zompetti, 1997, p. 73). Thus, the hegemony employs common sense to
merge and integrate social groups to believe in the dominant idea or philosophy (Zompetti,
1997).
Gramsci further theorized that, through the deployment of common sensical ideas, the
hegemony establishes and reifies its dominance in a given historical moment (Gramsci, 1971;
Zompetti, 1997). According to Zompetti (1997), this occurs when the dominated groups become
positioned within a historical bloc. Laclau and Mouffe (1993) explain the historical bloc as a
“social and political space relatively unified through the instituting of nodal points and the
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constituting of tendentially relational identities,” which means that various social groups are
linked by relationships of common interests (p. 136). Sassoon (1987) clarifies that the Gramscian
historical bloc does not position itself in cultural and hegemonic indoctrination unilaterally. The
historical bloc, “given its interrelated nature between multiple identities, suggests that the power
of the dominant society ebbs and flows during historical periods” (Zompetti, 1997, p. 73).
Zompetti argues that “the historical block, then, helps explain how subject identities can be
infused with common-sensical beliefs during one historical moment and be united in resistance
to the hegemony during another moment” (Zompetti, 1997, p. 74). The UN was created in
response to exigent world needs. Many countries of the world, with the U.S., playing a leading
role, yearned for the creation of the global body to solve common problems. While the UN
Charter serves to constitute the interests of the nations of the world, it nonetheless exists to
dictate how individual countries should act. Consequently, through the creation of agencies such
as the International Criminal Court to prosecute war criminals, the UN would dictate how the
nations even engage in international relations and conquests to safeguard their security.
American presidents, resisting this direction, have engaged in rhetorical dissent and defiance to
these treaties and institutions, which forms the crux of my overarching analysis.
Gramsci postulated that language is key to fomenting common sense. According to
Zompetti (1997), Gramsci saw that language reinforces the cultural and historical dimensions
that create it. Language assists the social actor(s)—humans in assessing “the greater or lesser
complexity” of our “conception of the world” (p. 325). In this view, “the common themes,
mentalities and ideas in society are perpetuated by the dominant order frame or conception”
(Zompetti, 1997, p. 73). Thus, common sense constructs discourse, and this is aided by the use of
linguistic and symbolic artifacts that configure and model an “understanding of unity,” such that
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“the common relationships may be more distant than originally thought” (Zompetti, 1997, p. 74).
As I will show in the next section, Gramsci asserted that, for us to resist common sense, we
should be prepared to transform common sense into good sense, which he termed buon senso.
According to Gramsci, working toward good sense invites people “to reflect and to realize fully
that whatever happens is basically rational and must be confronted as such” (Gramsci, 1971, p.
328). This action, according to Gramsci (1971), is a step to “overcoming bestial and elemental
passions through a conception of necessity which gives a conscious direction to one’s activity”
(p. 328). Consequently, an atmosphere develops that engenders a “healthy nucleus that exists in
‘common sense’ to be called ‘good sense’... to be made more unitary and coherent” (Gramsci,
1971, p. 328). Gramsci, therefore, mandates “intellectuals” to embark on this rhetorical
assignment in a bid to cause change to the politically dominant and hegemonic status quo.
Rhetorical Texts
In this thesis, I advance that the United Nations establishment is a hegemonic
organization and, therefore, legitimizes its authority by constituting nations, despite the
sovereign status of these nations. Through its treaties, agencies, annual General Assembly and
Security Council Meetings, and statutes, the UN can maintain its hegemonic status with political
authority over its member countries. It further dictates the nature of international law, foreign
policy, and international relations determinations of its member countries. Its influence over the
United States, for instance, would seek to restrict U.S. exceptionality within the comity of
nations. Thus, despite the U.S. playing a leading role in the establishment of this global body, it
has found its hand deep within the biting teeth of the United Nations establishment. As such, the
United States, in order to break loose and exercise its sovereign power granted to it by her
Constitution, Congress, and citizens, must resist the common sense narratives that limits its
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practice and conduct of foreign affairs and international relations in terms of war of conquests or
preemptive strikes, for instance. The attempt by the United Nations to establish the International
Criminal Court struck a major blow to the UN’s overall authority and legitimacy, as will become
clear in the next chapter. As a result, the UN has since weakened its hold over its members. As
my analysis will show, the United States has, in the post-Cold War era, defied United Nations
resolutions in many ways, with one of the most notable occurring with its resistance to the
International Criminal Court. The United States government has lobbied other countries to side
with its position, thereby balancing its authority and hegemonic status (forming a strong
position) to counter the hegemonic power of the UN. Consequently, investigating the U.S.
resistance to UN treaties, especially the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal
Court is very expedient.
The UN has influenced its 193 member countries since 1945. Accordingly, it has been
instrumental in the past in terms of reducing poverty, malnutrition, maintaining peace
(peacekeeping missions), environmental protections, etc. (United Nations’ website). As such, its
global reach impacts virtually every aspect of global stability and quality of life. The
International Criminal Court (ICC) also holds a unique position in the world. Because member
countries could now be bound by the laws of the ICC and also their national laws, many
countries fear that an ICC poses a threat to inspect and investigate its citizens on their own soil.
Another aspect is that the ICC frames juridical principles about what war crimes are and other
violations that may conflict with a country's national security interests (Rome Statute, 1998). For
example, the ICC clearly forbids the torture of alleged terrorists and would, therefore, insert its
jurisdiction into matters of American detention of enemy combatants -- something that the Bush
administration, for example, claimed was crucial to fight the war on terror. For these reasons,
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examining the rhetoric surrounding it becomes very neccessary. Moreover, the International
Criminal Court has become a rhetorical target for presidents like Bush and Trump (and some
American ambassadors). In most cases, the ICC seems to serve as a rhetorical playground to
galvanize the conservative base who always register fears about world socialist governments
taking over the U.S. Thus, the ICC, I argue, serves as a “representative anecdote” (Burke, 1969,
p. 59) or functions as synecdoche for international treaties as a whole. In other words, the ICC
becomes a singular example that essentializes all other treaties such that American conservatives
(and even some liberals) use the ICC rhetorically to cast all treaties as problematic, even though
each treaty is distinctly different.
Significantly, post-Cold War U.S. presidents, national security advisers, U.S.
ambassadors to the UN, and ambassadors to other countries, have played an important rhetorical
role in resisting the UN’s authority. The treaty that establishes the ICC, even though partially
supported by the U.S – the treaty establishing the ICC’s operation -- limits the expansion of
American authority and further inhibits the United States from achieving its foreign policy and
international relations objectives. This thesis, therefore, presents a neo-Marxist framework,
through the lens of Gramsci, to uncover the ideological struggle and the rhetoric of power in
resistance by the U.S. as it confronts the hegemony of the United Nations.
Close Reading and Close Textual Analysis
I will examine speeches made by post-Cold War American presidents concerning
international treaties and the ICC. This is because they led the United States at a crucial time
when deliberations for an International Criminal Court was in full swing, its establishment, and
its operation. Thus, I will analyze speeches made on the floor of the General Assembly by
presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Donald Trump. I will also examine speeches of national
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security advisors and ambassadors to the UN on the establishment of the ICC. Especially, I will
examine the arguments presented against the establishment of the ICC and deconstruct the
rhetorical strategies employed to resist the influence of the UN. In this thesis, I will use CTA but
instead of analyzing a single text (like most scholars do), I will be analyzing closely the rhetoric
of post-Cold War U.S. presidential administrations in a more comprehensive manner.
For a critic to carefully analyze rhetorical texts, the critic must engage in close textual
analysis or close reading of texts. According to Brummett (2019), “Close reading is the mindful,
disciplined reading of an object with a view to a deeper understanding of its meanings” (p. 2) in
the “form of criticism or critical analysis” (p. 8). Thus, close reading involves analyzing texts.
Brummett further conceives of texts as objects that generate the meanings ascribed to vital ideas,
principles, values, and so on. Thus, a critic engaging in criticism “reveals meanings that are
shared but not universally and also meanings that are known but not articulated” (p. 15).
Brummett further postulates that the art of doing criticism is “a calling.” In this way, a rhetorical
critic is a person who understands what messages mean and how these are expressed in people's
thoughts and actions. Brummett argues that critics work to expose hegemony, for instance, and
consequently oppose it since the critic can recognize the condition of empowered people
relishing the cooperation of the disempowered.
For a good rhetorical analysis of texts, it is incumbent that rhetorical scholars understand
how theories, methods, and techniques help in the close reading of texts. A text, according to
Fursich’s (2009) reading of Barthes (1972), is a complex set of discursive strategies that are
situated in a special cultural context or any given historical moment. Brummett (2019) states that
theories serve as a map to a text. Furthermore, Brummett contends that the method is a vehicle
that orients the critic on how to navigate the text. Thus, in this thesis, close textual analysis
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(CTA) will be the methodological approach. By doing CTA or a close reading, I aim to examine
the texts with laser-like focus, looking for ideologies, themes, inconsistencies, and clusters of
words that have special meanings (Best & Marcus, 2009; Biane, 2011; Campbell, 1996; Fursich,
2009; Gatta, 2010; Leff, 1986; Sillars and Gronbeck, 2000). Additionally, close textual analysis,
according to Gatta (2010), “studies the relationship between the inner workings of public
discourse and its historical context in order to discover what makes a particular text function
persuasively” (p. 11).
The technique will be an ideological rhetorical analysis through the process of
deconstruction. As Brummett (2019) rightly indicates, nobody explores a text without thinking of
techniques. To this end, techniques are the strategies and skills a critic employs to analyze a text.
Thus, performing textual criticism of the rhetoric of power in resistance between the U.S. and the
United Nations will help me focus on the underlying ideological assumptions inherent in texts
(Fürsich, 2009). According to Fürsich (2009), this type of analysis or engagement involves a
critical analysis, or what Hall (1975) calls “the long preliminary soak” (p. 15) of the chosen text
using rhetorical approaches (Real, 1996). When this is done, a critic can advance the criticism as
evidence of an overall argument. In fact, for Brockriede (1974) and Palczewski (2003), good
rhetorical criticism functions as a powerful argument. Textual analysis, according to Fürsich
(2009), allows a critic to discern latent meaning, but implicit patterns, assumptions, and
omissions of a text based on the premise “that texts are signifying hegemony and ideology and
broadly investigate” their relations to power and resistance (p. 241). Thus, employing CTA will
permit me:
to describe discourse accurately and perceptively so that the unique qualities of discourse
become clear to the reader; to analyze internal elements and stratagems of discourses, and
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to describe the relationship between discourses and their cultural contexts and the
persuasive forces impinging on them; to make evaluative judgment. (Campbell, 1972, p.
12)
The Rationale for an Ideological Rhetorical Critique
In his influential essay, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” McKerrow (1989), based
on Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge synthesis, theorizes how critics should approach the
analysis of discourse and power. He terms this “theoretical rationale” as critical rhetoric that
seeks to “unmask or demystify the discourse of power” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 91). Toward this
end, McKerrow presents a twin critique process as crucial principles of performing critical
rhetoric — the critique of domination and the critique of freedom. McKerrow (1989) posits that
critical rhetoric examines the dimensions of domination and freedom as these are exercised in the
world. Critical rhetoric, therefore, seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power that
construct social relations. To McKerrow (1989), the focus of the critique of domination “is on
the discourse of power which creates and sustains the social practices which control the
dominated” (p. 92). Hence, it is the critique of ideologies, perceived as rhetorical creations. In a
critique of domination, Ono and Sloop (1992) recognize that the critic’s task is to reveal how
subjects are unjustly dominated by systems of power and to aid subjects to liberate them from
domination.
McKerrow’s critique of domination makes claims of “right” action with the notion that
“power and interests, in whatever form, can and should ceaselessly be exposed” (Ono & Sloop,
1992, p. 49). With the critique of freedom, the aim is to understand the integration of power and
knowledge in society. It is also concerned with what possibilities for change the integration
invites or inhibits and what intervention strategies might be considered appropriate for social
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change (McKerrow, 1989). McKerrow (1989) characterizes this critique as “one of never-ending
skepticism, hence permanent criticism” (p. 96). I also find the critique of freedom appropriate
because it will help situate the nature of the discourse in its proper context. For instance,
ascertaining how the United States, a beacon of democracy, frames arguments of exceptionalism
in its foreign policy discourse against the International Criminal Court, a crucial institution of the
UN’s hegemony, is of significance to my analysis.
Wander (1983) also presents a case for an ideological critique of power and discourse.
Wander (1983) adduces that we must recognize the existence of consigned interests of dominant
groups that govern worldviews – a crucial step toward framing good reasons for political action.
Seen this way, ideological criticism serves as an approach through which rhetorical critics focus
not only on the rhetorical strategies of a particular discourse, but also on its social and political
goals. Hence, by doing ideological criticism, critics premise their analysis on the “ends as well as
the means of rhetoric, and the subject those ends to judgment” (Hart & Daughton, 2005, p. 209).
Additionally, Hart and Daughton (2005) identify a crucial element of ideological
criticism. According to them, criticism should be expansionistic -- meaning ideological critics
should study previously ignored texts. For this reason, my review of the literature shows that,
although rhetorical scholars have examined U.S. presidential discourse, substantially less
rhetorical scholarship has focused on how the U.S., and more importantly U.S. presidents, resist
international treaties. Thus, by performing an ideological criticism that examines the U.S.
exercise of power and resistance rhetorics, I aim to establish how conflictual ideological
processes and power relations between the U.N. and the U.S. impact American foreign policy
and international relations. An ideological rhetorical criticism, through a Gramscian lens, also
enables me to establish how ideology operates, along with locating and problematizing the
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strategies that further ideological formations. By looking at the values and beliefs in speeches of
U.S. presidents, national security advisors, and ambassadors to the UN, I aim to identify how the
U.S. objects to the hegemony of the United Nations, as it is rhetorically expressed by and
through the International Criminal Court.
Examining Texts for this Thesis
As the previous sections suggest, I will be using these various concepts to analyze
American presidential rhetoric regarding the UN’s International Criminal Court. Specifically, I
will use the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and common sense to understand the relationship
between American foreign policy and the agenda of the UN in this post-Cold War era. As such, I
will engage in a close textual analysis to examine the rhetoric of the Clinton, Bush, Obama, and
Trump administrations as they characterized American policy toward the ICC. In this way, I
hope to show how hegemony – as a station of power where the US and the UN engage in a
global tug-of-war – is not necessarily heroic or evil, but rather is a quest for dominance.
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CHAPTER IV: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Introduction
Now that we have reviewed the relevant literature, we know that little attention has been
paid to American presidential rhetoric concerning foreign policies, international treaties, and the
United Nations. Therefore, an examination into the rhetoric of modern American presidents
concerning the ICC is warranted. We first have to examine the rhetorical situation that
occasioned the ICC. Next, I discuss Foucault’s notions of power and governmentality to
establish its link with Gramscian concepts — hegemony, common sense, etc. I present my
overarching argument — why the ICC Treaty, the Rome Statute, functions as common sense and
why this articulatory conjuncture invites opposition from the counter-hegemony, the United
States. We must also understand how the UN exercises it common sense appreciating why the
U.S., through its presidents, engaged in an ideological contestation with international
organizations and international accords.
A Brief History of The ICC Treaty—Rome Statute
Innumerable treaties, conventions, and conferences, and the charters of the League of
Nations and the UN, have made all the provision for world peace that language can
describe, but the failure to establish authoritative bodies to interpret and to enforce that
language has turned the laws against war into a graveyard of good words. There is, as
always, no shortage of rules: endless, overlapping, repetitive formulae devised by
delegates in the expensive comfort of Geneva hotels, later to be signed and ratified by
states secure in the knowledge that should any question arise about their meaning or
application, they will be judges in their own cause. (Robertson, 2000, p. 179)

73

The International Criminal Court (ICC), effective in 2002, became operational as one of the first
permanent international criminal tribunal. This is one of the institutions that generated
controversial discourse in world affairs (Schabas, 2011; UN Doc. A/810). The purpose of the
ICC is “to end impunity, and through international criminal justice, the Court aims to hold those
responsible accountable for their crimes and to help prevent these crimes from happening again”
(International Criminal Court, n.d., para. 2). The ICC investigates and tries individuals with the
gravest crimes of concern to the international criminal community: genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and the crime of aggression. From this account, the prosecution of states is not
the focus of the ICC but rather individuals. However, these individuals are citizens of countries
who may or may not have ratified the treaty. The ICC seeks to “complement, not replace,
national Courts. Governed by an international treaty called the Rome Statute” (The International
Criminal Court, n.d., para. 3).
The ICC has the mandate to prosecute any individual anywhere in the world. However, a
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution becomes necessary before the Court
prosecutes alleged criminals who are citizens of a state which has yet to ratify the ICC Statute. In
this way, the court operates on the principle of ratione temporis (temporary jurisdiction), where
the Court can only investigate crimes committed after July 1, 2002, when the ICC Statute came
into force (Gegout, 2013). The ICC preamble also declares that war crimes, crimes of aggression,
etc., are serious criminalities that threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the world.
However, “the terms ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ are not defined in the ICC Preamble, and this leads to
different interpretations, as peace and justice for some can mean conditions of war and injustice
for others” (Gegout, 2013, p. 801).
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Before I discuss the Rome Statute/ICC as common sense, I will offer a brief historical
account of international tribunals. Some scholars contend that during the middle ages, there were
exceptional/isolated examples of international trials as well as an audacious attempt to drafting a
statute of an international court (Schabas, 2011; Schwarzenberger, 1968).
Schabas (2007) highlights the genealogy of the events leading to the Rome Statute.
Schabas notes that the intent of this statute was to prosecute breaches of the Geneva Convention
of 1864 and other humanitarian norms. Schabas further notes that The Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 were also the first revolutionary moments where laws of war were codified in an
international treaty. Therefore, The Hague Conventions, as international treaties, were meant to
levy obligations on states and were not intended to create criminal liability for individuals.
Schabas contends that these treaties recognized certain acts to be “illegal” but not criminal, since
there was the absence of any suggestion that calls for sanctions if such violations occurred. In
1913, however, a commission on inquiry proposed by the Carnegie Foundation to investigate
atrocities committed during the Balkan Wars utilized the provisions of The Hague Convention
IV as the basis to frame war crimes (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914). After
World War I, there were global discussions among world power to prosecute the criminal aspects
of those responsible for the War. There was also much pressure to go beyond violations of the
laws and customs of war and to prosecute the act of waging war itself in violation of
international treaties. And so, it was during The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 that allies
debated the wisdom of such trials as well as their legal basis. The U.S. expressed hostility to this
idea, “arguing that this would be ex post facto justice” (Schabas, 2007, p. 3). The U.S. delegation
debated that responsibility for the breach of international conventions and crimes against
humanity were premised on morality and not on law.
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Schabas (2007) further argues that the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920--that governed the
liquidation of the Ottoman Empire and negotiation of peaceful negotiations with Turkey--also
made provisions for war crimes trials to be known as “crimes against humanity.” Several treaties
and conventions also succeeded the Treaty of Sèvres until the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to
prosecute the World War II Axis Powers for War Crimes. The International Law Commission
(ILC) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) also established a committee charged
with drafting the statute of the ICC. The ILC worked until 1994 at which time ad hoc tribunals
were established to address atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, around
this time there were deliberations to create a tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi
leaders during the Gulf War as well as an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute genocide and other grave
violations in Rwanda after the Security Council voted to create such tribunals (Schabas, 2007).
Reports from the ad hoc tribunals and rulings fueled motivations for the ICC. These
reports were based on the findings particularly concerning the scope of war crimes. These were
essentially incorporated into Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
The obiter dictum (opinions of judges) also from the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav
Tribunal, which asserted that crimes against humanity could be committed in time of peace and
not just in wartime, as had been the case at Nuremberg, was also endorsed in the text of Article
7. Before the creation of the ICC, the International Law Commission (ILC), through the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), convened an ad hoc committee that met twice in 1995
(Bassiouni, 1999). Various nations’ arguments exposed profound differences about preferences
of the structure of the court, with some contesting the overall viability of this daring endeavor
(Schabas, 2007). After other negotiations such as the Zutphen draft (after an inter-Sessional
Meeting from 19th to 30th January 1998 in Zutphen, Netherlands), the proposals were
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consolidated into a coherent and workable document for submission to the Diplomatic
Conference (Bassiouni, 1997). Subsequently, pursuant to the General Assembly resolutions
adopted in 1996 and 1997, the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the ICC convened
on June 15, 1998, in Rome —headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
According to Schabas (2007), there were other international organizations and members from
more than 160 countries present. Schabas (2007) presents that
the enthusiasm was quite astonishing, with essentially all of the delegations expressing
their support for the concept or idea of the ICC. Driving the dynamism of the Conference
were two new constituencies: a geographically heterogeneous caucus of States known as
the ‘like-minded’; and a well-organized coalition of non-governmental organizations.
(p.18)
The “like-minded” individuals, according to Schabas, were committed to a handful of significant
propositions that were markedly at odds with the premises of the 1994 International Law
Commission draft. Schabas (2007) accounts that the like-minded, while operating relatively
informally, rapidly dominated the organization of the Conference. For example, essential
functions, including the chairs of most of the working groups, as well as membership in the
Bureau — the executive body that led the day-to-day affairs of the Conference – were occupied
by the “like-minded.” The principles of the “like-minded,” Schabas (2011) intimates, were
an inherent jurisdiction of the court over the ‘core crimes’ of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes (and, perhaps, aggression); the elimination of a Security
Council veto on prosecutions; an independent prosecutor with the power to initiate
proceedings proprio motu; and the prohibition of reservations to the statute (p. 19).
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The likeminded, according to Schabas (2011), dominated the conference and rubber-stamped
proceedings. Schabas observes that,
One by one, the provisions of the statute were adopted “by general agreement” in the
working groups, that is, without a vote. The process was tedious, in that it allowed a
handful of States or even one of them to hold up progress by refusing to join the
consensus. The chairs of the working groups would patiently negotiate compromises,
drawing on comments by States that often expressed their views on a provision but then
indicated their willingness to be flexible. Within a week of the beginning of the
Conference, the working groups were forwarding progress reports to the Committee of
the Whole, indicating the provisions that had already met with agreement. These were
subsequently examined by the Drafting Committee, chaired by Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni, for terminological and linguistic coherence in the various official language
versions of the statute. (Schabas, 2011, p. 20, emphasis added)
The Rome Statute and ICC as a Discursive Formation and Common Sense
For us to carefully understand how the Rome Statute functions as common sense, it is
crucial first to operationalize common sense rhetorically and discursively. In this direction, I
begin with Foucault’s concept of power, epistemes, and discursive formations. While Foucault is
a poststructuralist and Gramsci, more of a structuralist, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1993) scholarship
on Gramsci presents a way that Gramsci’s ideas can suit a post-structuralist perspective. In other
words, instead of post-structuralism’s proclamation that reality is discursive and structuralism’s
opposing view that material reality imposes meaning on language, Gramsci’s framework
dialectically conjoins these approaches by viewing materiality and discourse as mutually
reinforcing. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and common sense and Foucault’s power,
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governmentality, and discursive formations help us understand how influential people and
institutions exercise authority over the governed. Gramsci and Foucault offer us reasons for how
articulatory practices of international institutions and establishments (for instance, the United
Nations) persuade and how the “marginalized” or oppressed gain consciousness to respond to
these rhetorical maneuvers. In this vein, I argue for the operationalization of the Rome Statute
that established the International Criminal Court as a discursive formation. This later informs us
about how the Rome Statute becomes common sense, which necessitated a rhetorical backlash
form a counter-hegemony, like the United States.
Hall (1997) posits that Foucault (1972) shifts our attention from language to discourse —
conceptualized as a system of representation. According to Hall (1997), by discourse, “Foucault
meant a group of statements which provide language from talking about — a way of representing
the knowledge about—a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (p. 72). Hence,
Foucauldian discourse constructs the topic that delineates and produces the matters of our
knowledge (Hall, 1997). Foucault (1972), in talking about the problem of meaning and
representation, was more concerned about the production of knowledge, or epistemes; he called
discourse a system of representation, which frames the way we look at objects and, thus, how
they come to “mean” certain things for purposes of knowledge. Discourse constructs topical
issues and produces the substances of our knowledge and experience in society. To Hall (1997),
“discourse governs the way a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It
influences how ideas are put into practice and [is] used to regulate the conduct of others” (p. 72).
Hall continues that discourse helps to define an “acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write, or
conduct oneself ... which limits and restricts other ways of talking ... that rules out and restricts
other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge
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about it” (p. 72). Discourse comprises multiple statements and can include one text, an action, or
a single source (Hall, 1997). Discourse influences the state of knowledge or thinking at one time;
a concept Foucault labeled as epistemes, which transcend several “institutional sites within
society” (Hall, 1997, p. 44). For Cousins and Hussain (1984), whenever “discursive events refer
to an object and … support a strategy … a common institutional, administrative or political drift
and batter” (pp. 84-85), then they become classified into the same discursive formation. Foucault
(1972) explains that,
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices,
one can defame a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings,
transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a
discursive formation. (p. 38)
Consequently, when we avoid words that are already overloaded with “conditions and
consequences” (Foucault, 1972, p. 38) that are insufficient toward entitling something like
science, ideology, theory, or “domain of objectivity,” we establish conditions such as concepts,
and thematic choices that are exposed to rules of formation. Foucault (1972), in this way,
submits that these rules of formation “are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence,
maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division” (Foucault, 1972,
p. 38).
I posit here that the ICC Treaty — the Rome Statute — functions as a discursive
formation because it operates as a tool for social/international control by the UN (Zompetti,
2019). This is because it establishes a discourse of power and control. For Weedon (1987),
power operates through discourses that constitute and rule individual subjects. Foucault’s idea of
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power and especially of governmentality is essential to understanding how the UN governs
world affairs and how it produces discourse. Discourse then becomes a “form of power that
circulates in the social field and can attach to strategies of domination” as well as those of
resistance (Diamond & Quinby, 1988, p. 185).
Foucault advances that there are different types of power in the hands of a ruling group
— juridical power, disciplinary power, sovereign power, etc. These are magnified through
governmentality, where governing entities act with a derived legitimacy from the dominated. In
this way, Foucault’s concept of governmentality is closely related to Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony. This is because Foucault’s idea of governmentality also operates by means of the
consent of the governed. As the activities are endorsed, governmentality becomes more
routinized, accepted, and habitual. With reference to this discourse, when countries give due
accord to the ICC and the UN to determine their actions within the precincts of international law
by consenting to such power, countries grant the hegemony unfettered access to control their
lives. This unquestioned power given to the ICC to exercise jurisdictions over countries thus
becomes common sense. In other words, countries give accord to the ICC, then the patterns
become routinized, and thus the ICC’s jurisdiction becomes common sense
While I am not interested in analyzing the intricacies of the law, my purpose in this thesis
is to analyze how the discourse the ICC generated became common sense and, therefore, ushers
in a historical moment for counter-hegemonic altercations. As such, it is important to locate
Foucault’s emphasis on language and representation as a means by which a Gramscian notion of
hegemony can operate.
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Hegemony and Common Sense
In the previous chapter, I discussed the concept of hegemony and introduced that
hegemony operates by common sense. This section carefully articulates how the UN and its
agency, the ICC, exercises hegemonic power through persuasive ideological, and specifically
discursive practices. According to Freyberg-Inan (2019), “Power is exercised through and can be
augmented by institutionalization” (p. 185). Freyberg-Inan’s assertion means that international
institutions use their existence to dominate world issues. This is evidenced when “subinstitutions,” like the ICC of a global organization (UN), are established as conduits to further
such objectives. As numerous scholars of international relations and institutionalization observe,
the nature of cooperation induced from institutionalization concurrently restrains states from
exerting their power — a situation that may negatively impact their established loci of power and
established positions in world affairs (Ikenberry, 2001; Kreps, 2011; Lake, 1999; Thompson,
2009; Voeten, 2001; Wesitman, 2014). Thus, the growing institutionalization of world issues in
global bodies can neutralize “power politics” — such as the way the U.S. articulates its control
over world issues because of its strong military and economy. Freyberg-Inan (2019) asserts that,
institutions, both formal and informal, become key components in stabilizing power
relations and constructing and maintaining hegemony. In the Marxist tradition, Gramsci
(1971) theorized how in advanced capitalist societies the bourgeoisie used all manner of
institutions to persuade subordinated classes to internalize its values and goals and to
conceive of them as general interest. (p. 193)
Dominant groups, according to Freyberg-Inan (2019), present their rule as “legitimate” and are
vested to rule primarily through consent. Freyberg-Inan (2019), therefore, adduces that this is
“precisely how international institutions operate today to support the rule of internationally
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dominant actors” (p. 193). In this way, international institutions fashion discourses such as good
“governance norms via the Washington consensus through WTO rulings, from military alliance
commitments via Security Council resolutions to responsibility to protect (R2P),” that serve to
present and impose the interests of powerful actors as an “international common sense, which
becomes increasingly difficult to contest as such institutionalization progresses” (p. 193).
The responsibility and rules of international organizations, according to Barkin (2010)
and Weitsman (2004), support and strengthen particular worldviews, thereby supporting
countries that share those worldviews and ideas. Therefore, these become an effective way to
convince others that a specific action or cause of action is morally actionable. Consequently,
international institutions create an efficient strategy of creating legitimacy and knowledge that
can do this persuasively and, by so doing, solidifying consent (Barkin, 2010; Weitsman, 2004).
Following this, Keohane (1984) and Freyberg-Inan (2019) agree that hegemons invent
international organizations to advance their material interests and ideology. Despite international
relations scholars questioning the UN’s status and utility in contemporary world politics, it still
exists, nonetheless. This is attributed to the way it has dominated global governance and world
politics. What is more, the UN has been designed to control and establish world orders, such as
neo-liberalism and certain conceptions of “justice.”
Thus, the ICC was a rhetorical structure that was established, as it were, to limit power
politics and constrain powerful states. For Hopf (2013), the “institutional dimension of
hegemony concerns the international mechanisms by which the hegemon’s material power and
ideas are reproduced by acquiescent partners” (p. 321). The hegemony does not operate using
force but by the principle of consent of the dominated. Therefore, it is clear how the UN can
organize member countries together and persuade them into signing treaties and agreeing to
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conventions — for instance, the ICC Treaty (Rome Statute). Member states are invited to
summits and organizational meetings where the participants are able to voice their ideas and
objections. The process, then, appears democratic. But resourceful and influential countries often
encourage or “persuade” weaker states to align with them on important matters, thereby
influencing the outcome of most decisions. Thus, the idea of “consent” is really a form of power
manipulation.
Other scholars such as Cox (1983) envision that international organizations serve as
“transmission belts” for dominant power’s ideology. This means that, although international
institutions are always hijacked by powerful nations such as the U.S., Cox’s position above tells
us that powerful countries use international institutions to further economic ideologies. However,
this is inadequate. This could account for why international institutions acquire hegemonic
status. Cox’s argument and discussion on the rhetorical nature of power politics will serve a
greater purpose in my discussion of counter-hegemony later in this chapter.
Gencarella adduces that the “hegemony accordingly attends to consciousness, to ways of
thinking. A regime achieves domination in part because others take its ways of thinking as the
norm and come to accept their own status at the periphery” (p. 222). From this point, we see that
the hegemony, as already established, does not operate by force but by consent. This gives the
hegemon the power to interpellate, through its discourse, people and countries such that they
willingly adhere to its ideas. As we have already recognized, the UN, as a global hegemon,
influences the nations of the world with its ideology, thus making it easy for these states to abide
by the UN’s strategic maneuvering and its discourse. Thus, through continuous membership, the
UN can influence decisions and regulate affairs concerning these nations and even influence how
these nations should act. Furthermore, Gencarella argues that the
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hegemony forefronts identity construction as a fundamental political activity.
Additionally, hegemony is never complete or exhaustive. There is never a single, eternal
hegemony; hegemonic orders are always in competition— rising, falling, incorporating,
and being incorporated into others. Dominant hegemonies do arise, however, relative to
other ways of organizing consciousness. And the struggle for hegemonic control unfolds
at scales both local and global. (p. 223)
The hegemony, in its quest to always dominate world affairs, adapts to situations and
circumstances. Gramsci described this form necessarily as an “educational leadership” (Gramsci,
1971, p. 350). This is because the hegemony “sutures domination and subordination to the
processes of social organization and socialization” (Gancarella, 2010, p. 223). The nature of
organizing countries across the world into a wholistic unit is an essential negotiating and
persuasive skillset of the hegemonic formation (in the case of the UN). The hegemony
interpellates these nations through the establishment of a global common sense ideology. As
Althusser (1971) illustrates, the notion of interpellation occurs when people are influenced by a
dominant ideology to the extent that they become subjects to that philosophy. This global
common sense ideology is useful in the creation of universal rhetorical communities — in the
form of quasi-institutions such as the ICC and UNESCO.
Barnes (2015) already reminds us that the UN is a rhetorical institution. This relates
perfectly within Kastely’s (1987) conception of rhetorical communities. Kastely (1987) argues:
A rhetorical community is one formed or constituted by and through discourse. The art of
rhetoric may be described as the art of rendering an indeterminate situation determinate
for action. It is the art of discourse and deliberation. One branch of rhetoric focuses on
the ways in which discourse forms human community. The idea of rhetoric as
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constitutive of a community flows from the relationship between speaker and audience
and the importance of language to both that are essential elements in the traditional art of
rhetoric. The fundamental insight of this branch of rhetoric is that human communities
are formed and critically shaped in and by discourse. In this view, the study of rhetoric
becomes the study of how we constitute ourselves and our communities through our use
of language, and the study of law comes to focus on the ways in which legal discourse
forms understandings of ourselves and our communities (p. 578).
Kastely’s conceptualization concerns how the United Nations Sales Convention unified all states
to accept an ideology. Kastely recognizes through a rhetorical analysis of the text of the
convention, that it “seeks to establish, in short, a rhetorical community in which its readers' first
assent to the language and values of the text itself, and then use the language and values to
inform their relations with one another” (p. 577). Kastely argues that the rhetorical community
fashions meaningful discourse that delineates how this community will operate. As groups
engage in deliberations at these courts and tribunals, they apply the Convention to particular
international sales agreements, thus legitimizing the convention. In a similar vein, the drafting
process of the ICC was very time consuming since there were more consultations and, especially,
working groups to draft key versions of the statute toward the establishment of an international
tribunal. But as Schabas (2007) argues, most contentious clauses were not assigned to working
groups. Thus, the “like-minded” were able to transcend the opposing views that would have
occasioned the demise of the treaty. Schabas (2011) maintains that the final version of the ICC
Treaty, nonetheless, is replete with serious flaws. For him, geopolitical events and actions of the
UN in the 1990s may have contributed to the passage of the ICC Treaty. According to Schabas
(2011), most of these countries “are frustrated” at the feebleness of the United Nations and its
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affiliate institutions in the promotion of international peace and security. The success of the ICC
Treaty, in some respects, also “parallels the growth of the international human rights movement,
much of whose fundamental philosophy and outlook it shares. Of course, the Court has also
attracted the venom of the world’s superpower, the United States of America” (p. x). Despite the
success of the ICC Treaty, the manner and reasons for American opposition to it present us with
a rhetorical conjuncture.
As established earlier, common sense means “the philosophy of non-philosophers, the
conceptualization of the world that is uncritically absorbed” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 419). In this
direction, the UN would want all nations of the world, especially the superpowers, to follow its
directives. However, this is not possible when some countries, such as the U.S., feel besieged
and oppressed by such idea global body. In world governance, it becomes fascinating to
understand how
In searching for a way to explain how a small ruling class establishes and maintains
dominance over large populations, Gramsci contends that those in power do not govern
strictly by force; they must also obtain the consent of the dominated. Hegemony
accordingly attends to consciousness, to ways of thinking. A regime achieves domination
in part because others take its ways of thinking as the norm and come to accept their own
status at the periphery. (Gencarella, 2010, p. 222)
In this way, the hegemony, as an embodied and lived process, is educative, and it finds ways to
articulate historical moments (Ives, 2009).
The UN, regarding its status as an international hegemon, exalts itself in diverse
iterations at any given historical moment in order to not to lose its legitimacy. The hegemony is
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always in flux, and its status is always a site for struggle. (Gramsci, 1971). Gencarella reminds us
that the
hegemony is never complete or exhaustive. There is never a single, eternal hegemony;
hegemonic orders are in always in competition— rising, falling, incorporating, and being
incorporated into others. Dominant hegemonies do arise, however, relative to other ways
of organizing consciousness. And the struggle for hegemonic control unfolds at scales
both local and global. (p. 223)
By common sense, Gramsci means the everyday philosophy of those who are not professional
philosophers or intellectuals; the phrase refers to a “conception of the world which is uncritically
absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the
average man is developed” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 419). Gencarella (2010) explains that the value of
common sense lies in its application of the belief of “causality in judgment” (p. 231). In this way,
several essential characteristics of common sense must be identified for us and see its
relationship with the discourse formation of the ICC Treaty.
Nun and Cartier (1986) note that Gramsci (1975) advances some characteristics of
common sense, especially in his Quaderni Del Carcere. For Gramsci, common sense connotes a
negative meaning. A most vital and characteristic element is that, for Gramsci (1975), common
sense is an ontological being based on an uncritical consciousness, and “a conception which,
even in the brain of one individual is fragmentary, incoherent, and inconsequential, in conformity
with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is” (p. 1396). Gramsci
(1975) continues that common sense “cannot substitute an intellectual order because it cannot
attain unity and coherence even within individual consciousness, let alone collective
consciousness” (p. 1378). In this direction, Gramsci illustrates that “vulgar common sense …is
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dogmatic, eager for fixed certainties” (1975, p. 1425). Relatedly, common sense is “narrowly
traditional and conservative” (p. 1425). Nun and Cartier (1986) establish that this orthodox and
conventional conception of common sense presents a dogged guard of things and ideas —
conceiving them as ferociously apprehensive of any change.
For purposes of this current project, the hegemon (UN) possesses various powers by
which it can understand historical movements and reinvent itself. The UN realized that it was no
longer leading in international affairs, especially during the post-Cold War era. the UN simply
wanted to be relevant again – and the war crimes in Rwanda and Yugoslavia introduced a key
historical moment for the UN to assert itself. To constrain and confine the U.S. global
hegemony, the U.N. had to construct the ICC as a precautionary measure. However, the U.S. did
not sign the treaty because of its inherent contradictions and unquestioned nature. The U.S. does
not want to be a stooge for the common sense maneuverings of the UN. Thus, by
institutionalizing its ideas and functions, it becomes accepted and enforced as a popular common
sense to take charge of world affairs.
Following this, propagating an international common sense becomes a “chaotic
aggregation of unconnected conceptions ... within it one can find whatever one wants” (Gramsci,
1975, p. 1398), resulting “in a series of judgments because common sense identifies the exact
cause simple and within easy reach, undiverted by fantasies and metaphysical obscurities,
pseudo-profound, pseudo-scientific, etc.” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1334). The UN is transforming and
adapting to historical moments. Also, the UN has no allegiance to a particular country, and its
intrusion into state sovereignty makes its operations seem like the organization is everywhere,
constantly surveilling the actions of countries for possible war crimes and crimes of aggression.
It has performed well in some areas in terms of supplying aid and maintaining some peace, but it
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has nonetheless failed on its overall mandate to secure global peace. Its continuous existence has
been questioned severely, mostly by American presidents. Despite the questionable nature of its
operations, it still tries to maintain control in every aspect of international affairs.
The Rome Statute and the Rhetoric of Common Sense
Analyzing how common sense is reified in world politics and international relations,
Hopf (2013) posits that “hegemonic ideas are those that further the interests of the ruling group”
but are “veiled in language that presents them as if they were advancing the universal interests of
the people in general” (p. 321). Hegemonic power, according to Hopf, manifests in such a way
that these philosophies develop to be taken for granted narratives by the dominated populace. In
this way, a taken-for-granted truth or narrative is one that people assume to be without
questioning its empirical or normative validity. A legitimate truth, Hopf avers, is one that people
willfully regard as “right” in a context or historical moment. For Ikenberry (2001), the ideas that
have significance concerns the acceptability of the hegemonic order.
Therefore, Gramsci (1971) emphasizes that popular beliefs constitute “material forces” in
and of themselves (p. 165). In this way, Gramsci reasons that common sense can legitimize and
maintain – or thwart – elite projects. While the UN’s rhetorical common sense tries to uphold its
legitimacy and dictate how nations should relate and or function, it also serves as a roadblock
that foils the ideological posturing of independent world leaders. In the next section, I detail how
the UN tries to muzzle the foreign policy visions of U.S. presidents, especially during the postCold War era. However, a brief illustration is helpful here. Obama wanted a favorable working
relationship with the UN in order to support his grand strategy of globalization. Many scholars
warned that Obama was reducing America’s global power, especially when he made a speech in
which he described the exceptionalities of Israel as well as other countries. However, he was
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attacked because “exceptionality” has been bookmarked and trademarked as the perfect
description for America and not any other country. This also informs Trump’s ascension to
power. Trump campaigned to “Make America Great Again” because of the apparent weakening
of conservative American values under Obama. For example, Obama’s negotiation of the Iran
Nuclear Deal and other treaties were very weak, according to Trump. Trump, as well as other
hawks that would later form his core administrative infrastructure, argued that negotiating such
deals were not American enough; instead, the U.S. should impose more sanctions as well as
other actions against countries such as Iran. Similarly, Trump's America first ideology defined
most of his pronouncements and policies, such as his 2017 national security strategy.
Hopf defends Gramsci’s concepts by conceptualizing that common sense relates to and
projects the “ideological projects of state elites” (p. 318). A Gramscian constructivist
interpretation of hegemony, asserts Hopf, reestablishes common sense to a more central
“theoretical role” – a role that serves a “structural variable in world politics, akin to distributions
of material power or national identities” (p. 318). From Hopf’s account, common sense
constructivism purposes to bring the “masses back into world politics” (p. 318). Common sense
politics also advances “constructivism’s growing interest in the social power of practices and
habits — how states automatically perceive, feel, and act without conscious reflection on either
costs or benefits or normative “exclusions and prescriptions” (p. 138).
The Rhetorical Apparatuses of Hegemony in International Institutions
The United Nations has undoubtedly become a world hegemony. This means that it
features a “describable…social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it
cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three” (Cox, 1990, p. 62). In this way, world
hegemony is expressive in catholic norms, institutions and mechanisms which ground general
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directions of behavior for states as well as of international civil societies – rules which support
the hegemon’s ideologies and productive modes. Owing to this, Cox (1990) describes how an
international institution or organization functions as an ideological state apparatus through which
the worldwide customs characteristic of world hegemony are articulated. Wivel and Paul (2019)
define international institutions as “associational clusters among many states with some
bureaucratic structures that create and manage self-imposed and other imposed constraints on
state policies and behaviors” (p. 8). Hence, an international body, such as the UN, is uniquely
positioned to operate as the global hegemon.
In this regard, Cox (1990) argues, an international organization functions as the process
and conduit through which hegemonic ideology is advanced. Cox (1990) further delineates the
discursive features of an international organization and its hegemonic roles as follows: “They
embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are
themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms
of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb
counterhegemonic ideas” (p. 62). While the above speaks to the way an international hegemon
operates, Cox extrapolates that international institutions and rules are mostly introduced by the
state which establishes the hegemony. In the case of the UN and the ICC, they must have that
state’s backing. The dominant state takes care to secure the acquiescence of other states
according to a “hierarchy of powers within the inter-state structure of hegemony” (Cox, 1990,
pp. 62-63). However, this is the point of departure for the United States. Even though it helped
establish the international order under the auspices of the UN, the current world other that seeks
to constrain it is a threat and must, therefore, be resisted both materially and rhetorically.
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To this end, international organizations perform ideological roles by delineating
procedural measures for countries through legitimizing and recognizing certain institutional
policies at national levels — for instance, countries must ratify treaties. (Cox, 1990). The
hegemony, according to Cox (1990), is like a “pillow” that absorbs “blows” and sooner or later
the “would-be assailant” will be subsumed to conform to the dictates of the world power. In this
regard, a blossoming historical bloc and counter-hegemony could pose a threat. However,
according to Cox (1990), by the power of transformismo, the hegemony attempts to absorb
potential counterhegemonic philosophies and tries to coalesce these ideas within the hegemonic
framework ideology.
U.S. Power Politics and Counter-Hegemonic Discourse to the ICC
As world hegemonies, international institutions not only “constrain and enable individual
states but also contrite to changing the fabric of world politics” (Wivel & Paul, 2019, p. 90).
International institutions, in this regard, set barriers that seem to limit the discursive arrogation of
a superpower’s authority and influence in world politics and world actions such as war. Wivel
and Paul (2019) define power politics as the
contestation among individual states using their particular resources and bargaining
strengths to influence the structure of relations and the conduct of other actors in the
context of institutions, power politics involves the efforts by states to influence the
formulation, application, and enforcement of the rules and regulations of a given
institution as well as the control of bureaucratic positions and allocation of resources
within it. (p. 10)
For Wivel and Paul (2019), international institutions in the contemporary era have principally
disappeared as a focal point for debates between realists and their critics.
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While realists do not contest the presence of international institutions, most realists
(structural realists) are unconvinced about their effect on state behavior and state actions.
According to Wivel and Paul (2019), structural realists assume that the structure of the
international system is “anarchic,” and therefore power politics have the tendency to dominate
discourse that concerns countries. Further, power and interests are the bedrock of international
politics, and, therefore, they constitute “the predominant forces driving world politics” (p. 10).
Thus, international institutions, in the structuralist view are “mere facilitators.” In this regard,
power politics, to these scholars, “involves the efforts by states to influence the formulation,
application, and enforcement of the rules and regulations of a given institution as well as the
control of bureaucratic positions and allocations of resources within it” (p. 10). In this way,
powerful countries, such as the United States, wanted to exert their supremacy over world
policies. The international community protests he American rise to power in many ways,
especially, its quest to “lead” and to engage in just wars. Owing to these issues, a Gramscian
rhetorical analysis of international relations and foreign policy dilemmas must “insist upon an
ethical dimension to analysis so the questions of justice, legitimacy and moral credibility are
integrated sociologically into the whole and into any of its key concepts” (Gill, 1993, pp. 24-25).
Agenda Setting Power and the United States Counter-Hegemony
We have established earlier that the hegemony is strong and active. Accordingly, it
invites opposition and justifies countries not acquiescing to its common sense ideology. For Gill
(1993), the accomplishment of hegemony within a historical moment of social orientation is an
intricate and “contradictory process,” since counter-hegemonic forces can contest the dominant
organizational and “political arrangements” (p. 42). Gill adduces that the hegemony is even more
difficult to achieve internationally because there seems to be no universal world state or fully-
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fledged international civil society. However, Gill continues that there is a considerable
framework both of “international law and of international organizations (and thus a set of
international norms, rules, and values) which is partly interwoven with an internationalized
structure of production and exchange” (p. 41). In Gill’s terminology, an “international
hegemony” normally relates to the
dominance and leadership of a powerful state within the system of international relations,
achieving power over other states. However, this is an unsatisfactory definition, since it
associates social forces with a territorial entity, whereas the global system needs to be
conceived as a totality, and the social forces which operate within that system are not
territorially bounded or determined. (Gill, 1993, pp. 41-42)
Accordingly, the hegemony constitutes an anatomy of values and identifications regarding the
character of an ideology that subjectifies countries (Cox, 1990). These values, within a
hegemonic formation or historical bloc, are uncontested and appear as uncontrived conventions.
Therefore, the international hegemony obtains its status when most states acquiesce to the
dominant narratives of other states (Cox, 1990). For Gill (1993), an effort to engineer a
“hegemonic system of a hegemonic system of rule will tend to generate, dialectically, a set of
counter-hegemonic forces, which may or may not be progressive” (p. 43). Hence, critiquing U.S.
resistance to the ICC is a useful undertaking.
The Rome Statute as an Embodiment of Ideographs
Writing about what he terms “ideographs,” McGee presents that ideographs are concepts
in political and social discourse that move people and societies “toward or away from an object
of collective consciousness” (McGee, 1979, p. 79). McGee frames this concept because of the
way the concept of “ideology” has experienced mutations, being assigned all sort of names and
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revisions to suit scholarly practices. According to McGee, “We are presented with a brute,
undeniable phenomenon: Human beings in collectivity behave and think differently than human
beings in isolation” (p. 2). McGee agrees with Marx that the problem of consciousness is
primarily practical; this becomes explicit in the description and evaluation of the validity and
licitness of “public motives” (p. 4).
To McGee, analyzing ideographic usage in political rhetoric exposes the intensity of
structures of “public motives” that shape and influence an individual worldview. Thus, people
are “conditioned,” not directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that
function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses, for behavior and belief. In this way, ideographs
function as a critical device for us to analyze how common sense operates rhetorically. When a
claim is warranted by such terms as “law, liberty, tyranny, or trial by jury, in other words, it is
presumed that human beings will react automatically” (p. 6). For McGee, when a group of young
Americans decided to go to Montreal instead of to fight in a civil war, they displayed good
judgement. He sees this as a rhetoric of control, a system of persuasion that is occasioned to be
workable on the whole community. While McGee argues that a rhetoric of war is constructed to
make citizens consent and open to war’s necessity, we are oblivious of the fact that it is a
“rhetoric” that warrants negative and undesirable public judgment. McGee clarifies that the most
crucial point about ideographs is that they are prevalent in material discourse, “functioning
clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousnesses. They are not invented by observers;
they come to be a part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate” (p. 7). What
McGee means here is that ideographs embody the lived experiences of people, and the ideas to
which they have been predisposed. This also means, obviously, that common sense ideology is
purposefully articulated to sustain relations of power through discourse.
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Accordingly, the UN uses the <justice> ideograph as rhetorical strategy to frame the need
for an International Criminal Court — mainly, how it discursively formulated a historical
moment. For Eagleton (1991), ideology is a “process of production of meanings, … ideas
characteristic of a particular social group or class; ideas which help to legitimate a dominant
political power” (pp. 1-2). We have established that the hegemony tries to maintain systems of
control to legitimate its existence by consent and not coercion. Thus, an institution uses discourse
as bargaining power. Eagleton continues that ideology is also “the conjuncture of discourse and
power; the medium in which conscious actors make sense of their world” (p. 2). Although there
were discussions from the 1950s about the establishment of an international court to deal with
organized crime against humanity did not materialize. However, in the post-Cold War period,
consequences that elevated the U.S. as the unipolar hegemon became a “problem” for the world.
It was no wonder that once-powerful states in Europe supported this view wholeheartedly. The
rising power and influence of the U.S. were threatening. As such, the historical moment called
for a soft-balancing approach that would truncate the “arrogance” of the U.S. Thus, member
nations of the UN were encrypted into its ideological, albeit rhetorical, maneuvering.
Locating a dominant ideograph requires attention to its diachronic and synchronic
structure (McGee, 1980; Neville-Shepard & de Saint Felix, 2020). Studying an ideograph
diachronically means that critics must be in tune with its derivation or source of its “historical
development” to tease out its “empirical uses in a variety of historically grounded texts” (Ewalt,
2011, p. 373). In contrast, studying ideographs synchronically calls for appreciating how their
meanings transform and shape discourse in the moment. For Neville-Shepard and de Saint Felix
(2020), ideographs such as <liberty> and <family>. Accordingly, “because words become
ideographs through socialization, personified ideographs may be socially constructed to
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represent the same abstract values that normally function ideographically” (Neville-Shepard &
de Saint Felix, 2020, p. 4). Essentially, analysis of ideographs push rhetorical scholars to see that
as the world evolves, moves, creates, and responds to particular discursive creations inherent in
historical moments; simply put, words invoke new meanings. The analysis of ideographs also
enhances ideological criticism. This is because it helps rhetorical scholars properly delineate and
isolate the workings of ideologies and place them in appropriate perspectives for critique. In this
discourse, <Justice>, within the historical moment, means many things. While the UN frames
this ideograph as a controlling device to gain legitimacy, this ideograph might have evoked a
different meaning to different actors and member states. For instance, the arguments the U.S.
advances for war could be interpreted as bringing “justice” and freedom to the world or to
specific target areas. In this vein, creating an institution to bring justice to victims has conflicting
meanings.
As I will argue in the next section, U.S. presidents have motives for engaging in war.
From this perspective, crafting an International Criminal Court to challenge U.S. hegemonic
status would be detrimental. In other words, the U.S. boasts of a robust judicial and democratic
system that punishes crime in various form. Creating multiple multilateral establishments to deal
with problems that are addressed by the U.S. becomes problematic. Consequently, the United
States expresses incredulity toward the term <justice> and <war crimes.> 9/11 placed a
responsibility on American presidents for novel discursive reiterations of the concept of war —
in order to bring justice to the world and to purge terrorists, for instance. In this case, <war
crimes> and <justice> articulated by the UN connote something different than what the counterhegemony, the U.S., means by such terms. On the ICC website, “Justice is a key prerequisite for
lasting peace. International justice can contribute to long‐term peace, stability, and equitable
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development in post‐conflict societies. These elements are foundational for building a future free
of violence” (International Criminal Court, n.d.). Consequently, the discourse of the ICC
engendered different national definitions of this idea — making it incoherent to powerful
countries such as the U.S. who feels the ICC would undermine its national security objectives.
Gencarella (2010) discusses Gramsci’s views about language. According to him, what
precisely inspired Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is the philological phenomenon. This is
because “people could conquer another not so much through the use of weapons, but rather by
imposing customs and modes of thought” (Ives, 2004, p. 28). On the political significance of
language, Ives (2005) maintains that Gramsci’s notion of hegemony involves the “creation” of a
collective will. Consequently, Gramsci advances that,
‘language’ is essentially a collective term which does not presuppose any single thing
existing in time and space. Language also means culture and philosophy (if only at the
level of common sense) and therefore the fact of ‘language’ is in reality a multiplicity of
facts more or less organically coherent and coordinated. At the limit, it could be said that
every speaking being has a personal language of his own, that is his own particular way
of thinking and feeling. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 349)
Thus, the Rome Statute that established the ICC was a soft-balancing approach to restrain U.S.
influence and its power politics. Its provisions highlight specific vital issues like the war on
aggression or war crimes. I attempt to understand why the U.S. defies UN treaties by analyzing
the taken for granted provisions to which the UN expects countries to consent. In the arena of
realpolitik or power-politics, any soft balancing strategy orchestrated by a global power is likely
to be discountenanced by other significant powers/players.
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Conclusion
This chapter examined the rhetoric of power in resistance that the U.S., through its postCold War Presidents, appropriated to confront the strategic maneuvers of the ICC, a key UN
agency. I uncovered how the various administrations create conflicting and consonant foreign
policy visions to rhetorical strategize American exceptionalism and exalt and sustain America as
the World’s superpower. In the next chapter, I uncover the implications, both theoretical and
practical of my analysis. I also present directions for future studies.
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I analyze U.S. power in resistance rhetoric to UN and its treaties.
Specifically, I analyze the rhetoric of the presidential administrations (Clinton, Bush, Obama,
and Trump) towards the ICC. I explore the rhetorical genealogy of U.S. opposition to the ICC
and its influence on diplomatic rhetoric, U.S. international relations, and U.S. foreign policy in
the twenty first century.
U.S. Opposition, Agitational Slogans, and anti-ICC Rhetoric
Gramsci (1978) used the phrase “agitational slogans” to refer to how political parties
craft a “political formula” that corresponds to a real phase of historical development with the
ultimate aim of winning power (p. 375). Gramsci was writing this in response to how
intellectuals could mobilize all the rhetorical, material, and political resources available to offset
the dominant authority (fascist regime). These “agitational slogans” represent ideas that must
continually be rehearsed. In this discourse, U.S. agitational slogans against the ICC treaty are
masked by certain cardinal principles of American historical and ideological development. These
agitational slogans are also articulated to unmask and demystify the powers accrued by the
international hegemon, which in this case is the UN and its agencies. It is also clear that
American transnational hegemony – such as its ideas, material capabilities, and institutions (Cox,
1981) – feels threatened. In this way, the U.S. resorted to strategies to soft-balance and
counteract the UN's dominant common sense. Writing in Foreign Policy, Žižek (2009) illustrates
that the U.S. foreign policy vision under George W. Bush, for instance, was not the National
Security Strategy of 2002 (that also detailed U.S. relations with the ICC). Instead, Žižek argues
that George W. Bush engaged in an “aggressive pursuit of contradictory goals” that included the
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promotion of democracy and liberty, sustaining U.S. hegemony, among many other foreign
policy goals to construct a new world order for the twenty-first century (Žižek, 2009, para. 1).
Benzing (2004) postulates that John Bolton (A former U.S. Ambassador to the UN under
Bush and Trump’s former National Security Advisor) carefully summarizes the crux of U.S.
antagonism against the ICC in a statement he issued at the American Enterprise Institute in 2003.
Bolton posits that the “ICC is an organization that runs contrary to fundamental American
precepts and basic constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, checks and balances, and
national independence” (Bolton, 2003, n.d., para. 2). Bolton expresses similar concerns about the
ICC in numerous other fora. Other arguments by the U.S. against the ICC, Benzing synopsizes,
are as follows – the danger of seemingly shallow and politically machinated inquiry and
prosecutions against United States nationals, in particular, because of the prosecutor's
competence to activate trial charges (Roben, 2003). Also, there were allegations of insufficient
protections to ensure fair court proceedings, particularly in the absence of a jury (Stapleton,
1999); apprehensiveness about United States sovereignty, specifically, suspicion of “unlawful
jurisdictional” appropriation of discretion by the ICC over citizens of states that are not a party to
the Statute (Bergsmo, 2000; Morris, 2001; Paust, 2000; Scharf, 2001); overemphasizing crimes
beyond the scope of customary international law [ratione materiae] (Wagner, 2003); dispute
over a potential inclusion of “the crime of aggression” (Reismam, 2002); and lastly, the waning
power of the UN Security Council (Wedgewood, 2001).
These ideological positions were then reified into various political and legal structures to
undermine the Court and exert U.S. supremacy over the ICC, and by extension, the international
arena. This is also a means to conserve the authority of the U.S. as a world superpower and its
hegemonic position in international affairs. This rhetorical trajectory is crucial for how
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presidential rhetoric, since the Clinton administration, has been crucial to scrutinize U.S.
relationship with the Court and its impact in asserting U.S. hegemony and the construction of a
unipolar world view, as well the U.S. foreign policy vision in the 21st Century. Now that we
discussed how the counter-hegemonic rhetoric of the U.S. opposes international institutions and
treaties, it is now time to see how the various presidencies discursively resisted the ICC.
President Clinton will start this genealogy.
President Clinton’s Favorable Internationalism Rhetoric
President Clinton, on December 31, 2000, grudgingly ordered his Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, to append his signature to the Rome Statute. This single
action may be interpreted in many ways. On a Sunday morning, writes Schwartz (2003), the
Ambassador-at-Large traveled to the United Nations based on directives from the National
Security Coordinator, Samuel Berger. Schwartz further notes that President Clinton’s decision to
sign the Rome Statute to allow for U.S engagement speaks to his administration’s inclination
toward multilateralism.
I critique his administration’s fervor for multilateralism (while also extending the
discourse of American exceptionalism) and how this rhetoric occasioned support for UN actions
and, ultimately, undergirded narratives and discourse for the Rome Statute (ICC Treaty).
Clinton’s Rhetorical Justification for the U.S. to Internationalize
Clinton has been consistent is his commitment to the United Nations. During his address
to the UN in 1997, Clinton affirmed his conviction in alliances, partnerships, free trade
agreements, global information agreements, and “binding international commitments that protect
the environment as well as safeguard human rights” (Clinton, 1997, para. 8). Clinton (1997)
argued that,
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through this web of institutions and arrangements, nations are now setting the
international ground rules for the 21st Century, laying a foundation for security and
prosperity for those who live within them, while isolating those who challenge them from
the outside. This system will develop and endure only if those who follow the rules of
peace and freedom fully reap their rewards. Only then will our people believe that they
have a stake in supporting and shaping the emerging international system. (Clinton, 1997,
para. 9)
Clinton seems to strongly believe in the UN and especially in multilateralism especially by not
questioning some of the policies and precepts emanating from the global body.
In consonance with the above, Clinton argues that the United Nations must exercise a
leading role in shaping the international system by identifying areas and “filling in the fault
lines” that are pertinent to a new global era, especially as the world transitions to the 21st century.
Clinton reasons that the UN has charted a unique path during its first half-century, and the global
body will equally be significant in mobilizing efforts toward addressing international issues
during the next half-century, most notably, in the pursuit of peace and security as well as
promoting human rights. This may account for why, despite his opposition, he chose to support
the Court (ICC) by signing the treaty on the last day permitted by the accord for acceptance. In
this same address to the UN in 1997, Clinton highlights the situations in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, which the UN cited as justifications for an International Criminal Court (ICC). Because
it
was conceived in the cauldron of war, the United Nations’ first task must remain the
pursuit of peace and security. For 50 years, the U.N. has helped prevent world war and
nuclear holocaust. Unfortunately, conflicts between nations and within nations had
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endured. From 1945 until today, they have cost 20 million lives. Just since the end of the
Cold War, each year, there have been more than 30 armed conflicts in which more than a
thousand people have lost their lives, including, of course, a quarter of a million killed in
the former Yugoslavia and more than half a million in Rwanda. (Clinton, 1997, para. 11)
In this regard, Clinton (1997) justifies that the “The U.N. cannot build nations, but it can help
nations to build themselves by fostering legitimate institutions of government, monitoring
elections and laying a strong foundation for economic reconstruction” (para. 17).
With this acknowledgment, Clinton states that the United States must lead these efforts.
An exciting component of Clinton’s rhetorical approach is the way he touts U.S. support for the
structures of the UN. Not only does he acknowledge that the UN’s efforts are important, but that
they will also only succeed through the benefits of U.S. exceptionalism – in other words, U.S.
involvement is key to an effective ICC. The U.S., he argues, should spearhead the attempt to
quell “the spread of these global criminal syndicates,” as well as the urgent common quest of the
world to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. Regarding these, according to Clinton, “We
cannot allow them to fall or to remain in the wrong hands. Here, too, the United Nations must
lead, and it has, from UNSCOM in Iraq to the International Atomic Energy Agency, now the
most expansive global system ever devised to police arms control agreements” (Clinton, 1997,
para. 22). At one point, he acknowledges the supremacy of the United States to lead such efforts.
On the other hand, the UN must be at the forefront of international initiatives. In effect, Clinton
underscores that both the UN and the U.S. are global hegemonies and must continue to work
together toward desirable universal futures. However, it is not so much that they work together
as much as it is that the U.S. is paramount, and the UN serves as its proxy.
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Clinton, in this address, elevates his administration’s favorable posture toward
internationalism. President Clinton surmises that he was the “first of 146 leaders to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, our commitment to end all nuclear tests for all time -- the
longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control” (Clinton, 1997, para. 23). As
I indicated above, Clinton trusts much more in international institutions and, expressly, the UN
so much so that he desires the United States to be the lead in signing treaties and other binding
international agreements. At the same time, this argument communicates American
exceptionalism. Clinton reasons that the United States being the first signatory to this treaty
signals that the United States is special. Clinton (1997) justifies that the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty will prevent countries with nuclear power from “developing more advanced and more
dangerous weapons.” The Test Ban Treaty, he argues, will prompt other states to acquire such
devices. He notes that “I am sending this crucial treaty to the United States Senate for
ratification. Our common goal should be to enter the CTBT into force as soon as possible, and I
ask for all of you to support that goal” (Clinton, 1997, para. 23). Signing treaties of this nature
was why his administration seems not to have engaged in a war of aggression or war crimes.
While this appears to be the case for Clinton, Bush would argue that the ICC risks pursuing
politicized prosecutions because his administration often favored unilateral efforts. I will explore
subsequently in this chapter.
A key argument in Clinton’s administration’s unwavering support for multilateralism
manifests in his support of a proposal establishing an international court for criminal
jurisprudence. Clinton advocates that to “punish those responsible for crimes against humanity
and to promote justice so that peace endures, we must maintain our strong support for the U.N.’s
war crime tribunals and truth commissions. And before the Century ends, we should establish a

106

permanent international court to prosecute the most serious violations of humanitarian law”
(Clinton, 1997, para. 27). This pronouncement in 1997 set the stage for the International Law
Commission to resume meetings in Italy to draft the Statute. The United Nations realized that
with Clinton’s unalloyed devotion to the UN's ideals, he would do his best to ensure the Court
was established. This also explains why deliberations were fast-tracked, and the Statute was
ready by 2000. Even though Clinton disagreed with portions of the ICC treaty, he signed it on
the last day of the year in 2000 when the new administration was transitioning to power (to tie
the hands of the incoming administration to continue deliberations for an international court).
After this declaration, Clinton further establishes that the United Nations must “continue to lead”
in safeguarding that “today’s progress does not come at tomorrow’s expense” (Clinton, 1997,
para. 33). As such, Clinton articulates that the Secretary General was bent on pitching the “most
far-reaching reform of the United Nations in its history – not to make the U.N. smaller as an end
in itself, but to make it better. The United States strongly supports its leadership. We should pass
the Secretary General’s reform agenda this session” (Clinton, 1997, para. 35).
By affirming his and America’s most reliable support to the UN, Clinton sees the UN as
indispensable to the sustenance of U.S. unipolar identity in the world. President Clinton echoed
his commitment to globalization by confirming U.S. financial obligations to the UN. For Clinton,
continued funding of the UN expresses America’s unremitting pledge to the ideals of the global
body, mostly because “the United States was a founder of the U.N. We are proud to be its host.
We believe in its ideals. We continue to be, as we have been, its largest contributor. We are
committed to seeing the United Nations succeed in the 21st Century” (Clinton, 1997, para. 36).
In order to strengthen the American promise to the UN, President Clinton avows that he
prioritized his engagement to Congress on a “comprehensive legislation” that ensures “Congress’
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actions to solve … problems reflect a strong bipartisan commitment to the United Nations and to
America’s role within it” (Clinton, 1997, para. 37). Before President Clinton left office in
January 2001, all arrears were paid to the UN. Additionally, by leveraging Congress to take
legislative action to affirm American participation in the treaty, Clinton used Congress as a
rhetorical maneuver and a very effective rhetorical tactic to induce the collective will of the
American people toward his resolve for America’s leadership in this part of the international
arena. However, Clinton was oblivious to the fact that the UN’s hegemony was weak, which
allowed Bush to ratchet up U.S. supremacy and global authority to functionally end Clinton’s
multilateral ideology.
Clinton did this in response to international concern. The historical moment included the
criminal atrocities in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, etc., where international peace agreements
and various tribunals were established to deal with those international atrocities. At that point,
the U.S. was accused of doing little to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, for instance (Meyer,
1999). Thus, Clinton wanted to redeem America’s image and assert U.S. leadership even as the
world transitioned to the 21st century. The Rome Statute was seen as the perfect solution to the
growing international atrocities. This context (especially Rwanda) is crucial for providing an
understanding of Clinton’s motives toward the ICC. This is because Clinton’s failure to act in
Rwanda and the resulting actions – motivated by guilt – enhanced his unwavering support for the
idea of an International Criminal Court.
Clinton’s Constitutive Rhetoric at the Glorification of UN’s Common Sense
Clinton sustains his admiration of the UN in his 1999 speech to the General Assembly.
Clinton (1999) hints that “we have learned how to come together, through the U.N. and other
institutions, to advance common interests and values” (para. 2). For him, the United Nations is
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“indispensable” and that U.S. commitment to the U.N. ensures that the international body plays a
crucial role in American foreign policy into the next century. Most definitely, the concept of
American exceptionalism is reified by Clinton over and over again. In this way, the U.S. has the
deontological duty and “responsibility to equip the U.N. with the resources it needs to be
effective.” Clinton does not reflect on how other nations of the world might satisfy this purpose;
instead, he underscores the American role in the formation of this global body and why only the
U.S. could have a stake in reforming the structures and the successful operations of the UN. In
this way, Clinton seems to be glorifying his formidable role in sustaining and improving the
administrative structures of the UN. According to him, he “strongly supported the United States
meeting all its financial obligations to the United Nations, and I will continue to do so. We will
do our very best to succeed this year” (Clinton, 1999, para. 41).
Indeed, the U.S, under Clinton, paid the UN its arrears, which was highlighted by the
news media. In a press statement, James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman to President Clinton on
December 21, 1999, notes:
The United States yesterday paid to the United Nations $51 million, virtually completing
its payment of 1999 annual dues. On December 16, 1999, the U.S. had paid $100 million
toward bills owed from past years. This $100 million payment represented the full
implementation of the first tranche of UN arrears payments authorized under legislation
signed by President Clinton on November 29, 1999. Seven certifications that the UN and
other international organizations do not infringe on U.S. sovereignty had to be made for
this funding to be released. These payments will be sufficient to avoid the automatic loss
of the U.S. vote in the UN General Assembly, an outcome the Clinton Administration
and the U.S. Congress worked together to avoid. More fundamentally, the
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implementation of the arrear’s legislation is critically important to support U.S.
leadership in the United Nations. (Foley, 1999, para. 1-2)
Given the above, Foley (1999) maintains that the United Nations “remains an institution of great
importance to the pursuit of U.S. national security interests” (para. 3). Recognizing that “The
United States is proud of the key role it played in the creation of the UN,” Foley (1999) reiterates
that the UN is “proud to have been the organization’s largest financial supporter for the past 54
years” (para. 3). Therefore, the payments made by the U.S. to the UN budget represent
assessments and debts to the whole UN structure of about “$824 million since September 1 of
this year” (para. 3). Foley’s (1999) resolve in this statement glorifies American exceptionalism
since the U.S. is the only nation with enough resources to lead the world and, as a result, it
indicates how the U.S. must play a central role in restructuring the UN. In this way, America
must be respected in every negotiation, and therefore, the UN must listen to the “voice” of the
U.S. in all issues. In this way, the Clinton administration attempts to leverage its hegemonic
status as a way to mold the UN to American foreign policy whims.
U.S. Foreign Policy Architecture toward the UN Under Clinton
Clinton appointed experts in international law, foreign policy, and national defense as a
critical part of his administration. For example, he included David Scheffer, a professor of
international law and also the lead negotiator of the U.S. on the Rome Statute; Madeline K.
Albright, as Secretary of State and former ambassador to the UN; and Richard C. Holbrooke,
ambassador to the UN between 1999 and 2001, to be instrumental for his foreign affairs team.
Also, he had Joseph Biden and John Kerry as members of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. I begin with Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, the first female Secretary
of State in U.S. history. Secretary Albright was also a former ambassador to the UN between

110

1993 to 1997 before assuming the Secretary of State’s role. During the negotiation stages for the
formation of the ICC, Albright became the Secretary of State.
In a 1996 speech, Ambassador Madeline Albright mentions the value of the UN to the
United States. For Albright (1996a), the United States must support President Clinton’s
resolution to commit considerable resources to the UN. She quotes Presidents Truman and
Reagan on why multinational cooperation was the best for the United States to advance its
interests, especially as the world shifts to the 21st century. This rhetorical approach advances an
argument that reinvigorates the authoritative appeal of these Presidents who were crucial to the
formation and maintenance of the UN. This also thrusts the impact of U.S. hegemony into the
limelight. Even though she recounts the apparent lapses in the UN system, she believes that with
U.S. commitment to the UN's ideals, there could be meaningful reforms. Albright (1996a)
contends that “we will strengthen and reform the UN. And, because we are Americans, we will
not shy from the responsibilities of global leadership” (para. 48). Global leadership, according to
Albright, was crucial because America symbolizes perfection. In that regard, it is a good cause to
exalt American values unto the international arena.
In another public address at a Town Meeting in September 1996, Ambassador Albright
(1996b) notes that the UN’s role in strengthening justice and the rule of law is manifested in
agencies such as the UN Commission on Human Rights and the establishment of War Crimes
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Balkans. Albright (1996b) contends that America’s payments to
the UN, and U.S. “contributions are important to us; they are among the building blocks of a
safer and more just world. And yet, we each pay less than $7 a year – or about the price of a
movie ticket – for the entire UN system, for everything from blue helmets for peacekeepers to
polio vaccines for babies” (para. 43). By making this assertion, Albright (1996b) invokes a
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constitutive rhetoric by exploiting the conscience and emotions of the people on the continuous
support of the UN and its policies. Constitutive rhetoric, argues Charland (1987), occurs when
people are transformed to believe in a particular worldview by making them subjects of a
discourse. In doing this, Albright seeks to dispel some misperceptions by Americans regarding
the effectiveness of the global body. Albright (1996b) suggests that “there is a myth propagated
by some that the United States is running around the world doing the bidding of the UN. In New
York, most of my foreign counterparts would argue that the reverse is closer to the truth” (para.
48). Albright’s arguments also expose the secrecy that clouds U.S. engagement with
international bodies and even foreign policy actions. This discrete conduct of U.S. foreign policy
activity occurs because of the expanding powers of the President of the U.S., which enables the
presidency to issue executive orders on foreign policy concerns rather than seeking
Congressional approval (Hiland, 2017; 2019).
Albright recognizes that most Americans cannot grasp the intricacies of American
foreign policy. Therefore, Americans must be conditioned to accept everything emanating from
Washington as the best for the country. Albright’s position masks the collective intuition of the
American people, thereby interpellating them with the hegemonic ideology of American
exceptionalism. In this way, the hegemonic power reproduces itself by concealing
authoritarianism through incorporating people into the larger social structure (Nguyen, n.d.). For
Albright, “Under the UN Charter, the only body with the power to compel a nation to do
something is the Security Council, and as one of five permanent members of the Council, we
have great influence over what it decides” (1996b, para. 49). Ambassador Albright argues that
the Security Council’s backing was helpful in empowering President George H. W. Bush to
establish a “multinational coalition” that won the Persian Gulf War. Because America was able
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to obtain support from the Security Council, Albright mentions that the Security Council, in the
same manner, worked with President Clinton to ensure an “agreement from others to participate
in restoring democracy to Haiti and joined us in deploring the illegal shootdown by Cuba of two
U.S. civilian aircraft” (Albright, 1996b, para. 50).
In this way, Senator Albright underscores the immense support that the U.S. enjoys from
the UN. Because of this support, it is unacceptable for Americans to question U.S. actions in the
world since it commands supreme authority in world affairs. For Albright (1996b),
Opponents of American participation and leadership in the UN should understand: We do
not face a choice between acting only through the UN or only alone. We want – and need
– both options. If you're building a house, for some jobs, you’ll need a wrench, for some
a hammer, for some a screwdriver, for some all three. So, in diplomacy, an instrument
like the UN will be useful in some situations, useless in others, and extremely valuable in
getting the whole job done. (para. 51)
With this analogy, Albright begins to the negative popular conceptions of U.S. engagement with
international institutions. Albright (1996b) mentions that despite “all this, we know that some
Americans are simply never going to be comfortable with the UN. Either they fear it will evolve
into a world government, which is nonsense, or they are upset by the fact that it is full of
foreigners, which really can’t be helped” (para. 51). Since most Americans, as Albright suggests,
cannot appreciate American foreign policy leadership, it means the American vision of the
world, mainly constructed by post-Cold War presidents, is fragmentary and not uniform. As
Gramsci (1971) enunciates, common sense is a “conception which, even in the brain of one
individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and
cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 419). The
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conflicting ideologies prevent Americans from coming to terms with the real foreign policy track
pursued by the U.S.
Ambassador Albright recognizes the dominant status of the UN. Despite that the U.S.
enjoys someprivilege from the UN because it created the international body, the UN cannot fully
pursue American interests. The UN is “inherently hard to manage” because, “with 185 members
of the board; each from a different culture; each with a different philosophy of management;
each with unshakable confidence in his or her own opinions; and each with a brother-in-law who
is unemployed,” it becomes challenging for the U.S., and even the UN, to manage the different
expectations of its member countries (Albright, 1996b, para. 54). For Albright (1996b), this has
resulted in a “UN bureaucracy” leading to “elephantine proportions.” Consequently, Albright
argues that the “elephant” (UN) is required to “do gymnastics.” Albright means that the strong
position occupied by the UN has made it difficult to operate. Hence, the U.S. must lead the
creation of reforms by ensuring the UN advances the U.S. significantly in its operations. This
means that, even though the UN has a strong membership, it is weak because of the unnecessary
bureaucracy in its administrative structure. More so, the UN must rely on financial contributions
from its members. Therefore, the UN must relinquish its power to a more vibrant superpower –
the U.S. – to lead the charge in world affairs.
As U.S Ambassador-designate to the UN, Richard C. Holbrooke, in remarks to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, also guarantees his unalloyed devotion to the UN's ideals.
According to Holbrooke (1999), advancing a reform agenda at the UN is of paramount
importance to the U.S. in order to create a better relationship with the UN. As such, Holbrooke
ensures that he will advance legislation that provides meaningful restrictions to the UN that align
with U.S. national interests. In this way, Holbrooke (1999) acknowledges that “American
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leadership and influence are the tools necessary to advance our goals and interests at the UN”
(para. 12). In effect, the Clinton administration is pleased with the UN and, therefore, sees the
UN as a rhetorical platform for international supremacy. In a recent essay, Warner (2019)
postulates that Holbrooke “incarnated the hubris of American exceptionalism” (para. 4) because
he is a giant in American foreign policy. Thus, Holbrooke also articulates a clearer vision of how
the U.S. should engage with the world and, most importantly, international organizations after
the Cold War.
Congressional Rhetoric and the Limits of Presidential Power under Clinton
In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1998, Senator Rod Grams
labeled the ICC a “dangerous” global institution. David Scheffer, the lead U.S. negotiator on the
Rome Statute, also indicates that the final output of the treaty contradicts the essential doctrines
of treaty law (Scheffer, 1998). However, the Congressional rhetorical opposition to the ICC is
more profound in a statement by Senator Helms of North Carolina. When Senator Helms
addresses the United Nations Security Council in his capacity as the chair of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, he articulates several measures regarding reforms that must be
instituted in the operations of the UN. Most importantly, he ends the remaining aspects of his
address to talk about the ICC treaty, which was about to be operationalized by the end of the
calendar year (December 2000). He begins by acknowledging the increasing dominance of the
UN in world affairs – “Candor compels that I reiterate this warning: the American people will
never accept the claims of the United Nations to be the sole source of legitimacy on the use of
force” in the world (Helms, 2000a, para. 57). According to him, even though the U.S. signed the
UN Charter some fifty years ago, it did so by not ceding any
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syllable of American sovereignty to the United Nations. Under our system, when
international treaties are ratified, they simply become domestic U.S. law. Consequently,
they carry no greater or lesser weight than any other domestic U.S. law. Treaty
obligations can be superseded by a simple Act of Congress. This was the intentional
design of our founding fathers, who cautioned against entering into ‘entangling
alliances.’ (Helms, 2000a, para. 60).
He reiterates that the U.S. should join a treaty organization only if the US dominates the
institution. Senator Helms argues that the U.S. abides by provisions of treaties because they form
crucial components of domestic law. More importantly, “elected” representatives have judged
those treaties to be in line with U.S. interests. In that respect, “no treaty or law can ever
supersede the one document that all Americans hold sacred: The U.S. Constitution” (Helms,
2000a, p. 61.).
Consequently, as the UN transitioned to acquire a monopolistic grip on “international
moral legitimacy,” it alarms Americans, which means that it will be resisted by the U.S. This
also represents the Gramscian notion of hegemony — that is, moral leadership, so long as
countries consent to UN power and authority. More so, Helms reasons that the UN claims a
political authority over Americans without their consent, and that is why the establishment of the
ICC is a case to consider for how the UN acts beyond its power. He explains:
Consider: the Rome Treaty purports to hold American citizens under its jurisdiction —
even when the United States has neither signed nor ratified the treaty. In other words, it
claims sovereign authority over American citizens without their consent. How can the
nations of the world imagine for one instant that Americans will stand by and allow such
a power-grab to take place? (Helms, 2000a, para. 63)
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Helms’ argument means that the UN is exacting a transnational common sense that is
fragmentary and not in consonance with how the U.S. views the world in the 21st century.
Gramsci (1971) reminds us that common sense is always in flux and
“identical in time and space. It is the ‘folklore’ of philosophy, and, like folklore, it takes
countless different forms. Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception
which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and
inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses
whose philosophy it is” (p. 419).
Helms contends that international law could not defeat Hitler; neither did it defeat the Cold War.
According to him, “What stopped the Nazi march across Europe, and the Communist march
across the world, was the principled projection of power by the world's great democracies.”
From this perspective, Helms argues that “No U.N. institution — not the Security Council, not
the Yugoslav tribunal, not a future ICC — is competent to judge the foreign policy and national
security decisions of the United States” (Helms, 2000a, para. 69). By stating these, he justifies
that American courts can even refuse cases that are related to national security interests by
saying that those cases are above their jurisdictions.
He, therefore, avers that, “If we do not submit our national security decisions to the
judgment of a Court of the United States, why would Americans submit them to the judgment of
an International Criminal Court, a continent away, comprised of mostly foreign judges elected by
an international body made up of the membership of the U.N. General Assembly?” (Helms,
2000a, p. 69). Americans, according to Helms (2000a), express cynicism toward concepts like
an “International Criminal Court” and that the UN’s resolve to enforce a “utopian” idea of
“international law” is equivalent to denigrating the values of freedom that Americans cherish.
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Helms concludes that if the UN respects and acknowledges American rights and values, then the
U.S. will also cooperate with its directives. On the contrary, Helms (2000a) elucidates that if the
UN seeks to impose its “presumed authority” on America, then it will lead to the eventual U.S.
withdrawal from the UN. From this analysis, Helms argues that Clinton’s resolve to support an
international court is contrary to American values. While Helms’ rhetoric is acrimonious and
polarizing, his rhetorical posture also cautions further introspection and a moment for reflection
on American foreign policy in the 21st century.
In another Senate Committee hearing on foreign affairs on June 14, 2000, Senator Helms,
the Chairman of this committee, adduces that based on certain actions by the international
criminal tribunal of Yugoslavia, an International Criminal Court is likely to indict American
service members and officials. He subsequently introduces, for the first time, the American
Service Members Protection Act of 2000. Helms (2000b) advocated that the American
Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA) would block any U.S. collaboration with the “ICC so
long as the United States has not signed and ratified the Rome Treaty. It requires that United
States personnel be immunized from the ICC’s jurisdiction before the United States can
participate in any United Nations peacekeeping operation” (para. 11).
Further, the Act prevents the transmission of classified national security data to the Court.
The Act, continues Helms (2000b), also prohibits U.S. military aid to any country that has
ratified the Rome Treaty, “with a waiver for U.S. allies who have agreements that protect
Americans from extradition” (para. 12). Additionally, the Act “authorizes the President to use all
means necessary and appropriate to bring home any United States or allied personnel detained
against their will by or on behalf of the court” (Helms, 2000b, para. 13). Senator Helms
maintains that the Act does not prevent the United States from liaising with present or future ad
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hoc courts created through the Security Council. Consequently, the Act will also not thwart the
trial of “future Pol Pots and Saddam Husseins.” Additionally, Helms advances that the United
States does not accept the legality of the ICC's pretentious claim of jurisdiction over Americans.
Senator Helms recognizes that the International Criminal Court claims American citizens
will be under its influence, “notwithstanding the fact that the United States has neither signed nor
ratified the Rome Treaty. And if I have anything to do with it, the United States never will.”
Helms’ preoccupation with this Act is to rhetorically empower Congress to declare the ICC as an
invasion of and an affront to the human rights of Americans. Helms’ arguments prompt Congress
to enact legislation to forestall threats from the ICC in order to protect American interests.
Senator Helms chastised Clinton’s Secretary of State (Secretary Albright), who declared that the
United States planned to pursue a “good neighbor” policy with the ICC. Helms sees that position
as unwarranted and unfounded. As a result, Helms declares,
I want to know how we can be a good neighbor to a court that insists on its so-called right
to prosecute American servicemen and officials, even though the United States has
refused to join the Court. If other nations are going to insist on placing Americans under
the ICC’s jurisdiction against their will, then Congress has a right and responsibility to
place a cost on their obstinacy, and to ensure that our men and women in uniform are
protected. And that is why we are so pleased today to welcome the Honorable Caspar
Weinberger, who will share his perspective as a former U.S. Secretary of Defense on why
the prospect of international prosecutions of American servicemen and officials would
have a chilling effect on U.S. national security decisions. (Helms, 2000b, para.16-17)
Senator Grams, who is also a member of the committee, co-sponsored Senator Helms’ proposed
Act. Grams (2000) initiates proceedings to block the extradition of U.S. citizens to be tried by
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the ICC. He also had two initiatives signed into law that would prevent U.S. funds from
funneling into the ICC and thereby acknowledged that the ASPA would strengthen the efforts of
Senator Helms. Grams (2000) reasons that the supreme prerequisite for peace on this earth is
“not an International Criminal Court; it is the United States military” (para. 24). Grams (2000)
also scorns the position of international actors and the “like-minded” who advocated the
formation of the Court. Grams justifies his stance that “ironically, the very nations that have
created a court which inhibits our ability to project force have repeatedly called on the United
States to be the global enforcer. They should recognize that a treaty which hinders our military is
not only bad for America, but it is also bad for the international community” (Grams, 2000, para.
24). Consequently, Senator Grams emphasizes that “we cannot let this that happen” because,
“even if it is weak at its inception, the ICC’s scope and power can, and it will grow” (Grams,
2000, para. 26). In that vein, Senator Grams argues,
the Court will be an international institution without checks, without balances,
accountable to no state or institution for its sanctions or its actions. There will be no way
to appeal its decisions, except through the Court itself. And the rules of the Court will be
developed over time by the Court itself through custom and precedent. So, we must
affirm that the United States will fight any institution which claims to have power to
override the U.S. legal system and to pass judgment on our foreign policy actions. We
must refuse to let our soldiers and government officials be exposed to trial for promoting
the national security interests of the United States. (Grams, 2000, para. 27-28)
In effect, senator Grams fears the ICC would exercise totalitarian authority over the lives of
countries and individuals. The United States should firmly uphold a total policy of
noncooperation, no funding, and no acceptance of the Court's jurisprudence, along with a
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disregard for its rulings and an overall uncompromising resistance to ensure that the Security
Council does not refer any case to the Court.
In that same hearing, there was also a statement from Caspar W. Weinberger, a former
Secretary of Defense. His urgings were no different from senators Helms and Grams. However,
the themes inherent in his statement were virtually trying to echo American ideals and how a
“rogue” International Criminal Court would stain the heritage and values that America cherishes.
According to Weinberger (2000), there are bound to be cataclysmic events if America does not
take action to immunize American forces and American people from the actions of the
Court to which we thus far have decided we do not want to belong to …. Our status in the
world requires that we participate in a number of activities in different parts of the world.
We are a superpower. We are a country whose great good fortune and our strength and
our resources require us to bear certain responsibilities. We cannot bear those
responsibilities if we are going to have the people who are carrying out these very
difficult and dangerous duties for us are subject to prosecution by anyone who does not
particularly care for American foreign policy or anyone who does not particularly care
for America. And there are quite a few people like that in the world, as you know.
(Weinberger, 2000, para. 58-59)
Weinberger’s opinions raise important issues regarding foreign policy components. While
America should not accept or ratify the ICC treaty, the U.S. should also try to “lead” in
international affairs, particularly by redesigning its foreign policy focus that could circumvent
the eventual coming into force of an international tribunal that could potentially constrain U.S.
actions in the world. By leading, America should refocus its attention on other initiatives that
will enhance its international standing. The ASPA proposed by Senator Helms with support from
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some senators, according to Weinberger, would have a “chilling effect” on countries that have
ratified the treaty. Weinberger also expresses worry that the ICC was an obstacle to American
attempts to deal with terrorism at home and abroad because “with so many members from
various Third World countries, some of them hosts to terrorism, I would suspect that the ICC
would be used as a method of blocking any attempts by us that might be reasonably effective in
dealing with terrorism” (Weinberger, 2000, para. 69). There were also statements from
Professors Baikin and Wedgwood. They all agree that the treaty would not advance the interests
of the United States, and they restate the polarized and stern positions of senators Helms and
Grams.
Clinton’s Rhetorical Signature and “UnAmerican” Presidential Discourse
I began this section with how Clinton’s administration signed the Treaty on December
31, 2000, to allow for further discussions. The content of the statement authorizing David
Scheffer to sign the treaty was rhetorical. Clinton did not sign the treaty himself; he allowed
Scheffer to sign. Without Clinton’s imprimatur, the action clearly delegitimizes the authority of
the treaty. Even though the statement authorizing this assent to the ICC treaty was in his name,
David’s Scheffer’s signature cannot be regarded as the U.S. Presidential Seal. On the other hand,
it can be argued that the presidential directive means that Clinton supports the move. This is
debatable. However, Clinton’s 1997 speech at the UN, where he committed his administration to
the ICC, created the discursive moment and a rhetorical opportunity to the UN to negotiate the
ICC treaty. The many congressional debates and polarized positions about the ICC, coupled with
other international discourse about the treaty at the time, might have changed his view in the last
few days of his presidency.
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The defeat of the Democratic Party in the 2000 elections, however, provided opportunity
for him to escape the public backlash that his signature to the treaty would have generated. In an
unpopular move, he authorized the treaty to be signed for onward submission to the Congress for
ratification on the last day of the year. By signing the treaty on the last day of the year, Clinton’s
administration weakened overall American support for the bill. After signing the ICC treaty,
Clinton suggests that the treaty goes against American interest and therefore, implying that it
should not be ratified by the Senate. It was also a costly political mistake on the President’s part,
since Senator Helms and other Republican Senators hinted the Treaty would be “dead on
arrival.”
A careful inspection of the statement authorizing the assent to the treaty also yields some
rhetorical insights. According to Clinton, by signing this treaty, the United States reiterates her
“strong support for the international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity” (Clinton, 2000, para.1). Clinton asserts that
signing the treaty allows for further U.S. engagement in making the ICC “an instrument of
impartial and effective justice in the years to come” (Clinton, 2000, para. 1). Clinton reminds the
world of the historical record of American support and accountability for the Nuremberg
tribunals that tried Nazi war criminals. Clinton also mentions American leadership (a reference
to himself) when establishing international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Interestingly, Clinton hints that “our action today sustains that tradition of moral
leadership” (2000, para. 2). When Gramsci (1971) talks of moral leadership, Gramsci means
“that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as
‘intellectual and moral leadership’” (p. 57). Clinton’s choice of words casts the UN as a
hegemon. Through its principle of universality, the UN “subjugates” the world in a bid to gain
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“governmental power.” As Gramsci illustrates, the hegemony can exercise this power in a
manner that justifies it to lead. Clinton would have avoided backlash had his administration
offered possible alternatives, and if possible, not to have signed the treaty. However, not signing
the treaty would have also diminished the international standing of the U.S. in the post-Cold War
period since it would have weakened U.S. influence at the dawn of the new century. More
specifically, not signing the treaty would have degraded Clinton’s accomplishments in
Yugoslavia and undermined any attempt at overcoming his failure in Rwanda. Signing the treaty,
but not ratifying it, also gave the U.S. authority to assert its superiority on the international scene.
In essence, signing but not ratifying the treaty sends a clear message to the international
community that reminds them of American importance and supremacy. Additionally, Clinton’s
(proxy) signature established a discursive moment that renewed discussions on international law
and America’s role in multinational institutions.
Clinton observes that the ICC treaty would ensure that international conflicts such as war
crimes, genocides, and crimes against humanity will be addressed. He further underscores the
importance of the work of the U.S. delegation that worked with other countries and delegates to
draft the treaty – a development he described as “essential to the international credibility and
success of the ICC” (Clinton, 2000, para. 3). While recognizing that there are obvious flaws that
have the potential to dent the quality and effective operation of the Court, Clinton declares that
“with signature, however, we will be in a position to influence the evolution of the Court.
Without signature, we will not” (Clinton, 2000, para. 4). Even though he ordered that the treaty
be signed, he had some reservations — a posture that could be described as a rhetorical
maneuver to stab the UN in the back not submit the ICC treaty to the senate for ratification the
UN. As such, Clinton submits that,
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more must be done. Court jurisdictions over U.S. personnel should come only with U.S.
ratification of the treaty. The United States should have the chance to observe and assess
the functioning of the Court, over time, before choosing to become subject to its
jurisdiction. Given these concerns, I will not and do not recommend that my successor
submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are
satisfied. (Clinton, 2000, para. 6)
By offering this position, Clinton advises that the next president should not submit it for
ratification unless the concerns of the U.S. are met (i.e., the U.S. should have a say about cases to
be prosecuted at the ICC, procedures that prevents “politicized prosecutions,” and proper
working definitions of crimes). This also weakens his earlier concession agreeing to an
International Criminal Court in his 1997 speech at the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA). Such a hedging strategy deployed by Clinton constitutes a rhetorical move for the
Republicans to see some “Americanness” in his action. In effect, Clinton’s signature, while it
endorses the ICC, also cautions of its defects that future administrations and officials should
further consider. Wedgwood (2001) submits that the President’s assent to the treaty may
occasion an “international debate” over U.S. disposition toward the Court. The President’s
signature, according to Wedgwood, means that the United States enhances its “fund of goodwill”
(2001, p. 195).
Clinton’s action might seem “unAmerican” to some — however, it actually was quite the
opposite. Clinton could also be accorded the privileges as one of the U.S. presidents who
strengthened America’s hegemonic authority across the globe — partly due to his support for
multilateral organizations and global actions. He became President of the U.S. two years after the
Soviet Union collapsed. Therefore, how he managed to sustain U.S. leadership and project the
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U.S. to be a unipolar authority is commendable. He was involved in European crises – the
Kosovo issue. He also negotiated the cease fire in Northern Ireland, and support for the Dayton
agreements – all speak to his international status as a great leader whose foreign policy vision
supervised the unipolar world after the Cold War. It was during this period that America enjoyed
its unfettered global standing.
Polarized Positions Regarding American Foreign Policy Under Bush
The George W. Bush administration began its move to undermine the jurisdiction of the
International Court in its early days, less than a year after 9/11. Of course, the historical moment
provided the legitimate grounds to have that concern since the Bush administration was bent on
pursuing a “war on terrorism.” The first step the administration took to strain relations with the
treaty, and ultimately the UN, was to unsign the U.S. from the ICC treaty. Military action in
Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, would result in allegations of crimes against humanity and
war crimes. The Undersecretary of State under the Bush presidency, John Bolton, sent this letter
to Kofi Annan in 2002 to formally unsign the U.S. from the treaty. According to Bolton (2002),
This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party
to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its
signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to
become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary’s status lists
relating to this treaty. (Bolton, 2002, para. 1)
As an Undersecretary of State, John Bolton oversaw the office for Arms Control and
International Security. Bolton’s letter formalized U.S. discord with the ICC treaty. Bolton
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described this action as “my happiest day in government,” according to the Washington Post
(Morello, 2019).
Bolton’s appointment could mean that he was supposed to further the hegemonic dissent
against the “supposed” international jurisdiction of the ICC. Bolton was appointed as part of
Bush’s foreign policy architecture to identify the hegemonic excesses of the transnational
hegemon (UN) and to offer a corrective measure. Bolton expresses his neoconservative ideology
against international institutions and multilateral agreements. For instance, according to NPR
(2005), Bolton stated at the Global Structures Convention in New York in 1994 that, “There is
no United Nations. There is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only
real power left in the world, and that's the United States, when it suits our interests and when we
can get others to go along” (para. 7). In this way, Bolton underscores the exceptionality of the
U.S. in international affairs while also articulating America's leadership in the unipolar world.
Bolton’s ideological insight and rhetorical orientation toward international agreements and
international institutions proved useful to the American anti-ICC position.
The Bush administration presented the most compelling opposition to America’s
membership with the ICC. In other words, as compared to the seemingly “ambivalent” rhetorical
position held by Clinton’s government, the Bush administration pursued this position with
“aggressive unilateralism” (Galbraith, 2003). In effect, the Bush administration rhetorically
crafted a stronger counter-hegemony to confront this United Nation’s treaty. This means that
Bush led a more frontal effort to dismiss and attack the common sense of international
agreements proposed and enforced by international organizations. The common sense of
international agreements are the ideologies, as articulated through discourse, from global
institutions. These institutions fashion dominant discourses to be accepted by its member
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countries. Bava and Ireland (2016) intimate that the “mistrust” of the ICC was propagated by
Clinton and reinforced under President Bush. In the first four years of the Republican
government led by Bush, the administration was successful in gaining “international efforts to
keep the International Criminal Court from attaining any functional jurisdiction over the United
States or its citizens” (Galbraith, 2003, p. 683).
Internally, the Bush government was successful in passing key Constitutional provisions
such as the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA) of 2001. Under this provision,
Congress supports the Bush administration to bypass any ICC legal action, which, among other
things, authorizes the President to “use all means necessary and appropriate,” including the use
of force, to free U.S. (and allied) personnel detained or imprisoned by the ICC. Others have
dubbed it the “Hague Invasion Act” because the Court would be seated in The Hague (Trahan &
Egan, 2003, n.d.). The seemingly hypocritical rhetoric of Clinton’s response and signature to the
treaty raises apparent concerns. His signature to the ICC treaty in the “twilight of his
administration” was problematic since the incoming administration was able to capitalize on
Clinton’s lukewarm support for the ICC by influencing their opposition to the idea of an ICC
(Wedgwood, 2001, p. 193). As a result, it raises serious objections to Clinton’s actions.
Republican Congressmen, Senators, and other political actors vigorously condemned Clinton’s
decision (Grams, 2000; Helms, 1998). Consequently, the flip-flop between the two parties
(Republican and Democrat) made the U.S. appear hypocritical in the eyes of many countries and
particularly to the UN (Bevitz, 2002: Bowser, 2015; Glaser, 2003; Horton, 2003).
Bolton criticized Clinton for signing the ICC treaty. Bolton’s response is worth analyzing
because he was later appointed as the U.S. ambassador to the UN. In a sizzling op-ed published
by the Washington Post four days after Clinton signed the Treaty, Bolton (2001) charges that the
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President’s action is “injurious” and “disingenuous.” According to him, President Clinton was
right when he said the Senate should not endorse the treaty, but signing it is a disingenuous act –
a misguided understanding of international affairs, and a warped appreciation of diplomacy.
Bolton reiterated that the ICC’s provisions are incoherent, and the Court needed more time to
transform it into a workable document to be effective for twenty-first century application. In that
way, Bolton insists that the ICC is inadequate to indeed “deter the truly hard men of history from
committing war crimes” (Bolton, 2001, para. 3). Additionally, he says the ICC will only join the
league of dysfunctional international institutions such as the International Court of Justice and
transform into an “object of international ridicule and politicized futility” (Bolton, 2001, para. 3).
According to Bolton (2001), international scoundrels can be handled in several ways. For
instance, Slobodan Milosevic (the erstwhile Yugoslav and Serbian politician) was tried and
imprisoned by the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Bolton wanted an international court to
be modeled on the Yugoslavian precedent and the Nuremberg Trials.
According to him, the “like-minded” have an “unstated agenda” to elevate international
institutions above sovereign nation-states. This agenda, articulates Bolton, is alien to the U.S.
political and constitutional culture, and therefore, there is no ground for the world to conceive of
a permanent international court. Moving beyond this, Bolton justifies that a court empowered
with international jurisdiction will only harm the “national interests” of the United States as well
as undermine military operations needed to defend U.S. strategic interests around the world.
Bolton argues this because American presence in countries, especially war-torn areas, risks that
U.S. military personnel could be hauled to the Court as committing war atrocities and crimes
against humanity — the very criminalities that the Court was formed to prosecute. Bolton agrees
that the then proposed ASPA introduced by Republican senators must be passed at all costs.
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Bolton reasons that Clinton’s signature has weakened and could possibly undermine the ASPA,
which received political approval from former secretaries of state, such as Henry Kissinger,
George Shultz, James Baker, and Lawrence Eagleburger. This Act was also endorsed by
Secretary of Defense-designate Donald Rumsfeld and former Secretary Casper Weinberger and
former national security advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Allen.
Bolton appeals to the authority of these foreign policy heavyweights as enough
justification that the ICC will not further American interests. As anyone will expect, Bolton
demands that the Bush administration quickly unsign the ICC treaty by stating that “What one
president may legitimately (if unwisely) do, another may legitimately (and prudently) undo”
(Bolton, 2001, para. 8). By unsigning America from the ICC treaty, Bolton argues that future
presidents could possibly unsign numerous unratified and controversial treaties that the Senate
has yet to ratify — a move that will announce a significant foreign policy vision for the U.S. in
the future.
Another corrective measure to further muzzle the ICC’s prosecutorial powers was Donald
Rumsfeld’s statement, which further advanced the unipolar vision of President Bush. Rumsfeld’s
arguments hinge on the illegitimacy of the ICC and the fear of politicized prosecutions. The
ICC's entry into force on July 1, 2002, according to Rumsfeld (2002), means U.S. soldiers – as
well as current and future U.S. officials – could be at risk of prosecution by the ICC. Rumsfeld
charges that the United States “rejects the jurisdictional claims of the ICC” (Rumsfeld, 2002,
para. 2). Rumsfeld frames the ICC as a villain and a “witch hunt” and as a rude gesture to
prosecute Americans who risk their lives to protect human beings.
He also levels new charges against the ICC. These charges are steeped within the
rhetorical trajectory of the agitational slogans pursued by Senator Helms, Ambassador Bolton,
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and other like-minded U.S. hegemonic exceptionalists. Rumsfeld insists that “the U.S. has a
number of serious objections to the ICC – among them, the lack of adequate checks and balances
on powers of the ICC prosecutors and judges; the dilution of the U.N. Security Council's
authority over international criminal prosecutions; and the lack of an effective mechanism to
prevent politicized prosecutions of American servicemembers and officials” (Rumsfeld, 2002,
para. 3). In this way, Rumsfeld reiterates the agitational slogans perpetuated by his exceptionalist
contemporaries. Because of America’s interests, and especially in the moments of “war on
terrorism,” Rumsfeld charges that “even though the United States has not given its consent to be
bound by the treaty… U.S. citizens will be exposed to the risk of prosecution by a court that is
unaccountable to the American people” and has no regard for American rights (Rumsfeld, 2002,
para. 6). As a superpower, the U.S. sees and recognizes any threat to its hegemonic project as
troubling and, therefore, works at length to soft-balance and weaken a counter-hegemonic
project.
Rumsfeld, however, notes that “fortunately there maybe mechanisms within the treaty by
which we can work bilaterally with friends and allies, to the extent they are willing, to prevent
the jurisdiction of the treaty and thus avoid complications in our military cooperation”
(Rumsfeld, 2002, para. 8). This means that negotiations have started for continuous opposition to
the ICC treaty since the U.S. fears the risk of “politicized prosecutions,” as well as a
“disincentive for U.S. military engagement in the world” (Rumsfeld, 2002, para. 9). Rumsfeld
observes that “isolationism – something that would be unfortunate for the world, given that our
country is committed to engagement in the world and to contributing to a more peaceful and
stable world” (Rumsfeld, 2002, para. 9). In this way, Rumsfeld tries to articulate the
exceptionality logic while also trying to assert U.S. moral leadership in the world.
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Little attention is usually paid to institutional rhetoric. However, the ICC treaty discourse
ensured that U.S. presidents amass all political, legal, and institutional power to meet strategic
goals in line with U.S. foreign policy aspirations. For instance, under George W. Bush, the
United States created the offices of the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International
Security to achieve intended foreign policy objectives. This could be a useful place for us to
carefully inspect presidential rhetoric and discourse around U.S. foreign policy, especially within
the U.S. governance architecture. These exigencies impel presidents to carve out these offices
with roles backed by congressional legitimacy to push foreign policy ideas in a given historical
moment.
Bush’s Counter-Hegemonic Discourses against the ICC
Bush's election ushered in a unique historic moment for U.S. foreign policy. Specifically,
Bush’s victory was part of a crucial conjuncture regarding American involvement with
international institutions, international treaties, and the rhetoric of globalization and
multilateralism. The first term of President George W. Bush was remarkable in various ways.
His administration presented spirited rhetorical defiance to the authority of international
institutions and international agreements.
President Bush’s foreign policy vision was orchestrated mainly in response to 9/11.
President Bush’s regime was very vocal on its un-compromising position toward international
law generally. Concerning the International Criminal Court, President Bush’s appointees such as
Bolton, Rice, and Rumsfeld controlled powerful offices to control U.S. actions toward the Court.
Galbraith argues that under President Bush, the U.S. contested the ICC’s authority because it
sought to protect American autonomy. This became important since the provocative and
debatable nature of the ICC treaty seemingly presents an affront to the U.S. Constitution, and
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because the U.S. – during the Bush administration – favored war tribunals as compared to a
permanent international body (Galbraith, 2003). Galbraith surmises that policymakers expect to
safeguard U.S. personnel from external pressures. In so doing, Galbraith (2003) maintains that
the U.S. position scuffles the ICC’s jurisdiction and the significant discretionary powers
available to the Court’s prosecutor.
Threading a very conscious path, Bush vetoed UN Security Council resolutions and
allowed the passage of two vital Constitutional frameworks to frustrate the successful operation
of the International Criminal Court – The ASPA (2000) and the Bilateral Immunity Agreement
(2004) (Bilateral Immunity/Article 98 Agreements.)
Before I analyze these fundamental strategic and oppositional rhetorical mechanisms, I
first examine how congressional rhetoric played a crucial role in Bush’s resistance to
international agreements (Wysockci, 2013). Proclamations in Congress have authority in the
sense that they are constitutionally legitimized and deemed as the conscience of the nation. This
is because Congress, rhetorically, represents the people of the United States. Thus, any action
that comes from this chamber symbolically serves as the position of the American populace. In
that regard, Bush relied on Congress for most of his policies while also depending on his foreign
policy officials (through Bolton, Rumsfeld, Rice, and Senate leaders such as Senator Helms,
Grams, etc.). Zarefsky (2004), Stuckey (2010), and Prasch (2016, 2019) remind us that the
President has power over national definitions by priming what is right and to think about in any
given historical moment. In this regard, President Bush utilized Congress as a legitimate
rhetorical power to support his foreign policy initiatives.
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U.S. Deontological Politics and the Rhetoric of Vetoing UNSC Resolutions
The Bush administration began its formal resistance to the ICC by vetoing UN Security
Council resolutions. According to UN News (2002), the United States vetoed a move that sought
to extend the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) since the UN was
unwilling to exclude specific provisions that would shield members of the American military
from possible war crimes. This also rhetorically marked a decisive American antagonism to
international accords. The objection to this UNSC resolution was that the U.S. “demanded a
clause in the resolution guaranteeing that U.S. military personnel serving on the mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC” (Benzing, 2004, p. 187).
According to John Negroponte, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN during the early years of the
Bush presidency, “the United States wants to participate in international peacekeeping; but the
United States, a major guarantor of peace and security around the globe and a founding member
of the United Nations, does not and will not accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over the
peacekeepers that it contributes to UN-established and-authorized operations” (Negroponte,
2002, para. 6).
Consequently, the UNSC passed Resolution 1422 (2002) and was endorsed by the
Security Council during its 4572nd meeting, on July 12, 2002. This resolution, also known as
S/RES/1422, granted the United States its desire for immunity from ICC prosecutions. By doing
this, Benzing adds that the UNSC acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the UNSC’s
power to maintain peace). The resolution reads as follows,
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC,
if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing
State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations
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established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting July 1, 2002,
not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the
Security Council decides otherwise; 2. Expresses the intention to renew the request in
paragraph 1 under the same conditions each July 1 for further 12-month periods for as
long as may be necessary. (S/RES/1422, 2002)
The United States also vetoed another UNSC resolution – S/RES/1497 (2003) – on August 1,
2003, to exempt its personnel from participating in a multinational force in Liberia. These
actions are rhetorical because they inform the UNSC that the U.S. is more powerful than the UN.
It also communicates America’s status as the world’s unipolar hegemon over global affairs, in
contradistinction to the UN. These actions also bolster U.S. hegemony vis-à-vis the UN. The
Bush administration, according to Benzing (2004), also abandoned the request for the second
renewal of S/RES/1422 (2002) – a step that furthered in its noncooperation with the ICC.
Rhetorical Power of American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2001
The year 2002 marked the zenith of U.S. opposition to the ICC. In July 2002, the UN
managed to secure the required number of countries to ratify the ICC treaty to come into force.
Thus, the Bush administration garnered all of its rhetorical capital to defy the global hegemon’s
authority. One of these was the ASPA (2001), which was introduced in the house in November
2002 and passed on August 2, 2002, as a component of an appropriations bill (Galbraith, 2003).
More so, it was around this time that the 2002 national security strategy was also initiated. For
Cram (2014), the national security strategy of 2002 (otherwise known as the Bush Doctrine)
introduced President Bush’s foreign policy for the U.S. The NSS 2002 postulates that “today, the
United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political
influence” (p. iv). In this way, Bush asserts that the U.S. is already a world superpower and had
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the moral authority to lead the planet according to American desires and interests. This logic
undergirds the reasons why Bush snubbed Security Council resolutions and instead pursued a
war in Iraq. This new foreign policy philosophy rhetorically tells the United Nations that
America does not recognize its authority, even though the U.S. historically aided in its creation
and worked with it on various issues. As my analysis will later show, the move was orchestrated
to scorn the UN’s influence and bring its authority into disrepute. By establishing this precedent,
Bush lays the foundation for how future presidents will act concerning the ICC. According to
Bush, the NSS (2002) means the U.S.
will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security
commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations,
inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction
does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept. We will work together with
other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and cooperation, through
such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals
from the ICC. We will implement fully the American Servicemembers Protection Act,
whose provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and
officials. (NSS, 2002, p. 31)
Bush realizes that the ICC might one day target members of the American military because of
the actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, with the support of Congress, the ASPA was
passed, and Bush signed it into law precisely a month after the ICC came into force.
The Act, passed by the 107th Congress, had this preamble – “To protect United States
military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the United States Government
against criminal prosecution by an International Criminal Court to which the United States is not
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party” (ASPA, 2002, p.1). The President was given enormous powers under this Act to do the
following: prohibit any government official from cooperating with the ICC; permit Armed
Forces to use in peacekeeping missions only if the relevant country is not an ICC party or has
signed a bilateral agreement with the United States (unless the Security Council has exempted
U.S. peacekeepers from ICC investigation); ban military assistance to ICC parties with the
exception of NATO countries, major allies, and countries with whom the United States has
suitable bilateral agreements; authorize presidential use of “all means necessary and appropriate”
to free U.S. government employees and certain other categories of individuals from ICC
detainment (Galbraith, 2003, p. 54). Additionally, this Act provides that courts, including all
federal and state courts, as well as state agencies and local agencies, should not collaborate with
the ICC by refusing any inquiry “for cooperation submitted by the ICC pursuant to the Rome
Statute” (ASPA, 2002, p. 11).
A key argument in this Act is the invocation of the “Bill of Rights.” The Act states that
because America is a global power, its Bill of Rights grants it the authority to encourage
protections to which all Americans are entitled under the Bill of Rights to the United
States Constitution, such as the right to trial by jury. Members of the Armed Forces of the
United States should be free from the risk of prosecution by the International Criminal
Court, especially when they are stationed or deployed around the world to protect the
vital national interests of the United States. The United States Government has an
obligation to protect the members of its Armed Forces, to the maximum extent possible,
against criminal prosecutions carried out by the International Criminal Court. (ASPA,
2002, p. 4)
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The Act further encourages federal, state, and or local government actors to not release any U.S.
citizen or even a resident alien to the ICC. Additionally, the Act prohibits any legislation that
calls for financial assistance of any form to the ICC. Thus, this strong opposition to the Court
weakened the ICC’s operation nearly from the date of its entry into force. The Bush
administration’s intractable disposition was seemingly unstiffened by the Dodd Amendment
(Bava & Ireland, 2016). This amendment was passed during President Reagan’s presidency. The
Dodd Agreement 5530.3 governs international agreements for which the U.S. observes.
Although established in 1987, “the text, purpose, and legislative history of the Dodd Amendment
show that significant forms of cooperation with the ICC – such as providing manpower, sharing
intelligence, and protecting witnesses – are permitted by ASPA under certain discrete
circumstances” (Bava & Ireland, 2016). These “discrete circumstances” were noted because
there were exceptions to the ASPA proscriptions. Despite precedent of working with the UN and
U.S. law such as the Dodd Amendment, the Bush administration rhetorically deviated from
former U.S. support of the UN, which helps rhetorically solidify American exceptionalism and
promotes resistance to UN hegemony.
Bava and Ireland elaborate that although the provision makes no explicit mention of the
“ICC per se, the text of the Dodd Amendment leaves no doubt that it applies to the ICC as
opposed to other international justice efforts” (p.7). From this position, the Bush administration
realizes that, for the U.S. to lead, there must be a rhetorical hedge in the President’s refractory
posture toward international organizations. This provides room, despite opposition, for the U.S.
to apply other forms of resistance to cripple ICC’s jurisdiction. Interestingly, the Dodd
Amendment would explicitly ban government support for proceedings initiated against
Americans by the ICC (Bava & Ireland, 2016). Thus, the Dodd Amendment obviates concerns
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about the potential prosecution of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident while still supporting the
clear American interest of promoting international justice. Secondly, Congress feared that the
then-undefined “crime of aggression” would be used to “prosecute American government
officials, military officers, etc. The Amendment’s drafters assuaged this concern by only
allowing support for prosecutions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes” (Bava
& Ireland, 2016, pp. 8-9). In this regard, the Dodd agreement allows assistance “only on a case
by case basis” while also limiting the organs within the ICC that could be supported (Bava &
Ireland, 2016, p. 9).
The New Common Sense Rhetoric of Bilateral Immunity Agreements
For Antonio Gramsci, the hegemony directs an emerging class to help maintain a form of
cultural dominance. Gramsci suggests that the hegemony “leads the classes which are its allies
and dominates those which are its enemies. Therefore, even before attaining power, a class can
(and must) ‘lead’; when it is in power, it becomes dominant, but continues to ‘lead’ as
well…there can and must be a ‘political hegemony’ even before the attainment of governmental
power, and one should not count solely on the power and material force which such a position
gives in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). The
unilateral position afforded the U.S., especially after the Second World War, grants it the
authority to negotiate accords with other countries to maintain its interests abroad. Even though
the U.S. has incredible hard power (e.g., military strength), it typically chooses a soft power
approach premised on alliance formation and the consent of smaller and less powerful countries.
As a result, it was able to maintain influence over most countries that otherwise would have
surrendered U.S. servicemembers to the ICC for prosecution. Such influence, based mostly on
the persuasive appeal of ethos, is called by Hayden (2011), the “rhetoric of soft power.” Since
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the ICC also became operational in July 2002, the U.S. found it expedient to craft many alliances
to present a potent force in the world and to shield military officials from criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, the summer of 2002 generated great rhetorical opportunities for anti-ICC
discourses mainly generated from the U.S. During the negotiation stages for the ICC treaty, the
countries that deliberated the drafting of the Statute were diligent in referencing international
law. The Coalition for International Criminal Court (CICC) (n.d.), for instance, opines that the
drafters also streamlined prospective disputes between the Rome Statute and existing
international commitments. The factsheet issued by the CICC reasons that the negotiators
acknowledged that some nations have agreements such as Status of Forces Agreements
(SOFAs), mandating them to return a person who might have committed crime. Recognizing that
the ICC made room for such immunities under Article 98, the U.S. also concluded bilateral
agreements with allies and other signatories of the treaty. Article 98 of the Statute indicates that,
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State
for the giving of consent for the surrender. (The Rome Statute, 1998, p. 48)
This rhetorical caveat in the Statute accentuates the vision of the framers who articulated a
provision for contingencies and compromises under extreme cases. Another issue that the Article
98 proviso raises is that it grants the ICC a rhetorical maneuver to harass dissenting states. While
it is evident that the Rome Statute framers relied on international law and acknowledged state
sovereignty, the treaty nevertheless included this rhetorical entrapment aimed at countries that
would not accede to the ICC's jurisdiction. Further discussions on the Rome Statute, legitimizes
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and stresses the importance of the ICC in international criminal jurisdictions. This covertly
primes the UN and, in particular the ICC, to dominate and control international law. The U.S.,
realizing this trap, drafted the Bilateral Immunity Agreements (Article 98 Agreements) to
frustrate the jurisdiction of the ICC. Here again, John Bolton offers persuasive narratives to
justify why the bilateral immunity was necessary.
Bolton (2003) justifies that “in order to protect all of our citizens, the United States is
engaged in a worldwide effort to conclude legally binding, bilateral agreements that would
prohibit the surrender of U.S. persons to the Court” (para. 1). The Article 98 agreements,
according to Bolton (2003), are explicitly “contemplated under Article 98 of the Rome Statute
that created the ICC, provide U.S. persons with essential protection against the Court’s purported
jurisdictional claims, and allow us (U.S.) to remain engaged internationally with our friends and
allies” (para. 4). The text of the agreement was also signed by Ghana, a sub-Saharan African
country. The heading of the agreement was “Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Government of Ghana Regarding the Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal
Court” (Article 98 Agreement, 2003). Portions of the text of the agreement are captured below:
Bearing in mind Article 98 of the Rome Statute:
Hereby agree as follows: …
1. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall, not absent the
expressed consent of the first party.
a. Be surrendered or transferred by any means to the International Criminal
Court for any purpose or
b. Be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third
country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or
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transfer to the International Criminal Court…… (Article 98 Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Ghana, 2003).
The above stresses that hegemonic alliances represent new ways of asserting power and control
over universal discourses. Powerful countries with the material capabilities, ideas, and strong
institutions such as the U.S. have soft balancing capabilities to offset a threatening international
power and regional bodies (Cox, 1981). As Walt (1985, 2009) avers, alliances are formulated in
response to a threat. When a hegemonic state such as the U.S. feels its interests are at stake, it
pursues not only a rhetorical path, but it also implements strategic efforts to win the trust of other
countries by building alliances and signing deals to amass power to ward off the threats it cannot
confront militarily. In this regard, Walt (2009) argues that “weaker clients have to worry more
about abandonment--because the unipole needs them less — and the unipole will be less likely to
be dragged into conflict by reckless or adventuristic allies” (Walt 2009, p. 98).
After World War II and most notably after the Cold War, we now live in a unipolar world
led by the United States. However, as we noted earlier, Gramsci (1971) reminds us that
hegemony is always in flux and struggles for hegemony are constantly occurring. This explains
why the UN and countries such as Russia clamor for multipolar and polycentric worlds (Ayres,
2018). In such circumstances, the U.S. continually wants to lead; therefore, it must, through its
hegemonic authority, establish systems and coalitions to always maintain its status in
international affairs, such as international law, trading agreements, and other global initiatives.
By formulating discursive strategies such as Article 98 agreements, the U.S., in many ways,
articulates a rhetoric of control over universal laws. Thus, it polices and insulates its interests
against the international pressures of the twenty-first century. Even though these immunity
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alliances between the U.S. and other countries were not permanent ones, they could be referred
to as ad hoc coalitions. Tetrais (2003) acknowledges that these ad hoc coalitions and bilateral
alliances are more resilient than permanent and multilateral alliances. Also, Fontana (2000)
surmises that “the construction of a structured network of alliances founded upon the consent of
the constituent members presupposes a universality, or at least a potential mutuality, of interests
and values” (Fontana 2000, p. 320).
The formation of alliances of this nature (Article 98 Agreements) could lead to the
creation of historic blocs. Matsouka (2014), when analyzing the U.S.-Japan agreements, argues
that hegemony is also expressed within a broader assemblage of forces, which he identifies as the
Gramscian “historic bloc.” Consequently, this represents a “historical congruence” occurring
between material forces, institutions, and ideologies (Cox, 1981; Matsuoka, 2014, p. 75). During
the signing of the Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIA) between the U.S. and signatories of the
ICC treaty, Bolton expresses satisfaction because most countries have consented to these U.S.
agreements, and as a result, the U.S wields more power and legitimacy to further oppose any
criminal trials against Americans. In so doing, this rhetorical maneuver also emboldens U.S.
bilateral Article 98 partners to defy ICC meddling. Also, this means that the U.S. interests will be
protected without any threat of legal intimidation.
An ideological interrogation of the rhetoric of alliances reveals how powerful countries
interpellate smaller and weaker nations with unquestioned, commonsensical ideologies. This is
because treaties represent a consensual tool in the hands of hegemonic states to rally smaller and
less powerful countries to believe in a dominant ruling idea, which becomes difficult for them to
refuse. For instance, Bolton advances that
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the United States has concluded and signed Article 98 agreements with 70 countries all
over the globe, representing over 40 percent of the world’s population…ensuring that all
U.S. persons are covered by the terms of the agreement. This broad scope of coverage is
essential to ensuring that the ICC will not become an impediment to U.S. activities
around the world. (Bolton, 2003, para. 5)
Hegemonic authority carefully obstructs and enacts frameworks that embody nations to sign
Article 98 agreements that guarantee Americans will be immune from “politically motivated
criminal accusations, investigations, and prosecutions” (Bolton, 2003, para. 6). Hence, for
Bolton, the Article 98 agreements require countries that sign this accord to “agree, either
reciprocally or non-reciprocally, not to surrender U.S. persons to the International Criminal
Court, not to retransfer persons extradited to a country for prosecution, and not to assist other
parties in their efforts to send U.S. persons to the ICC” (Bolton, 2003, para. 6). Bolton’s position
in Bush’s government allows him to ensure other nations become acrimonious to the UN's
hegemonic orders. When other countries resent dictates from the UN, it weakens the dominance
of the UN while according enormous authority and power to the U.S.
As Cox (1997), Beyer (2009), and Matsuoka (2014) argue, the framing of consensus is
defined by a common interest – a common sense interest – expressed in monolithic narratives.
However, the disparate power relationships often favor the dominant party. In this regard, Bolton
expresses that entering into agreements with other countries ensures that in the event a country
that is not Party to the Rome Statute becomes one, it will be difficult for those countries to
surrender Americans to the ICC. Because the ICC prerogative overrules consent of the nations to
hand over persons for prosecution, the UN expresses a form of hegemonic power not based on
consent, but domination. This also means, in the face of such defiance or resistance, that the UN
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realizes it is becoming weak. Therefore, applying some force through its agencies could regain or
retain some of its power. Bolton (2003), recognizing this apparent feebleness of the UN,
concludes that these Article 98 agreements are crucial to future U.S. international cooperation on
a range of diplomatic, military, and security initiatives. It (Article 98 agreement) also sends an
important political, albeit rhetorical, signal that American concerns will be widely shared around
the world.
According to Bolton, the U.S. opposition should not be misconstrued as a move to
“undermine the ICC.” Instead, Bolton asserts that the U.S. wants suitable “relations with the
Court” because it is dedicated to “bring to justice those who commit genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. This is the stated goal of ICC supporters, and a goal that the United
States has and will maintain” (Bolton, 2003, para. 12). Bolton’s proposition suggests that the
American judicial system is not corrupt and that it has the capacity to prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity, which is why the U.S. does not need the ICC. This argument also exalts
American exceptionalism in global affairs. Bolton resurrects a new common sense that defies the
ICC’s mission. This is because the U.S. considers itself to uphold democracy and the rule of law.
Bolton (2003) argues that allegations of war crimes against officials were “frivolous” and that a
“case by case” approach is ideal. Therefore, he recommended ad hoc international tribunals and
not a permanent court with universal jurisdiction. Fontana (1993) posits that the hegemony could
also be operationalized as the “vehicle whereby the dominant social groups establish a system of
‘permanent consent’ that legitimates a prevailing social order by encompassing a complex
network of mutually reinforcing and interwoven ideas affirmed and articulated by intellectuals”
(p. 141). While Bolton’s arguments seem polarized and neoconservative, they nonetheless
articulate a new vision from the conservative Bush government that intends to implement an
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order to formulate a New World Order where the U.S. concretizes its unipolar, superpower
status. Ironically, it was President George W. Bush (1990) that coined the phrase “New World
Order” when he militarily engaged Saddam Hussein in the first Iraq war.
Bloomfield’s Rhetoric: The UN as an Unaccountable Global Institution
As Assistant Secretary of Stature for Political-Military Affairs in the Bush administration,
Lincoln Bloomfield (2003) articulates that he was “responsible for conducting bilateral Article
98 negotiations worldwide” as well as overseeing “worldwide security assistance funding
accounts that are affected by the law adopted by the U.S. Congress relating to the ICC and the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act – ASPA” (para. 2). In that regard, Bloomfield
indicates that his position also allows him to deal with “conflict and security everywhere in the
world” (2003, para. 2). Bloomfield’s (2003) position on the ICC is no different from Bolton,
Senator Helms, and the overall Bush administration. He also supports Bolton's view for war
tribunals like those of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, instead of a permanent universal
court. According to Bloomfield, the ICC does not operate under the functional structure of the
U.N. Security Council; and, therefore, it is independent of sovereign states. Hence, the ICC’s
“independent” status renders it unaccountable. For Bloomfield, most ICC signatory countries are
fascist states, making them democratically impotent and unfit to impose their will on a
democratic country such as the U.S. In this case, the UN’s insistence on a permanent universal
court is an affront to the U.S. Constitution.
Bloomfield (2003) argues that the absence of political accountability over the UN grants
the U.S. government a legitimate duty to abandon the ICC treaty. Echoing the lead of the U.S.
negotiation team on the Rome Statute, Bloomfield claims that the end product of the ICC treaty
represents “consequences that do not serve the cause of international justice” (para. 5).
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Bloomfield’s conception of international justice means that the UN’s failure to incorporate all
U.S. interests when designing the ICC treaty renders it inappropriate, faulty, and risky. For
Bloomfield, President Bush realized there is the potential for the ICC to indulge in “politicized
prosecutions” since the “Court’s lack ready accountability to governments legitimately
empowered to represent” the interests of their citizens (Bloomfield, 2003, para. 6). Accordingly,
the ICC’s prosecutions could abuse individual rights and privileges (Bloomfield, 2003).
Bloomfield holds that the U.S. ideological stance on the ICC is justified because the
United States is a nation of immigrants; we have familial ties to localities all over the
world. Our national interests know no bounds: we have diplomatic representation almost
everywhere, and our private businesses and educational institutions are similarly
represented far and wide. The United States military is unique in its global presence and
operations. Our personnel were found in over 100 countries over the past year. At one
point in 2003, more than 400,000 U.S. military personnel were serving outside American
territory. By next year, the U.S. will have over 50 treaty alliance commitments to defend
the security of countries all over the world. One does not have to hold a view of
American exceptionalism to acknowledge the profile and symbolic resonance of the
American identity in the world. (Bloomfield, 2003, para. 23)
Bloomfield’s arguments are illustrative of America’s power and that its exceptional qualities
should render it immune from ICC jurisdiction. As such, Bloomfield advocates that America is
significant to the world. As a result, prosecuting its citizens means that the UN, and to a large
extent, the world, does not appreciate how America has made and continues to make the world a
better place. Additionally, the U.S. has the moral right to engage in military operations and
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control affairs of other countries and, therefore, should be immune from any universal criminal
jurisdiction.
Bush’s Tough Hegemonic Stance and Anti-ICC Campaign Rhetoric
A day after the ICC began operating, President Bush addressed reporters in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, on July 2, 2002. According to Bush (2002),
The International Criminal Court is troubling to the United States, it’s troubling to the
administration and obviously troubling to the United States Senate as well. President
Clinton signed this treaty, but when he signed it he said it should not be submitted to the
Senate and therefore never has been. And I don’t intend to submit it either because as the
United States works to bring peace around the world our diplomats or our soldiers could
be drawn into this Court. That’s very troubling, it’s very troubling to me, and we’ll try to
work out the impasse at the United Nations, but one thing we’re not going to do is sign
on to the International Criminal Court. (para. 1)
President Bush’s pronouncements justify his foreign policy architecture, personnel, and strategy
when he became President. Bush’s aversion for multinational cooperation, coupled with his
intense enthusiasm for pre-emptive military strikes, means that the provisions in the Rome
Statute would complicate, if not challenge, his foreign policy vision. Therefore, in the National
Security Strategy (NSS, 2002), President Bush details that, for his government to meet “global
security commitments,” the U.S. needs to take necessary actions to protect its citizens devoid of
any hindrance. For him, any activity that will protect Americans is justified and should not be
“impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International
Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not
accept” (NSS, 2002, p. 31). In that regard, the U.S. “military operation and cooperation” will be
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achieved through “multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the
ICC” (NSS, 2002, p. 31). The NSS of 2002, also known as the Bush Doctrine, was
commissioned within a strategic historical moment – two months after the ICC came into force
and a moment when the U.S. was preparing for strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq as constitutive of
the post-9/11 era. Consequently, the American Servicemembers Protection Act and the Article
98 Agreements presented strong provisions that will help strengthen his foreign policy
architecture and enable him to fulfill the Bush Doctrine. Bush’s actions represent a powerful
rhetorical strategy and a way to project the U.S. from any oppositional, international politics that
would diminish the authority and significance of the U.S. in its global hegemonic struggle.
Therefore, Cram (2014) notes that the NSS 2002 invents an impending danger and, thus,
transforms any non-U.S. state or institution as a challenger to America’s global power and
possibly an enemy for the exercise of military force.
President Bush’s anti-ICC rhetoric continues in the second term of his administration. In
the campaign debate with Senator John Kerry, Bush (2004) justifies why he did not sign some
significant international treaties such as the ICC. According to Bush (2004),
I wouldn’t join the International Criminal Court… a body based in The Hague where
unaccountable judges, prosecutors, could pull our troops, our diplomats up for trial. And I
wouldn’t join. And I understand that in certain capitals of, around the world that that
wasn’t a popular move. But it’s the right move not to join a foreign court that could,
where our people could be prosecuted. My opponent is for joining the International
Criminal Court. I just think trying to be popular kind of in the global sense, if it’s not in
our best interest, makes no sense. I’m interested in working with other nations and do a
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lot of it. But I’m not going to make decisions that I think are wrong for America. (Bush,
2004, n.p.)
President Bush’s stringent position validates his foreign policy inclination. Bush’s hegemonic
formation is premised on the fact that joining a court that would most likely prosecute Americans
is misguided and damaging to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Hence, it is better to resist any
international effort that hampers America from advancing its interests. The International
Criminal Court, from Bush’s position, is a threat to America’s hegemony. Thus, the ICC has
accrued substantial power to determine how countries should operate. The ideological function
of the Bush Doctrine stands in stark contrast to the ICC treaty. With America’s global influence,
resisting the ICC treaty further emboldens the superpower image of the U.S. in international
affairs. This also means that under President Bush, international cooperation is not necessary.
Yielding to international influence weakens the U.S., and given America’s role in the world, it
must pursue a unipolar ideology to exact a New World Order in the twenty-first century.
Cosmopolitan Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Multilateral Ideology under Obama
To rhetorically analyze American support for the ICC, I explore Obama’s universal,
pragmatic, and idealist foreign policy strategy. Then, I reconnoiter the genealogical trajectory of
the American relationship with the ICC during Obama’s presidency. Consequently, I investigate
how Obama’s relationship with the ICC enabled him to emphasize U.S. hegemony and project a
new American-led international order for the twenty-first century. Despite the worldwide
expectation that the Obama administration would resume a favorable relationship with the Court
and improve America’s leadership at international organizations, I argue that such an expectation
was misguided and a clear misinterpretation of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus at that historical
moment. President Obama is very cautious about his foreign policy approach, but becoming
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more progressive means that President Obama’s administration would likely need to improve
relations with other countries and possibly rejoin many international projects. However,
Obama’s foreign policy seems rather to play an oversight and leadership role of these
international bodies and global agencies. For instance, Smith (2010) notes how the New Republic
described Obama as an individual with a pure “instinct toward idealism,” and a person with
“equally apparent devotion to pragmatism” (Smith 2010, p. 156). Given this, Obama pursued a
multilateral foreign policy vision that extols the power of America other than committing it to
international organizations.
First, in critiquing Obama’s cosmopolitan rhetoric and his rhetorical aptitude, it is crucial
that we briefly explore Obama’s international background, experience in U.S. political
leadership, and how this history shaped his ideology regarding international affairs.
Cosmopolitanism, according to Ramzy (2006), is the articulation of new apparatuses of
identification orchestrated by the globalized nature of the world. Basing his reasoning from the
theoretical work of Appiah (2000), Ramzy offers that a cosmopolitan persona can “rhetorically
negotiate the space between local and global discursively tying people to the national as well as
to the global or transnational” (Ramzy, 2006, p.2). Accordingly, Obama’s foreign policy
discourse reveals an impressive understanding of the U.S. role in international affairs, especially
during the twilight of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In 2009 when Obama became President,
significant tension existed between the U.S. and Arab nations, partly due to the American
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and, of course, America’s longstanding support for Israel. The
popular consciousness at the time, especially given the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, created a
discursive moment that Obama needed to approach with a revolutionized foreign policy vision.
Furthermore, Obama was to reconfigure and re-calibrate U.S. power. As Gramsci (1971) tells us,
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the hegemony is ever-changing and adapting to changing political climates within a certain
historic moment. In this regard, Obama favored a conciliatory rhetorical maneuver with
international institutions and bodies. Obama’s unique international character and global
acceptance provided clues regarding how he would steer U.S. leadership in the world to conform
to 21st-century globalization and global governance. Stuckey (2010) argues that Obama’s novel
personality and multicultural background mean he must explore a rhetorical pathway that is
distinct from other Presidents. Moreover, as a constitutional law professor, he must envision
America’s role in the world vis-à-vis international law and political arrangements. Consequently,
he must enact a new global popular common sense concerning American foreign policy with
renewed U.S. global governance.
New U.S. Foreign Policy Common Sense by Obama
Many scholars of international relations expressed enormous optimism about Obama’s
intended foreign policy ideology as it was articulated before his election (Cowell, 2008;
Stockman, 2008; Wike, 2008). For instance, Skidmore (2011) recognizes that just about seven
months into his administration, Obama was declared the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize – one
of the most prestigious awards in world history. The Norwegian Nobel Committee (2009)
testifies that,
Obama, has as President, created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral
diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United
Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialog and negotiations are
preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.
(para. 2)
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This award might foreshadow how Obama’s relationship with international institutions would be
very cordial. However, Skidmore (2011) argues that, “while international institutions no longer
face open American hostility, the Obama Administration has moved neither to revamp the
crumbling institutional infrastructure of global order nor to commit the United States to binding
international agreement” (p. 43). Obama’s presidency was a rescue mission to reposition
America’s geopolitical standing. In this way, Obama’s cosmopolitan orientation means he
needed to fashion a new ideology that coheres America’s global standing during chaotic
incidents like 9/11 and American incursions into the Middle East. Accordingly, Obama had to
reconfigure America’s hegemonic standing. This would involve transforming America’s existing
common sense to a new way of thinking in order to resurrect America’s global standing.
As Eagleton argues, “How could we expect it to be otherwise if a ruling bloc has had
centuries in which to perfect its hegemony? In Gramsci’s view, there is a certain continuum
between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘scientific’ consciousness, such that the difficulties of the latter
should not be intimidatingly overestimated; but there is also a permanent war between
revolutionary theory and the mythological or folkloric conceptions of the masses, and the latter is
not to be patronizingly romanticized at the expense of the former” (Eagleton, 1994, p.199). In
reading Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as well as ideology and its vicissitudes, Eagleton
(1994) frames this understanding for us to appreciate hegemonic transitions from unquestioned
popular conceptions to revolutionized worldviews. Following this, the President of the world’s
most powerful country was not to reassert a new foreign policy philosophy, but to re-strategize
and refine America’s relations with international institutions and alliances. Eagleton continues
that “what is needed is not just some paternalist endorsement of existing popular consciousness,
but the construction of ‘a new common sense and with it a new culture and a new philosophy
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which will be rooted in the popular consciousness with the same solidity and imperative quality
as traditional beliefs’… Such a ‘world-view’ cements together a social and political bloc, as a
unifying, organizing, inspirational principal rather than a system of abstract ideas” (Eagleton,
1994, pp. 199-200). Accordingly, President Obama’s administration positioned itself in a way
that transformed America’s relations with international institutions in extraordinary fashions.
While he appreciated the role of international bodies in twenty-first-century world politics,
Obama believed that U.S. leadership, renewed relations, and distinct foreign policy approaches
were crucial in the formulation of new global configurations.
President Obama’s Multilateralism and Pro-ICC Rhetorical Paradox
President Obama wades into the ICC controversy in 2004 during his senate campaign. At
the time, Obama’s response to the Candidate Questionnaire affirms that the U.S. should consider
joining the ICC but not until certain conditions were clearly defined. Answering questions about
whether the United States should “ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,”
Obama (2004) answers, “Yes the United States should cooperate with ICC investigations in a
way that reflects American sovereignty and promotes our national security interests” (para. 4). In
a follow-up response as to what concerns needed to be solved before the U.S. should join the
ICC, Obama (2004) responds that “prior to ratification, what should the United States
relationship with the Court be, particularly in regards to sharing intelligence, prosecuting war
criminals, and referring cases to the UN Security Council?” Analyzing the then-Senator Obama’s
comment, we notice that he clearly is not against U.S. membership with the ICC, but only if or
when the UN’s oversight of the treaty aligns with U.S. foreign policy and international relations
interests. Obama reiterates Clinton’s position when he (Clinton) ordered Ambassador David
Scheffer to sign the Rome Statute but recommended that the Senate not ratify until certain
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conditions are met. What this means is that Obama understands that the ICC, even though a
popular project, risks constraining U.S. foreign policy actions. In that vein, certain UN
guarantees along with careful revisions of the Statute could warrant Senate ratification and
consequently, U.S. membership.
Because the U.S. commits to world peace, understanding and cooperating with the ICC
while not necessarily joining, was crucial. Obama realizes that an entrenched political inclination
like that of the Bush administration would have further impaired U.S. image and global
capabilities. During Bush’s political and historical moment, the U.S. presented stringent
counterhegemonic resistance to the ICC treaty. Before running for the Senate, Obama did not
rhetorically challenge the prevailing “Bush Doctrine” regarding issues pertaining to the ICC. At
that particular time, doing so would have risked political miscalculation for Obama. Obama’s
rhetorical brilliance and decentering perspective about the controversial ICC treaty aided his
foreign policy aspirations for the biggest job in the world, the United States Presidency. That
action enhanced his ethos and set the stage for him to carefully craft his foreign policy ideology
before becoming President.
Obama’s Rhetoric on International Law and Global Political Institutions
After Obama’s victory in the 2008 polls, many scholars of foreign policy, and mainly
those who have been long promoters of multilateralism, became very optimistic (Kerler, 2008;
Skidmore, 2011). Smith (2010) surmises that Obama’s election was expected to institute
significant change in and revolutionize U.S. foreign policy. With Vice President Joseph Biden’s
several years of experience on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, coupled with “an allstar foreign policy team and Democratic control of both houses of the Congress” (Skidmore,
2011, p. 42), the U.S. was touted to enact a multilateral policy for the 21st century. Before the
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elections, Obama (2007) acknowledges at a symposium organized by the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs that “these are not the best of times for America’s reputation in the world. We
know what the war in Iraq has cost us in lives and treasure, in influence and respect. We have
seen the consequences of a foreign policy based on a flawed ideology, and a belief that tough
talk can replace real strength and vision” (Obama 2007, para. 1). Obama notes that the reputation
of the U.S. is badly tarnished overseas, and therefore, his administration would restore America’s
image to its former glory. This foreign policy campaign rhetoric is not unique to Obama. For
instance, Trump similarly campaigned on an “America first” ideology and the need to make
America great again because the U.S. was not leading international affairs (Trump, 2015).
However, Obama’s approach is antithetical to Trump’s foreign policy ideological framework in
many ways. During his Chicago speech, Obama notes that “Many around the world are
disappointed in our actions,” and therefore, he promises to “lead a new chapter of American
engagement” (2007, para. 19). Obama’s discursive disposition presents a narrative about the
world’s current problems and describes a rhetorical urgency to be addressed by broad American
collaboration with robust international institutions to surmount monumental global challenges.
Obama, in his address, expresses his knowledge of world issues. For Obama, in order to
understand the world and prepare for the presidency, he embarked on many voyages to
familiarize himself with the problems of the world. As he explains,
on a trip to the Middle East, I met Israelis and Palestinians who told me that peace
remains a distant hope without the promise of American leadership. At a camp along the
border of Chad and Darfur, refugees begged for America to step in and help stop the
genocide that has taken their mothers and fathers, sons and daughters. And along the
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crowded streets of Kenya, I met throngs of children who asked if they’d ever get the
chance to visit that magical place called America. (Obama, 2007, para. 5-7)
Obama’s narrative suggests that despite the existence of the United Nations to innovate solutions
to address global challenges, the world still reveres and relies upon the exceptional United States.
Obama intimates that “America is the last, best hope of Earth. We just have to show the world
why this is so. This President may occupy the White House, but for the last six years, the
position of leader of the free world has remained open. And it’s time to fill that role once more”
(Obama, 2007, para. 9). For Obama, America has suffered a “hegemonic crisis” where its
powerful status and commanding role in world issues is questioned. In that regard, he intends to
position America on a pedestal to carefully regain, rebuild, and lead the world again. During the
same forum, Obama claims that for America’s national security and common security interests to
be secured, the U.S. must deploy its “full arsenal of American power and ingenuity”; he
continues by saying that to “constrain rogue nations, we must use effective diplomacy and
muscular alliances” (2007, para. 40). While this is not necessarily related to his ICC discourse, it
foreshadows his intentions for Libya and Syria, as well as his negotiation of the controversial
Iran Deal.
Obama surmises that because the U.S. “preaches compassion and justice to others,” it
must lead an international effort to bring peace to the world and help other nations by
“marshalling a global effort to meet a threat that rises above all others in urgency – securing,
destroying, and stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction.” This, according to Obama
is only attainable if America leads reforms at the UN and other international institutions so they
are to “keep pace with the fast-moving threats we face” (2007, para. 53). Accordingly, Obama
justifies that such real reforms would not happen by
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dismissing the value of these institutions, or by bullying other countries to ratify changes
we have drafted in isolation. Real reform will come because we convince others that they
too have a stake in change - that such reforms will make their world, and not just ours,
more secure.… The world can only become a better and peaceful place is America
liberates and lead and to tell another great American story. (Obama, 2007, para. 83)
Additionally, Obama recognizes that for a favorable global future with U.S. leadership,
international political institutions are crucial. However, their existence is tied to America
exerting its hegemonic status and impressing its values through these institutions. In this way,
Obama constructs a new narrative that with U.S. leadership, the world will become better.
Obama also reconstructs a new vision of how other countries must see the U.S. Thus, the U.S.
represents an example for other nations to follow. This synecdoche exalts America’s influence
over multilateral bodies and other powers. Burke (1941) explains that synecdoche represents
“meanings as: part for the whole, whole for the part, container for the contained, sign for the
thing signified, material for the thing made cause for effect, effect for cause, genus for species,
species for genus” (p. 426). By using this master trope, Obama represents America (one nation)
as the “savior” of the whole world. Obama’s hegemonic conception also casts doubt on solely
relying on global institutions and renders them useless unless they are guided and managed by
the United States.
U.S. Hegemonic Relationship with the ICC under Obama
Douglas Dunbar, a researcher at the American Non-Governmental Organization’s
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (AMICC), indicates that the Obama administration
had a grand strategy concerning relationships with international agreements. According to
Dunbar (2011), Obama’s relations with the ICC are anchored on the following grounds. These
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include engagement in the discourse of the Assembly of State Parties, cooperation with and
encouragement of ICC’s work to prosecute war criminals, non-negotiation of Bilateral Immunity
Agreements, and an unclear roadmap on a probable resigning of as well as subsequent
ratification of the Rome Statute.
For the first time since the Bush administration’s refractory inclination on the ICC, the
Obama administration, through its first Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,
Ambassador Stephen Rapp, addressed the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute at The
Hague in 2009. Before the Obama administration, the Bush administration boycotted all
correspondence with The Hague. Therefore, a return to attending meetings for parties at The
Hague means America begins to make a rhetorical return to multilateralism. Rapp (2009) states
that the U.S. finds it a great honor
to address you on behalf of the U.S. Delegation, which for the first time is attending a
meeting of the Assembly of States Parties as an Observer. Although we have not joined
previous meetings of the Assembly, we have not been silent in the face of crimes against
the basic code of humanity, crimes that call for condemnation in the strongest possible
way. (Rapp, 2009, para. 1)
Rapp’s representation of the U.S. at The Hague occasions a move for rhetorical feasibility to see
if probable American concerns about the ICC have been met. Rapp offers a historical narrative to
prime attendees that the United States was not against crimes against humanity, since,
historically, the U.S. worked with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and former
Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Incidentally, Rapp was a former
prosecutor for these tribunals.
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Rapp (2009) argues that historically it has been international criminal tribunals, not
courts, that provide answers to “horrific crimes with historic justice, but they have done
something of equal importance: They helped foster an expectation among victims that justice
would be delivered at home, too, and not just in an international court” (para. 2). Like Obama,
Rapp hints that institutions of international justice could play leading roles in ensuring
accountability. More importantly, since the U.S. is a strong adherent and global leader in the rule
of law, it prioritizes assistance for countries to apply the rule of law to improve their legal
systems, to ensure their accountability, and to provide for justice in their societies. Rapp, even
while he touts America’s historical legacy in fostering international justice, cautions that “should
the Rome Statute be amended to include a defined crime of aggression, jurisdiction should
follow a Security Council determination that aggression has occurred” (2009, para. 5). While the
U.S. does not recognize the authority of the ICC, it wants to extend American values to the
Court. The absence of the U.S. from scheduled meetings at the ICC Assembly of State Parties
also means that it missed out on many issues and developments. Therefore, the U.S. was not
privy to the intricacies of how the ICC operates. This lack of knowledge severely impedes
America’s ability to enhance the ICC as a way of extending American global influence.
In another address delivered at an ICC conference in Kampala, Uganda, Rapp (2010)
reassures the Assembly of State Parties that the U.S. is concerned about criminal activity and
international justice. However, the U.S. expects the ICC to treat each alleged war crime and
crimes against humanity on a case-by-case basis. The address in Kampala was in response to the
Lord’s Resistance Army’s insurgence, whose forces had stolen the lives of “thousands of
innocent men and women and stolen the youth of countless children” (Rapp, 2010, para. 2). At
this meeting, Rapp reiterates the U.S. resolve to “better protect future generations from the
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savageries of centuries past and present, from crimes that have seared our collective conscience”
(2010, para. 1). At the same hearing in Kampala, there were supporting statements from the legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, Harold Hongju Koh.
U.S. oversight over the court’s activities was not only limited to observations at the
Assembly of the State Parties but also on actions and prosecutions by the ICC. For instance,
when the ICC convicted the Congolese warlord, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the National Security
Spokesman, Tommy Vietor, issued a statement lauding the decision by the Court (Vietor, 2012).
President Obama also released several statements supporting the ICC, especially on its actions in
Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, on May 24, 2010, President Obama issued a statement when
he signed the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of
2009. Obama (2010) relies on Congress to pass an Act to support the ICC’s efforts to try war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Obama, together with his foreign policy
apparatus, offers numerous statements in support of ICC’s work. However, like the Bush
administration, he rhetorically admonishes the ICC’s legal actions and proposed actions against
American military personnel. This inconsistent discourse calls into question Obama's theoretical
support for international criminal justice. Rhetorically, this means that Obama sees citizens of
the U.S., and especially U.S. servicemembers, as above international criminal jurisdiction. This
explanation announces an invocation of an American common sense – the inviolability of the
U.S. military. In 2016 for example, Ambassador Samantha Powers issued a statement on the ICC
conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As evident
on the U.S. Department of State’s website between 2009 and 2016, Obama’s foreign policy and
national security architects issued numerous statements and delivered political speeches in
response to actions by the Court.
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Additionally, it is instructive that Obama’s ambivalent nature toward the ICC illustrates
how America sees itself as a superpower that would rather support good causes than to be a party
to constraining and threatening international agreements. America sees itself as more powerful
than the United Nations. It has similar structures, and its mechanisms are much swifter than the
unyielding bureaucracy of the UN. Furthermore, the U.S. invariably perceives international
cooperation to be premised on communist and socialist philosophies. Therefore, the U.S. must
lead in disaggregating the power of an international institution acting as the global hegemon.
President Obama's presidency becomes pivotal at a historical moment when the United
States was still waging the war on terrorism and the moments when nuclear tests were
controversially creating problems for the world. In response, President Obama’s international
resolve to safeguard the national security of the United States was to lead denuclearization
efforts and to fight terrorism, such as al Qaeda. Additionally, between 2009 and 2016, President
Obama refrains from acknowledging the ICC at the United Nations. In this direction, Obama
followed Bush’s lead. In doing so, Obama seems not to be in support of the ICC even though his
administration seems to be acknowledging efforts and prosecutions at the ICC. Acknowledging
the ICC on the rhetorical platform (UNGA) would have accorded some legitimacy to the ICC.
The administration’s resolve, rather, was to provide a verdict on prosecutions rather than being
part of a court that the country fears would unfairly prosecute Americans.
The U.S. presence at the Hague’s meetings is also a rhetorical maneuver. Although not a
signatory, the U.S. positions itself strategically to lead international justice efforts simply by its
attendance. This tactic is similar to what Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) call “a rhetoric of
place.” In other words, the location of the rhetorical enactment of U.S. perspectives regarding the
ICC symbolically represents the importance of American global power at the very venue where
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the ICC exists. Moreover, because the U.S. prefers unilateral action, the UN should also pursue
American principles of justice. By issuing statements on ICC actions, the U.S. not only
undermines the ICC but also displays the superior strength of the U.S. This deed by the U.S. will
not only irk the ICC, and largely the UN member countries, but it also attracts strategic enemies
from strong advocates such as international human rights organizations. Accordingly, by acting
as an amicus curia to the court, the U.S. weakens the jurisdictional effort of the ICC because the
United States being a “friend of the court” rhetorically provides legal arguments that prevent the
ICC from investigating American military personnel regarding war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
Support for the ICC in National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010 and 2015
President Obama’s national security documents of 2010 also highlight U.S. continuous
engagement with the ICC through the Assembly of State Parties. The ideological strength of
these documents delineates the importance of Obama’s actions. The NSS (2010), as one of its
cardinal action points, directs U.S. foreign policy to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. It
states that,
the United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the
‘Responsibility to Protect.’ In so doing, we have recognized that the primary
responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign
governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community
when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when
they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such
crimes inside their borders. (NSS, 2010, p. 48)
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The document underscores America’s ardent determination to collaborate with the international
community to prevent such atrocities. However, when these prevention efforts fail, the United
States will work “multilaterally and bilaterally” to garner all the diplomatic resources as well as
in “certain instances” deploy its military to respond and avert mass exterminations and
genocides. Crimes against humanity, genocides, and war crime atrocities committed in the global
south and Eastern Europe, specifically Yugoslavia, Kosovo, etc., were increasing in phenomenal
proportions. The UN responded to these challenges by establishing the ICC treaty. However, by
not ratifying the treaty, the U.S. must act unilaterally to assert its hegemonic authority. As such,
Obama’s first national security strategy includes elements of power and authority to serve as a
counterhegemonic resistance to the UN’s effort. By resisting the UN, the U.S. symbolically,
albeit rhetorically, crafts an image of the UN that, despite all its resources and powerful status in
the world, failed to prevent tribal and civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa and the atrocious
genocide in Rwanda. While the above contributed to negotiating the ICC treaty, Obama realizes
that working under the UN is unwise in the 21st Century. Even though it promises collaboration,
Obama’s administration is prepared to respond swiftly (by deploying the military) if
multinational cooperation becomes ineffective.
On international justice and international law, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS)
emphasizes U.S. commitment to peace by actively working to bring peace and justice in Europe
and Africa. In an earlier version of the National Security Strategy, the United States, according to
the NSS (2010, sees the promotion of peace and justice as not merely “moral imperatives” but
rather “stabilizing forces in international affairs.” Under Obama, the NSS 2010 affirms the U.S.
support for national justice systems and commitment for “ad hoc international tribunals and
hybrid courts.” Like the Bush administration, Obama prefers ad hoc tribunals rather than a
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permanent international criminal court. A permanent international criminal court is likely to be
too powerful and portends a challenge to U.S. military and security interests – a challenge to
U.S. foreign policy and a weakening of its hegemony. In this case, the NSS 2010 pledges to
continually “support institutions and prosecutions that advance this important interest” (NSS, p.
48). Obama did not make any commitment to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. However,
Obama’s NSS 2010 advocated that the U.S. would engage with parties to the Rome Statute and
assist “the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent
with the requirements of U.S. law” (p. 48). Obama’s strategy in the NSS 2010 is to only support
the ICC on issues that matter to American interests, while with other cases of genocide and mass
atrocities, the U.S. will work directly with international organizations until there is the need to
use force. Thus, Obama was able to refine U.S.-UN relations regarding the Court with a well-laid
out approach instead of the uncompromising position of the Bush administration.
The NSS (2015), also reiterates the administration’s earlier stance on international
cooperation on crime. The Strategy will continue to support the “International Criminal Court”
but in a manner that resonates with U.S. law and protects military personnel from prosecution.
To maintain its international hegemony, the NSS (2015) of Obama’s presidency further states
that it will continue to “mobilize allies and prevent and respond to mass atrocities using all our
instruments of national power” (p. 22). Finally, the NSS (2015) also details America’s readiness
to embrace the post-World War II legal infrastructure that oversees a peaceful world and lead a
new world order.
Trump’s Unilateralism and the Rhetoric of U.S. Imperial Retreat
President Trump enters the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign with the mission to “make
America great again” (MAGA) because America is no longer “winning” in international affairs
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(MacDonald, 2018). In his first foreign policy address to the nation, President Trump indicates
that he will pursue a unilateral vision regarding foreign policies. Trump repudiates international
organizations such as the UN, NATO, , and said he will navigate ways to unsign the U.S. from
these accords since they do not advance American interests. Clarke and Ricketts (2017) maintain
that Trump’s “administration has been remarkable for the extent to which its foreign policy
positions have run counter to the largely liberal internationalist approach of successive
administrations since 1945” (p. 366). For other scholars such as Brands (2017), Trump’s foreign
policy inclination represents a “hardline, nearly zero-sum approach that would actively roll back
the postwar international order and feature heavy doses of unilateralism and latter-day
isolationism” (p. 74). Brands (2017) asserts that the 2016 presidential election introduced
rigorous reservations about globalization, transnational alliances, and other crucial elements of
American ideological expansionism.
For instance, Clarke and Ricketts (2017) argue that the well-spring of Trump’s foreign
policy rhetoric is found within the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy – that dwells
on notions of U.S. national honor and reputation. These scholars argue that four distinct but
complementary traditions have guided America’s foreign policy: the Hamiltonian or open door
to the world position, the Jeffersonian or the perfection of the democratic system, the Jacksonian
or perpetuation of populist ideals and military authority, and the Wilsonian or moral principle.
Thus, the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian traditions are more profound in Trump’s foreign policy
pronouncements. These traditions are also couched in American exceptionalism and ultimately,
the perpetuation of American hegemony. My analysis will show that Trump rather rallies on the
rhetoric of the Truman and Monroe doctrines. Trump appeals to these authorities to rhetorically
articulate his foreign policy approaches in two of his speeches at the UN. Goldsmith (2017)
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adduces that Trump’s presidential attack on international law and international organizations is
occasioned by “economic nationalism, anti-cosmopolitanism, anti-elitism, a belief that
international law does not reflect American values but threatens American institutions” (para. 1).
A few days into his presidency, President Trump’s administration drafted an Executive Order
titled “Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties” that signals the U.S. retreat from various
international accords (Washington Post, n.d,, n.p.). This announcement fulfils President Trump’s
promise to exit the U.S. from international agreements (Galbraith, 2019a).
Trump’s Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announces the U.S. exit from the Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran. Galbraith (2019) underscores that
the National Security Adviser, then John Bolton, also publicizes the U.S. retreat from the
“Optional Protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both
withdrawals were triggered by pending International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases grounded in
these treaties that were recently brought against the United States” (Galbraith, 2019a, p. 132).
However, my focus in this thesis is Trump’s renewed agitation toward the International Criminal
Court. First, I navigate Trump’s rhetorical aversion to multinational institutions and treaties,
especially that of the UN and its agencies. Subsequently, I map out how Trump invokes the
Truman and Monroe doctrines coupled with how Trump also establishes a closer relationship
with the Jacksonian and Jeffersonian traditions that guide American foreign policy and
international commitments. This undertaking will then inform how Trump’s foreign policy
inclination communicates American exceptionalism and American hegemony on the
international scene.
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Trump’s Rhetorical Assault on International Institutions
Trump advances that his foreign policy course “will always put the interests of the
American people and American security above all else. It has to be first. Has to be” (Trump,
2016b, para. 2). Here, President Trump articulates that after the Cold War, America’s foreign
policy swerved “badly off course.” America, according to Trump, reneged on its efforts to
advance “a new vision for a new time.” He continues that the U.S. foreign policy in the present
historical moment “makes no sense” because logic was replaced with foolishness and arrogance,
which led to one foreign policy disaster after another” (Trump, 2016b, para. 6). Trump speaks
enthymematically about the exact “foreign policy disasters.” As Aristotle posits, when rhetors
speaks enthymematically, they invite us to include our understanding in order to appreciate the
discursive meanings of the speech. Trump could then be referring to America’s continuous
support for other nations and close ties with international institutions while also blindly doing the
bidding of other powerful countries. In this regard, Trump prefers a foreign policy that will
“make America strong again” and “reliable again” (Trump, 2016, para. 33). Accordingly,
“America is going to be reliable again. It’s going to be a great and reliable ally again. It’s going
to be a friend again. We’re going to finally have a coherent foreign policy based upon American
interests and the shared interests of our allies” (Trump, 2016b, para. 33). Therefore, Trump
discloses a new common sense. Because he indicates America’s foreign policy was haphazard,
especially after the Cold War, he plans on making America’s foreign policy more coherent and
meaningful to exigent needs – in accordance with America’s self-interests – of the twenty-first
century.
Thus, Trump presents a case that would transform the common sense of America’s
existing foreign policy and international relations to a new common sense (Gramsci, 1971) —the
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“America first” approach. This America first perspective is also ambiguous and fragmentary. In
a bid to make a more profound coherent foreign policy to meet the demand of a “timeless
Principle,” Trump wants to build a strong military. According to then-candidate Trump, the
American military is “depleted,” and the U.S. must work to improve military capacity, other than
be preoccupied about global warming, for instance. Trump (2016b) underscores that “the
military is the cheapest, single investment we can make. We will develop, build, and purchase
the best equipment known to mankind. Our military dominance must be unquestioned, and I
mean unquestioned, by anybody and everybody” (para. 45). Trump’s discourse frames a new
common sense by pitting overreliance on the U.S. military for national power and hegemonic
status. According to Gramsci, any unquestioned philosophy converts to common sense, and this
becomes the philosophy of the masses. Of course, it is the same military that, arguably, would
indulge in war crimes and allegations of crimes against humanity. Because Trump aims to
construct a foreign policy that would stand the test of time (several generations), Trump argues
that it then behooves him to “look for talented experts with approaches and practical ideas, rather
than surrounding myself with those who have perfect resumes but very little to brag about except
responsibility for a long history of failed policies and continued losses at war. We have to look to
new people” (Trump, 2016b, para. 70). In other words, Trump believes that for a new common
sense direction of American foreign policy, there must be a departure from the norm and the
appointment of people with the required mindset to MAGA. This also informs Trump’s
premature termination of personnel appointments to notable political offices like that of the U.S.
Ambassador to the UN, the Secretary of State, National Security advisors, among many others.
Trump also promises to “reinvigorate Western values and institutions. Instead of trying to spread
universal values that not everybody shares or wants, we should understand that strengthening and
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promoting Western civilization and its accomplishments will do more to inspire positive reforms
around the world than military interventions” (Trump, 2016b, para. 72).
Moreover, Trump pledges that America will not “surrender” to the “false song of
globalism.” He indicates that he is always “skeptical of international unions that tie us up and
bring America down and will never enter…And under my administration, we will never enter
America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs” (Trump, 2016b,
para. 79). This allusion is a particularly poignant rhetorical trope because Trump fails to
acknowledge the historical role that the U.S. exercised in establishing these organizations. More
so, Trump did not believe that America’s inclusion in international organizations is crucial to
help advance American interests. Riding on the neoconservative ideology, Trump desires a world
where America rather leads to global peace and prosperity. For him, “America will continue and
continue forever to play the role of peacemaker. We will always help save lives and indeed
humanity itself, but to play the role, we must make America strong again” (Trump, 2016, para.
84). Under this false dichotomy, Trump perceives that America only pursues its interests when it
opposes the ideologies of international institutions. Opposing the hegemony of international
bodies is also a means to asserting American influence and power in world politics.
On March 21, 2016, Trump delivers another foreign policy speech to the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Trump (2016a) presents a sharp attack on the United
Nations. He asserts that the “the United Nations is not a friend of democracy, it’s not a friend to
freedom, it’s not a friend even to the United States of America where, as you know, it has its
home” (Trump, 2016a, para. 35). Trump notes this position because the UN earns its legitimacy
and powerful status from member states, some of whom are fascist and totalitarian governments.
Also, Trump believes that, because the UN is headquartered in the U.S., its decisions must be
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favorable to American interests. In that regard, Trump beliefs that using the U.S. power of veto
“100 percent” when he becomes President, is one of the ways of ensuring America has an
important say in world politics. As President-elect, Trump promised reforms at the UN. After
Obama’s administration abstained from a vote over Israel’s “illegal” occupation of the West
Bank, Trump tweeted on 26 December that “The United Nations has such great potential but
right now it is just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time. So sad!” (Donald
J. Trump, 2016). This tweet after his election ossifies his vision for unilateralism and a clear
vindication of his campaign on refining America’s relations with international bodies.
At a lunch with UN Security Council Ambassadors on April 24, 2017, Trump hints that
“the United Nations has tremendous potential — tremendous potential — far greater than
what I would say any other candidate in the last 30 years would have even thought to say.
I don’t think it’s lived up — I know it hasn’t lived up to the potential. I mean, I see a day
when there’s a conflict where the United Nations, you get together, and you solve the
conflict. You just don’t see the United Nations, like solving conflicts. I think that’s going
to start happening now. I can see it. And the United Nations will get together and solve
conflicts. It won’t be two countries; it will be the United Nations mediating or arbitrating
with those countries” (Trump, 2017b, para. 11.).
The statement seems to suggest that Trump dislikes the UN—just that he feels it has not lived up
to its potential. Also, Trump’s pronouncements communicate his dislike for international
institutions premised on the traditional foreign policy thinking established by Presidents Monroe
and Truman. Trump’s dislike for multilateralism prompts him to use rhetorical appeals based on
the foreign policy ideologies of Presidents Truman and Monroe. This also means that in pursuing
this foreign policy direction, Trump sharply diverts from other approaches and traditions pursued

171

by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama. By appealing to these authorities (Truman and
Monore), President Trump imports the rhetorical memory of U.S. resurgence and origins of its
hegemonic framework into a new era of American power and international standing.
Resurgence of Truman and Monroe Doctrines Under Trump
Writing about geopolitics and presidential rhetoric, O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992)
accentuate that “political speeches and the like afford us a means of recovering the selfunderstandings of influential actors in world politics. They help us understand the social
construction of worlds and the role of geographical knowledge in that of social construction” (p.
191). Accordingly, the exact meaning of an “America first” and “making America Great Again”
policy is ambiguous and contradictory. This presents a need to investigate some of the popular
traditions that guide the conduct of American foreign policy to which President Trump alludes or
with which he identifies – the Truman and Monroe Doctrines. Brands (2006) writes that, before
the 20th century, Monroe was the only doctrine that bore the name of a President because it
succinctly expresses the principles underpinning American foreign policy within that particular
historical moment. Presidential doctrines, posits Brands (2006), could be dangerous because they
seemingly glorify personalities at the expense of the needs of the country. Although, presidential
doctrines are for dignifying past presidential legacies, Gilderbus (2006) reasons that the Monroe
doctrine was instituted for defensive measures by the U.S. President James Monroe in the 1823
annual message to Congress, who framed the doctrine that was later named after him. This
doctrine guards against European influence in the Western Hemisphere. One of the cardinal
principles was the U.S. rejection of the European monarchical system of government that the
U.S. viewed as archaic. Also, Monroe sought U.S. removal from all European political affairs.
Brands further notes that the Truman Doctrine has a global focus with a predisposition toward
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confronting external threats to its national security such as communism. Merrill (2006) presents
that the Truman Doctrine, advocated by President Harry Truman in 1947, was unfavorable to
multilateralism but rather emphasized a reiteration of America in a globalized world. Merrill
reasons that Truman stresses and highlights America’s insecurity in an unsettling world. Thus,
instead of pursuing international objectives, America must focus on its vulnerability, strengthen
its interests at home, and restrategize its foreign policy. The two doctrines discussed above serve
as the backbone of U.S. foreign policy ideology for at least the most of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries (Merrill, 2006). The Monroe and Truman Doctrines also developed America
into a potent force especially for the majority of the twentieth century by transforming America
into a world hegemon since the Doctrines emphasized American unipolar dominance.
At the UN General Assembly in September 2018, Trump hints that “responsible nations
must defend against threats to sovereignty not just from global governance, but also from other,
new forms of coercion and domination” (Trump, 2018, para. 53). Undoubtedly, Trump’s
pronouncements also support the Truman and Monroe Doctrines that emphasized the need for
America to secure itself against threats to its security and national interests. According to Trump,
those countries located in the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S., are dedicated to
preserving their independence from the intrusion of colonialist foreign influences (Trump, 2018).
As we have established earlier, the UN is a rhetorical institution since utterances on this global
stage influence the decisions and actions about countries and their interests (Barnes, 2015). On
this stage, Trump’s reference to foreign domination reinforces the need for America to exit
international agreements that threaten its security interests and foreign policy aims. In this
regard, Trump charges that,
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since President Monroe … we reject the interference of foreign nations in this
hemisphere and in our own affairs. The United States has recently strengthened our laws
to better screen foreign investments in our country for national security threats, and we
welcome cooperation with countries in this region and around the world that wish to do
the same. You need to do it for your own protection. (Trump, 2018, para. 60)
President Trump’s allusion to President James Monroe reiterates the significance of the Monroe
Doctrine in the present historical moment of U.S. foreign relations strategy.
In his first address to the UN General Assembly in September 2017, Trump underlines
that the UN was established to fashion a better future for the world in a spirit of cooperation to
advance sovereignty and to enhance prosperity for all people. Trump also hints that the United
States, during that moment, also developed the Marshall Plan to help restore Europe. By
appealing to the significance of the Marshall Plan premised on the idea that the whole “world is
safer when nations are strong, independent, and free,” President Trump echoed President
Truman’s approach to U.S. foreign policy. According to President Trump, Truman’s message to
Congress called on the U.S. to support “European recovery…in full accord with our support of
the United Nations. The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of
its members” (Truman, 1947 as cited by Trump, 2017a, para. 13). In this scenario, Trump
presents that, for the world to meet present and future challenges, the nations “must begin with
the wisdom of the past” where a solid coalition was built by strong, sovereign, and independent
nations. He argues that “strong, sovereign nations let their people take ownership of the future
and control their destiny. And strong, sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the
fullness of the life intended by God” (Trump, 2017a, para. 17). At this moment, it is increasingly
clear that Trump’s foreign policy agenda invokes the dictates of the Truman Doctrine as a
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symbolic ideology for how he conceives America to be. In other words, Trump sees American
stringent engagement in world issues as a disadvantage to U.S. progress. According to Trump,
withdrawing the U.S. from numerous international agreements and, instead, pursuing more
unilateral actions is the only way for America to have an effective and formidable foreign policy.
Concerning American exceptionalism, on the 230th anniversary of the U.S. Constitution,
Trump touted the document as “the oldest constitution still in use in the world today” since it
constitutes the basis for “peace for human nature, human dignity, and the rule of law” (Trump,
2017a, para. 18). Moreover, the words “We the people” in the U.S. Constitution show that
American citizens must be protected at all times. In that regard, Trump discloses that any means
to limit and contravene these privileges by an unaccountable institution are threats to American
independence and the rule of law. Therefore, in Trump’s foreign policy aspirations, the U.S. will
continue to uphold the principle of sovereignty. As such, Trump reasons that the U.S.
government’s primary duty is to preserve its citizens’ inalienable rights and defend their inherent
values. He states that his policies put America and its citizens first; therefore, other countries
should follow America’s lead. By appealing to the presidents of other countries in this manner,
Trump espouses a nationalistic sentiment that would steer attention from international bodies and
prompt other countries to sever their ties with the UN. Consequently, other countries should now
look to the U.S. for guidance and support, thereby rebelling against the UN. Accordingly, instead
of obeying a global body that dominates them without a promise of a good future for their
citizens, the best course for other countries is to follow the example of the U.S. – a rhetorical
strategy by Trump to stir a hegemonic crisis with the UN.
Furthermore, in advancing a unilateral ideology vis-à-vis the UN, Trump argues that
America already embodies the provisions and principles outlined in the UN Charter. Citizens of
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America, according to Trump (2017a), embody the values championed by the UN since the U.S.
military engages in many peacekeeping efforts around the globe. In furtherance of its supreme
power in world affairs and doing well to end World Wars the U.S. did not expect “territorial
expansion or attempt to oppose and impose our way of life on others. Instead, we helped build
institutions such as this one to defend the sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all” (Trump,
2017a, para. 29). This pronouncement communicates to the UN that any attempt to orchestrate
universal jurisdiction over America is unjustified since America’s universal ideology led to the
formation of the global body in the first place. Because he campaigned to not cooperate with
international institutions, Trump avers that America wants “harmony and friendship, not conflict
and strife” and because America is guided by outcomes and not ideology, its foreign policy is
based largely on “principled realism, rooted in shared goals, interests, and values” (Trump, 2017,
para. 30). This statement offers a rhetorical insight into his disagreement with American consent
to many international treaties. Such international treaties have been condemned by Trump as not
serving American interests – a situation that puts America’s hegemony under threat.
Accordingly, the U.S. must guard its interests against threats to its sovereign power. This
positions the U.S. to disaggregate its policies and not conform to the UN, which is highly
bureaucratic and not result-oriented. The United States, according to Trump, seeks to reassert
authority from the UN because the UN has lost focus, and other countries “have hijacked the
very systems that are supposed to advance them. For example, it is a massive source of
embarrassment to the United Nations that some governments with egregious human rights
records sit on the U.N. Human Rights Council” (Trump, 2017a, para. 66). For this purpose, it is
outrageously paradoxical for Americans to be subject to “unaccountable international tribunals,
and powerful global bureaucracies” (Trump, 2017a, para. 81). Consequently, President Trump
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acknowledges President Truman’s 70-year-old foreign policy agenda. This declaration indicates
that if the world accepts the prospects of the future and surmounts the contemporary dangers,
then the world rests on “strong, sovereign, and independent nations – countries that are rooted in
their histories and invested in their destinies; nations that seek allies to befriend, not enemies to
conquer” (Truman 1940 as cited by Trump, 2017a, para. 83). In that regard, the world must build
secure and desirable futures that digress from dictates of the UN’s “decay, domination, and
defeat” (Trump, 2017a, para. 88).
In the 2019 speech at the UN, Trump asserts that, because the American military has
spent over two and a half-trillion dollars since his election to completely “rebuild our great
military, the U.S. is by far, the world’s most powerful nation. Hopefully, it will never have to
use this power” (Trump, 2019b, para. 4). For Trump, America’s military is inviolable. Because
he favors a unilateral ideology, Trump advances that only “wise leaders always put the good of
their own people and their own country first” (Trump, 2019b, para. 8). First, Trump’s rhetorical
tactic is to scorn previous administrations who committed America to so many treaties and other
agreements. According to Trump (2019b), “the future does not belong to globalists. The future
belongs to patriots. The future belongs to sovereign and independent nations who protect their
citizens, respect their neighbors, and honor the differences that make each country special and
unique” (Trump, 2019b, para. 9). This position reiterates his earlier stance on multinational
institutions. At this time, President Trump and his national security advisers have launched an
attack on the UN and its agencies, especially the ICC. Also, President Trump announced the U.S.
exit from the Paris Climate Accord and the UN Arms Trade Treaty. The Arms Treaty, claims
Trump, is inconsistent with the Second Amendment and therefore infringes Americans’ rights.
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Trump’s foreign policy strategy also seeks to eliminate threats to American traditional
rights. In this way, Trump advocates that American values bequeathed to the nation by its
founding fathers are great dictates and therefore, the U.S. must exercise authority and “control
over others.” This historical narrative exalts the U.S. Constitution over international accords.
Also, Trump faults past American presidents for not respecting the U.S. Constitution and the
foundations that formed America's global influence. Trump believes that, through an “American
First” agenda, U.S. influence over international doctrines in the twenty-first century will reach
greater heights. Trump’s invocation of the rhetorical memories of the U.S. is very instructive.
Appealing to historical traditions strengthens his arguments and offers him a strong rhetorical
pathway as well as the moral authority to transgress international law. Therefore, Trump echoes
the historical foreign policy memories to bear on his foreign policy visions.
Bolton’s Opposition against the ICC: U.S. Hegemonic Countermeasures
In this section, I analyze the National Security Adviser, John Bolton’s rhetoric of
resistance to the ICC in the Trump administration. Bolton’s experience in U.S. foreign policy
could earn him the accolade of an “intellectual of statecraft” (O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p.
193). Bolton was also crucial in Bush’s onslaught against internationalization and more
importantly, opposition to the ICC. Besides, as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in 2002,
John Bolton “signed an official letter saying the United States would never become a party to the
International Criminal Court” (Taylor, 2018, para. 1). In an opinion piece published by the Wall
Street Journal, Bolton (2017) adduces the fundamental reasons why he oversaw the U.S. exit
from the International Criminal Court. Bolton (2017) repudiates the ICC’s authority and labeled
it as a “direct assault on the concept of national sovereignty” (n.p). Even though the U.S.
opposed the establishment of the ICC since the Clinton presidency, U.S. opposition intensified
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under President Bush and, most importantly, when John Bolton was the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations. Bolton (2018) believes that since its establishment, the ICC has been
“ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed, outright dangerous” (para. 4). In a fiery speech at the
Federalist Society, Bolton lays out essential precepts about the United Nations, the U.S.
opposition to this global body, and American antagonism toward key treaties, including the
Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court. He expresses contentment with
how he “unsigned” the United States from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Bolton calls that action his
“happiest day” in government (Bolton, 2018). Bolton delivered this speech in response to a
request by the ICC’s Prosecutor to investigate American soldiers for “alleged detainee abuse.”
Bolton described this as an “utterly unfounded, unjustifiable investigation.” In that regard,
Bolton states unequivocally that, “We will not cooperate with the ICC. We will provide no
assistance to the ICC. And we certainly will not join the ICC. We will let the ICC die on its own.
After all, for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us” (Bolton, 2018, para. 16).
Bolton argues that the United States based its opposition to the International Criminal
Court on five agitational slogans. Bolton’s sentiments on the ICC sound much like his earlier
comments during the Bush administration. First, the ICC, according to Bolton “threatens
American sovereignty and national security interests” (2018, para. 18). Accordingly, Bolton
conceives that the ICC prosecutor enjoys “unfettered discretion to investigate, charge, and
prosecute individuals, regardless of whether their countries have acceded to the Rome Statute”
(Bolton, 2018, para. 18). This argument raises important concerns about how the international
hegemon (UN) and its agency, the ICC, expect all nations of the world to acquiesce to its
hegemony. The ICC, according to Bolton (2018), is an agency where member countries pledge
to maintain peace. However, when that peace process falters, then it will prosecute people for
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war crimes, and other violations to what the hegemon deems as a crime. In other words, since the
ICC claims universal jurisdiction and, by extension, dominates the world with this common
sense, the U.S. would not bow to such an ideology, as it concentrates too much power in the
ICC.
For Bolton, the ICC has no consent whatsoever from the U.S. because the ICC’s structure
conflicts with American values – it constrains Constitutional checks and balances and separation
of powers. According to Bolton, the ICC does not have the suitable capacity to hold personnel
accountable. Additionally, Bolton reasons that fascist governments in countries such as
Venezuela who are signatories to the ICC allow them to impose their will on the U.S. In other
respects, Bolton questions why the United Nations Security Council does not have oversight
responsibility for the ICC and why this duty, instead, is accorded to the Assembly of State
Parties of the ICC. Bolton realizes that the exclusion of the Security Council also eliminates the
U.S. from potentially vetoing some of the actions of the ICC. As a result, Bolton concludes that
the ICC and its jurisdiction runs counter to U.S. sovereignty and influence in world affairs.
Moreover, Bolton articulates that the ICC’s claims of jurisdiction concerns crimes that
have ambiguous and vague conceptions that amplify the “court’s unfettered powers.” Bolton
posits that,
The definitions of crimes, especially crimes of aggression, are vague and subject to wideranging interpretation by the ICC… The crime of aggression could become a pretext for
politically motivated investigations. Was the mission of U.S. Navy Seals that killed
Osama bin Laden in Pakistan a crime of aggression? What about the U.S. and coalition
airstrikes in Syria to protect innocent children from chemical weapons? How about U.S.
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military exercises with allies and partners around the world? Or Israel’s actions to defend
itself on countless occasions? (Bolton, 2018, para. 26)
Bolton challenges over the definitions and meanings of the crimes stipulated in the ICC treaty for
their ambiguity. This construct means the treaty employs ambiguous language that could be
categorized as international, political, and legal ideographs — which means different things to
the framers of the ICC treaty and countries from whom it expects compliance. War crimes, for
instance, means different things, as Bolton indicates in the above quote. When the U.S. sends its
military to free innocent civilians from areas under militant insurgency, that could not be
classified as a war crime or crime of aggression, according to Bolton. That action also represents
how America uses its global power. Hence, constraining the U.S. from achieving its global duties
becomes a threat that must be contested. For Bolton, the ICC’s supremacy means that it could
begin to further institute and include new definitions of crimes that would further prevent U.S.
national security objectives. Accordingly, Bolton states that “a side event at the Assembly of
States Parties recently included a panel discussion on the possibility of adding ‘ecocide,’
environmental and climate-related crimes, to the list of offenses within the court's jurisdiction”
(2018, para. 27). A critique of this pronouncement indicates that the ICC’s claim of global
jurisdiction is dangerous since it harms America’s interest and its global hegemony. Therefore,
America must vigorously contest ICC mandates.
In this speech, Bolton argues that the ICC fails on its mandate and its fundamental aim –
which is to prevent and “punish atrocity crimes.” Despite the ICC spending over a billion dollars
since its inception in 2002, Bolton avers that the ICC only managed eight convictions and thus,
the “dismal record is hardly a deterrent to dictators and despots determined to commit horrific
atrocities” in countries such as the DRC, Sudan, Syria, and many others. This solidifies the belief
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that “the hard men of history are not deterred by fantasies of international law such as the ICC.
The idea that faraway bureaucrats and robed judges would strike fear into the hearts of the likes
of Saddam Hussein, Hitler, Stalin, and Gaddafi is preposterous, even cruel” (Bolton, 2018, para.
29). Bolton’s confrontational accent labels the ICC as “superfluous” and its continued existence
a paradox. This rhetorical position claims that the U.S. exceptional judicial system already deals
with crimes and thereby holds Americans to the “highest legal and ethical standards.” Also, the
U.S. prides itself as a democratic country with a robust system in conducting criminal trials.
Bolton offers that the ICC’s principle of complementarity (prosecuting crimes with consent of a
culprit’s country) holds no precedent and, therefore, cannot be trusted. Finally, Bolton states that
the ICC’s authority has waned and has been “sharply criticized and rejected by most of the
world.” This view is fortified by the fact that more than seventy nations in Africa and elsewhere
have withdrawn their membership because of the “disproportionate number of arrests against
Africans” (Bolton, 2018, para. 37). Bolton argues that the ICC, to African countries, is a neocolonial institution to control and dominate Africans, which is why Kenya, Malawi, Burundi, and
South Africa unsigned the treaty. Finally, Bolton admonishes that the U.S. will negotiate more
bilateral agreements that will be negotiated along with measures aimed at preventing the ICC
from its “illegal” prosecutions.
From the foregoing, the ICC is an extension of the UN common sense that seduces
member states into consenting to the global body’s hegemony. Additionally, this common sense
antagonizes the administrations of post-Cold War U.S. Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and
Trump. The U.S. stringent opposition is more profound because of the conservative ideology
pursued by the administrations of Bush and Trump. A law professor, Sterio (2019), harshly
criticizes Bolton’s speech because he claims Bolton made baseless accusations not supported by
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international law. However, Bolton was speaking at a time when the U.S. was juggling several
serious foreign policy issues— Iran, North Korea, as well as dealing with the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. To avoid the bureaucratic red tape measures that characterizes the UN and
its snail-pace decision-making, the U.S. had to pursue its own security interests. Within this
discursive moment, the Rome Statute’s cardinal principles – control and prevent war of
aggression, war crimes, and genocides – are not pressing needs for American geo-strategic selfinterests. Therefore, the U.S. would not acquiesce to the demands of the ICC. According to
Bolton, the ICC only exercises illegitimate authority. Therefore, even though Sterio’s (2019)
criticism of Bolton’s speech falls within the context of international law, it nonetheless overlooks
crucial aspects of the ideological posturing and the political conjuncture at the time of Bolton’s
speech that guided his rhetorical action. Accordingly, the Rome Statute will be interpreted as an
attempt to thwart the principle of self-determination and America’s adherence to the rule of law.
Ultimately, America’s exercise of power politics becomes threatened. The fact that this treaty
has been signed by most nations reinforces how the ICC represents UN hegemonic common
sense. Common sense, according to Gramsci (1971), is the unquestioned beliefs that a hegemon
uses to exercise control over dominated groups. Even though the treaty came into force after
some thoughtful debates and rigorous negotiations, the process of signing the treaty yields the
countries to a dominant force — the UN. Since the hegemony operates by consent and not
coercion, these countries consented to the common sense ideology of the UN.
A few weeks after Bolton’s speech at the Federalist Society of America, President Trump
addressed the UN. Trump (2018) charges that the “United States is stronger, safer, and a richer
country” in less than two years because of his “American first” policy – largely influenced by
dictates of American exceptionalism, the Truman and Monroe Doctrines (Trump, 2018, para. 8).
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At this forum, Trump presents that the U.S. will continually choose independence and
collaboration over globalized “governance, control, and domination” (Trump, 2018, para. 11).
Trump observes that America’s policy of “principled realism” grants it the authority to not
consent or be held hostage to “old dogmas, discredited ideologies, and so-called experts who
have been proven wrong over the years, time and time again. This is true not only in matters of
peace but in matters of prosperity.” This established the kairotic moment for Trump to announce
America’s withdrawal from several international agreements. By rhetorically advancing an
American first ideology, Trump positions himself to harass and berate the UN Human Rights
Council. According to him, the Human Rights Council has become an “embarrassment” to the
UN because it has failed to prosecute people for egregious human rights abuses while
condemning the U.S. and its allies. As a consequence, Trump justifies the American exit from
the UNHRC. Furthermore, Trump (2018) states that,
the United States will provide no support in recognition to the International Criminal
Court. As far as America is concerned, the ICC has no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no
authority. The ICC claims near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of every country,
violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process. We will never surrender
America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy … America is
governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the
doctrine of patriotism. (Trump, 2018, para. 51)
Trump’s tirade against existing U.S. international obligations has its roots in conservative
exceptionalist ideology that fails to submit U.S. actions to scrutiny by outside forces. David
Kaye, a professor of human rights law, reasons that despite how America helped promote the
postwar global human rights regime that has been key to its diplomatic and foreign policy,
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“human rights” in American foreign policy is becoming “what others violate” (Kaye, 2020, para.
4). According to Kaye (2020), when the U.S. articulates human rights law to condemn abuses
worldwide in Hong Kong, Venezuela, etc., it should also embrace those same principles when
they are deployed against it. However, the role of a rhetoric of resistance to international
supremacy and power politics may violate Kaye’s contention. The U.S. is the world hegemon.
Therefore, any foreseeable danger to the advancement of its international endeavors is
threatening. These threats to its power must be resisted. In doing so, the U.S. reclaims its global
superiority. Trump’s ironclad position also frames past U.S. presidents who helped empower
institutions to maintain world peace as not being prescient. Trump’s arguments against the
international obligations seem to justify his claim that global efforts are now working against the
U.S. Consequently, in the present conjunctural moment, Trump sees American withdrawal from
the very international institutions it created as the only strategy to reassert U.S. influence in the
world.
Trump Administration’s Hegemonic Resistance to the ICC
Revocation of Visas of ICC Prosecutor
Here, I discuss Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s rhetorical ultimatum to the ICC
Prosecutor and other rigid rhetorical maneuvers. Trump demanded blocking ICC prosecutions.
After Bolton’s 2018 speech at the Federalist Society and Trump’s address at the UN, the ICC
announced that it was discontinuing investigations against the USA. As a precautionary measure,
the U.S. revoked the visa of ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on April 4, 2019. However, before
the revocation of the visa, Secretary Pompeo spoke to reporters on March 15, 2019, to lay out a
policy on visa restrictions. Pompeo cites the Immigration and Nationality Act (2012) that
stipulates nonadmission to aliens “whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the
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Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences” [Immigration and Nationality Act, 2012 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(C)(i)]. Pompeo invokes this provision to disallow any programmed investigation of
war crimes against Americans from the International Criminal Court. This extreme directive
means that the Trump administration would exhaust all opportunities to prevent the ICC’s
investigations. Pompeo continues that the ICC has “unaccountable prosecutorial powers and the
threat it poses to American national sovereignty” accounts for why the U.S. has refused to join
the international court since 1998 (Pompeo, 2019, para. 7). Pompeo continues that
I’m announcing a policy of U.S. visa restrictions on those individuals directly responsible
for any ICC investigation of U.S. personnel. This includes persons who take or have
taken action to request or further such an investigation. These visa restrictions may also
be used to deter ICC efforts to pursue allied personnel, including Israelis, without allies’
consent. The implementation of this policy has already begun. Under U.S. law, individual
visa records are confidential, so I will not provide details as to who has been affected and
who will be affected. (2019, para. 8)
According to Pompeo, the rule of law, accountability, and justice are cherished American values.
As a result, the U.S. has become the “envy of the world.” Pompeo intimates that the U.S. justice
system acts against servicemembers who commit “international crimes.”
To appease the U.S., the ICC announced that it was terminating investigations and
rejecting further requests to investigate war crimes in Afghanistan just a week after Pompeo’s
announcement (BBC, 2019). Specifically, on April 12, 2019, the ICC announced that it
discontinued investigations into alleged atrocities by American soldiers in Afghanistan between
2003 and 2004. This news excited John Bolton, the then-National Security Advisor in the Trump
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administration. The Washington Post reports Bolton’s reaction to the news announced by Fatou
Bensouda, the ICC prosecutor. Bolton says, “Today is the second happiest day of my life”
(Bolton, 2019 as cited in Morello, 2019, para. 10). The first, announces Bolton, was when the
U.S. first unsigned the ICC treaty. According to President Trump,
today, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced its unanimous rejection of a
request to investigate American military and intelligence professionals who served in
Afghanistan. This is a major international victory, not only for these patriots but for the
rule of law. We welcome this decision and reiterate our position that the United States
holds American citizens to the highest legal and ethical standards. Since the creation of
the ICC, the United States has consistently declined to join the court because of its broad,
unaccountable prosecutorial powers; the threat it poses to American national sovereignty;
and other deficiencies that render it illegitimate. Any attempt to target American, Israeli,
or allied personnel for prosecution will be met with a swift and vigorous response.”
(Trump, 2019a, para. 1)
However, in response to several agitations from NGOs and others., and after reviewing
additional evidence, the ICC decided to reopen the investigations (BBC News, 2019;
International Criminal Court, 2020).
ICC’s Hegemonic Authority: The Clash of Hegemons
On March 5, 2020, the ICC proclaims that its Appeals Chamber decided unanimously to
approve the Prosecutor ‘s application to conduct investigations into alleged crimes under the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court regarding the situation in Afghanistan. According
to the International Criminal Court (2019), it “amended the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of
12 April 2019, which had rejected the Prosecutor's request for authorization of an investigation
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of 20 November 2017 and had found that the commencement of an investigation would not be in
the interests of justice. The Prosecutor had filed an appeal against that decision” (para. 1). This
ruling may seem hypocritical. The U.S. sees this as an international legal witch hunt--ushering in
another historical moment of renewed U.S. agitation against the court.
In a swift response to the ICC, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo frames the ICC personnel
as “politicians” with ulterior motives to counterbalance U.S. influence as they advance UN
security and political interests. In that regard, Pompeo (2020) redirects the hegemonic resistance
slogan which states that “the United States is not a party to the ICC, and we will take all
necessary measures to protect our citizens from this renegade, unlawful, so-called court” (para.
14). From this indication, Pompeo’s response to the ICC’s resurgence means that the U.S.
remains stringent in its resolve against complying with the ICC in any way. Resisting the ICC
means that the U.S. is safeguarding democratic processes, sovereignty, rule of law, and
advocating for more robust international judicial systems (such as ad hoc tribunals). In this way,
the ICC and multinational bodies must begin to reform and revise their standards — a more
persuasive and robust approach toward multilateral cooperation in the twenty-first century.
Unless or until this happens, powerful countries such as the U.S. will suspect foul play, and
ideological disputes between the ICC and the U.S. will continue. For Pompeo (2020), “the ICC
today stumbled into a sorry affirmation of every denunciation made by its harshest critics over
the last three decades” (para. 15). Thus, in trying to live its vision, the ICC exhibited rhetorical
impotence in dealing with powerful states. For the successful operation of the ICC, it should
pursue alternatives to American targets. Since it is likely that the severe atrocities in countries
such as Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, along with Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and Sevastopol, are within the ICC’s jurisdiction, these crimes should have been pursued
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instead of the UN’s hegemonic bickering with the U.S. While Russia withdrew its signature from
the ICC treaty in November 2016, there has been no concerted effort by the ICC to prosecute
Russian officials (Busol, 2020). Discursively, the seemingly selective application of international
law against Americans accounts for continued U.S. hostility to the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, Pompeo asserts that the ICC is manipulated by foreign parties who feed it with
false and fake information. Pompeo alleges that “we have evidence suggesting that there has
been – there have been efforts to provide misinformation to the court by foreign parties. We’re
going to take all the appropriate actions to ensure that American citizens are not hauled before
this political body to settle a political vendetta” (Pompeo, 2020, para. 15). Another main reason
the Trump administration avoids any form of cooperation with the ICC is because of the fears of
flawed espionage. Moreover, the ICC’s belligerence against listening and cooperating with the
U.S. affords America the moral authority to attack the ICC under the pretense of international
law. Pompeo also contends that the administration plans monumental
announcements probably in a couple of weeks about the path that we’re going to take to
ensure that we protect American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, our intelligence
warriors, the diplomats that have worked for the State Department over the years to
ensure that the ICC doesn’t impose – doesn’t impose pressure on them in a way that
doesn’t reflect the noble nature of the undertakings of every one of those Americans. We
have a solid system here in the United States. When there’s wrongdoing by an American,
we have a process by which that is redressed. This ICC thing is not that. (Pompeo, 2020,
para. 40).
The travel bans were another means to reassert U.S. opposition to the ICC’s jurisdiction. The
ICC’s resolution to overturn its ruling and reopen investigations into alleged American war
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crimes and crimes against humanity may also be seen as diplomatic and rhetorical witch-hunting.
This rhetorical and judicial disingenuousness prompted the Trump administration to further
implement stringent measures to prevent the ICC’s “illegal” trial of American citizens.
Trump’s Executive Order
Another rhetorical approach toward limiting the ICC’s prosecutorial powers over
American citizens is Trump’s Executive Order concerning the ICC. After two erstwhile
administrations who held different positions on the ICC treaty, Trump decides to pursue a
uniquely confrontational policy regarding the U.S. and the ICC’s jurisdiction. President Trump,
after revoking visas of ICC officials and further preventing any form of collaboration, invokes
the “International Emergency and Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 212(f) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States”
(Trump, 2020, para. 2). In the Executive Order, Trump intimates that the ICC and its
“illegitimate assertions of jurisdiction over personnel of the United States and certain of its allies,
including the ICC Prosecutor’s investigation into actions allegedly committed by United States
military, intelligence, and other personnel in or relating to Afghanistan, threatens to subject
current and former United States Government and allied officials to harassment, abuse, and
possible arrest” (Trump, 2020, n.p). He asserts that the ICC’s actions portend an infringement on
American sovereignty in such a way that the ICC hinders crucial national security and foreign
policy operations of the United States. Trump’s arguments share rhetorical identification with
that of the Bush administration’s challenge to the ICC. While this approach stands in stark
contrast to that of President Obama, President Trump chooses this trajectory because it advances
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his “America first” approach that revives his “unquestioned” and exceptionalist foreign policy
ideology.
As Commander-in-Chief, President Trump maintains that the U.S. is not a party to the
Rome Statute and as such will never accept ICC’s jurisdiction, nor will he accept the ICC’s bold
assertion that it has control over the United States. In this regard, Trump posits that, in line with
already-issued sanctions on ICC personnel, the U.S. seeks to impose additional “tangible and
significant consequences on those responsible for the ICC’s transgressions, which may include
the suspension of entry into the United States of ICC officials, employees, and agents, as well as
their immediate family members” (Trump, 2020, para. 2). Trump advances that, when the ICC
personnel are denied any form of access to the U.S., they will begin to recognize American
resolve toward opposing the “ICC’s overreach by seeking to exercise jurisdiction over personnel
of the United States and our allies, as well as personnel of countries that are not parties to the
Rome Statute or have not otherwise consented to ICC jurisdiction” (Trump, 2020, para. 2). In
this proclamation, Trump rhetorically reconstructs his immigration rhetoric from his presidential
campaign and appropriates it to oppose the jurisdictional authority of the ICC. Trump also
supplants reasoning in the application of international law to national security concerns.
Strengthening U.S. opposition to the ICC by inundating it with security threats, the U.S.
amplifies its fears about the ICC and constructs the ICC as a threat to the peace and tranquility of
the U.S. Accordingly, Trump plans to “declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.”
Utilizing radical approaches in dealing with external threats of criminal prosecutions shows the
immense national power that is appropriated by the U.S. to oppose any predeterminable legal
challenge to U.S. authority. By employing the war metaphor unobtrusively in this discourse,
President Trump, instead of resorting to congressional backing to advance U.S. foreign policy
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interests concerning the ICC, utilizes the evolving powers of the executive branch or what is
known as the doctrine of the “Unitary Executive” to diminish the President’s reliance on
Congress as well as to enhance the President’s ability to take swift action against the global court
(Beasley, 2010; Hiland, 2017, 2020).
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
Summary of Thesis
In this thesis, I presented a Gramscian rhetorical reading of American antagonism to the
International Criminal Court, a crucial agency of the UN. I probed the rhetoric of power in
resistance concerning the discourse of international treaties by showing how both the United
States and the United Nations have become global hegemons. From the foregoing, I uncover
American resistance to the constitutive force of United Nations treaties by paying attention to
post-Cold War American presidents. By using a neo-Marxist lens and analyzing a key foreign
policy accord – the International Criminal Court – that spans the presidencies of Clinton, Bush,
Obama, and Trump, I locate how the United States offered conflicting and sometimes consonant
foreign policy visions, particularly concerning resistance to international treaties. I contend that
the United States, through its post-Cold War presidents, resists UN treaties because of their
“common sensical” nature, their constitutive force, and ideological imbalance with the global
hegemonic power of the United States.
Because superpowers seek to retain and possibly enlarge their spheres of political and
ideological influence in contending for global hegemony, I argue that the actions of post-Cold
War American presidents against the ICC are latently revolutionary. This is because they seek to
topple the international hegemony of the UN and establish the United States as a “winning
candidate” in all frontiers of international politics by eliminating all forms of resistance. The
discourses and confrontational slogans that underline the U.S. retreat from international accords
do not limit its hegemonic status in the global arena. That is to say, I conclude that U.S.
imperial/hegemonic retreat form international agreements do not translate to mean national
decline; but ultimately, they are a rhetorical ploy to solidify its powerful status globally to
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become “a shining city on the hill” for other countries by disentangling its interests from a
competing hegemon like the United Nations (Bulmer-Thomas, 2018).
Theoretical Implications
Toward a Neo-Marxist Rhetorical Theory
The rhetoric of power and discourse (Benoit, 1994; Blair & Michel, 2000; Condit, 1983;
Cloud, 1994; Greene, 1998, etc.) have gained attention in rhetorical studies but much less in the
analysis of presidential action toward foreign policy initiatives — especially U.S. actions about
UN rhetoric (Barnes, 2015; Carney, 2017). Also, research on how powerful nations exercise
power and resist international influences has largely been in the domains of international
relations, law, and political economy, with only a handful of studies in communication. Although
in the communication discipline, there is the conspicuous absence of U.S. rhetorical opposition
to treaties in the literature – a move that beckons rhetorical scholars to emphasize the importance
of rhetoric in international affairs and the formation of global futures (Beer & Hariman, 1996;
Edwards, 2008; Stuckey, 1995; Parry-Giles, 2002). Especially, we must begin to think about how
ideological contestation occurs in the international arena concerning how international
organizations articulate discourses and how superpowers resist the rhetorical maneuvers of
hegemony exercised by international organizations.
I engaged this dialectic – the tension between the U.S. as a superpower hegemon and the
UN as a global hegemon – in my examination of American confrontation to international
treaties, especially to the ICC treaty. I believe this undertaking serves a greater purpose in the
twenty-first century when U.S. unipolar dominance is under threat from international institutions
and burgeoning regional and continental hegemonies. This behooves us to delineate the
hegemonic struggle in twenty-first-century international discourse. In this direction, a neo-
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Marxist rhetorical inquiry is crucial. Aune (1994) argues that the inadequacy of a theory of
rhetoric and political judgment disturbs Marxists, especially relating to fashioning subjective
agencies and objective structures. Aune (1994), in his book, Rhetoric and Marxism, reiterates
Marx and Engel’s conception that people make history, but these are not determined. He notes
that classical Marxism is entrenched in economic determinism and class but not focused on
meaning making. Hence, a neo-Marxist orientation that applies Marxist concepts to the reading
of discursive formations helps us to unmask the discourse of power and domination (McKerrow,
1989). This also helps us investigate how powerful actors assert hegemonic status while also
enabling us to make meaning of the discourses they articulate in novel historical and
conjunctural moments. A neo-Marxist critique also enables us to appreciate how U.S. foreign
policy discourse and ideology is constructed as a form of knowledge over the world and how this
influence worldviews and the conception of the world.
Aune (1994) expresses disappointment that Gramsci’s framework of the “actual moment
when hegemony becomes counterhegemonic” remains “untheorized” (p. 73). Aune continues
that because Gramsci was absent from the realms of popular struggle, he was unable to “theorize
systematically (either in abstract or a concrete way) how moments of counter-hegemony are
made” (p. 73). In the field of international relations, Cox (1987, 1993), Fusaro (2010), Gill
(1993), among many others, have applied Gramsci’s ideas to international relations. These
scholars discuss the nature of hegemony, common sense, and counter-hegemony among
international institutions and superpowers. However, in rhetorical studies, there has been a
noticeable absence of the rhetorical critique of struggle in discourses of international
organizations and how presidential rhetoric of powerful countries, such as the U.S., concerns
international treaties and alliances. I extend this discourse by analyzing how rhetoric mediates
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the discursive ideological struggles between the United States and the UN. For instance, Burke
writes that “identification is affirmed with eagerness precisely because there is division.
Identification is compensatory to division. If mean were not part of one another, there would be
no need for the rhetorician to proclaim unity” (Burke, 1969, p. 22). A Gramscian rhetorical
analysis bridges this gap since it unifies this dialectic -- discourse with materiality. It also
informs our appreciation of the rhetoric of power in resistance.
Thus, rhetoric enables us to investigate “the realm of division” (Aune, 1994, p. 47). In
this direction, rhetorical action should then arbitrate the connection between language (discourse)
and its material conditions or possibilities (Condit, 1983). Hence, emphasizing rhetoric’s role in
socio-political action does not privilege poststructuralists orientation to discourse that neglects
the material (Aune, 1994). In this regard, rhetoric both is constrained by objective realities and
therefore, “structures…objective truths and objective realities, as persuasion results in and from
social change” (Condit, 1983, p. 362). Gramsci’s concepts benefit rhetorical critics since they
bridge the gap between material reality and discourse. Since all language is metaphorical and the
hegemony requires hegemonic consent —Gramsci’s work enhances rhetoric’s usefulness in
relation to the poststructural and discursive orientations. To better apply neo-Marxist principles
through a Gramscian lens to analyze the discourses of power, Aune advocates that we are
obliged to create a “continuum of domination.” Aune’s observations means that as rhetorical
critics, we should not only concern ourselves to locate the telos within a historical moment but
also for us to engage in continued criticism to better uncover the treatises of domination and
resistance in discourses.
One area of concern for critical Marxism is how to articulate the materiality of discourse.
Abercombie, Hill, and Turner (1994) observe that the “analysis of ideologies and forms of
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knowledge and belief is in a state of disorder” because “the critical problem that contemporary
Marxist theories of ideology have to face is: how is one to reconcile materialism with the
autonomy of ideology?” (Abercombie, Hill, & Turner, 1994, p. 152). Here, Althusser’s (1971)
notion of interpellation and Charland’s (1989) constitutive rhetoric help rhetorical scholars. In
this thesis, the rhetoric these presidential administrations (Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump)
formulated to resist the ICC gave meanings to these American foreign policy traditions and
doctrines articulated by these post-Cold War U.S. Presidents. Without the speeches,
the doctrines would be meaningless. To send a clear signal, these administrations had
to engage in this rhetoric to constitute their position and inclination to internationalization.
Constitutive rhetoric is an art that establishes “character, community, and culture in language.
Also, it involves the central idea by which culture and community are created, preserved, and
altered” (White, 1985, p. 28). In order to assert its hegemonic principles, the UN, through its ICC
treaty, employed a “failed constitutive rhetoric” (Zagacki, 2007, p. 274). In its quest to
interpellate the nations of the world with its ideological commonsense, the UN fails to identify
with certain key members – the U.S, for instance. By articulating a global identity, the UN rallied
the international <justice> ideograph. However, the word <justice> means different things to
different, powerful countries — a reason Bolton, for instance, offers for U.S. opposition to the
ICC treaty. The U.S., I argue, presented a strong opposition to stymie the efforts of the ICC’s
jurisdiction, thereby creating a hegemonic crisis with the UN. The UN’s architecture is
weakened by America’s incessant opposition to it. Thus, the UN’s resolve to interpellate its
members with an ICC ideology failed to transform the U.S. into a subject position.
Greene posits that “ideology has material existence” (p. 26) because ideologies
interpellate subjects by positioning them in discourse (Althusser, 1971; Charland, 1989). We
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stressed earlier that Althusser utilizes the word “interpellate” to explain how ideology guides
people’s thoughts so that their identities become concretized, or tied, to the prevailing
ideological order, through a process he identifies as, “interpellation or hailing” (p. 174).
Accordingly, this process of “hailing” educates subjects into an ideology or a system of ideas
(Althusser, 1971). According to McGee (1980), human beings “in collectivity behave and think
differently than human beings in isolation” (p. 2). Charland (1987) elucidates that “interpellation
occurs at the very moment one enters a rhetorical situation” since one must be conditioned as an
“interpellated subject and exist as a discursive position in order to be part of the audience of a
rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur” (p. 138). Ideology interpellates individuals
as subjects. The time has come to examine how this thesis “‘penetrates the mystery’ in question,
and, specifically, how the way it penetrates this mystery leads directly to the problematic of a
materialist theory of discursive processes, articulated into the problematic of the ideological
conditions of the reproduction/ transformation of the relations of production” (Pecheux, 1994, p.
145). Pecheux’s desire is for us to recognize how discourse manifests materially.
In international politics, we must appreciate how discourse translates to actual realities
and how dominant powers contest as well as reject discourses of power along the international
terrain. This also helps us underscore the discursive orientations of ideologies. According to
Therborn (1980), ideologies are defined as all social phenomena of a discursive nature. They
include “both everyday notions and “experience” and elaborate intellectual doctrines, both the
‘consciousness’ of social actors and the institutionalized thought-systems and discourses of a
given society” (p. 2). Following Althusser, Therborn (1980) suggests that the “operation of
ideology in human life involves the constitution and patterning of how human beings live their
lives as conscious, reflecting initiators of acts in a structured, meaningful world. Ideology
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operates as discourse, addressing, or, as Althusser puts it, interpellating human beings as
subjects” (p. 15). In this way “Ideologies thus situate individuals in time and space by reference
to personal, positional and social characteristics” (Abercombie, Hill, & Turner, p. 154).
Therefore, Abercombie et al. (1994), suggest that “Therborn's argument may work for
‘natural persons’ but it needs to be shown how it applies in the case of ‘juristic persons.’ One can
further ask whether the formation of corporate structures has to be by interpellation.…, ideology
does not invariably constitute persons; it can also de-constitute them” (p. 158). This thesis
enables us to understand how constitutive rhetoric and interpellation occasion ideological
contestation among two powers. Thus, an ideological rhetorical investigation through the reading
of presidential resistance, I believe, offers us a heuristic approach by theorizing about
presidential power, presidential rhetoric, and the rhetorical presidency’s relationship with
international political institutions. By examining key rhetorical documents and arguments the
U.S. presented against the Rome Statute, I contribute to the discussion on the rhetoric of power
in resistance. Further, I show how a neo-Marxist rhetorical critique is crucial to understanding
presidential rhetoric and the rhetorical presidency –areas that the literature on presidential
rhetoric has ignored. I addition, I engage an ideological criticism of American resistance to the
rhetoric of the UN International Criminal Court treaty. While many treaties have been enacted by
the United Nations, the American initial and continual resistance to the International Criminal
Court presents an ideological hotspot for continuous criticism. The persuasive elements that are
inherent in this text are crucial for continuous critique if we are to understand and reconceptualize the edges of foreign policy rhetoric, presidential rhetoric, and the rhetoric of
international institutions as well as their impact on international public diplomacy, foreign
policy, and international relations discourse.
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The Rhetoric of Place/Space in Brokering International Treaties
Regionalism has played a key role in U.S. foreign policy, rendering geopolitical
calculations to be crucial in U.S. foreign policy aspirations (Fry, 2003). Most notably, the place
or location for foreign policy action is key to American presidents. Kaldor (1990) reasons that
the way we describe the world and the words we use shape our perceptions of the world and how
we act. Geopolitical thinking rages in U.S. foreign policy aspirations and is also a discursive
practice in international politics that serves to represent the world in terms of “places, people,
and dramas” (O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p. 192). O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992) maintain that
studying how geopolitics intersect with “spatialization,” specifically with respect to foreign
policy strategy, has been the domain of “core powers and hegemonic states” (p. 192). As a
result, foreign policy and international politics occur through discourse that is fashioned around
strategic places.
The spatial turn in rhetorical studies has largely ignored international relations. Basing
her arguments on critical geography, Prasch (2016, 2019) explicates that U.S. Presidents
incorporate the meaning of the places they visit into their speeches. Consequently, we can make
a rhetorical inquest into geopolitics, hegemony, and presidential power. Presidential
proclamations, as Windt (1986) argues, are not ephemeral. With the expanding powers of the
presidency (Beasley, 2010; Hiland, 2017, 2019), presidents create opportunities for themselves
to shape future foreign policy actions — with respect to which continents and issues they want
the U.S. to pursue. Realizing this, international hegemons such as the UN, in negotiating
international treaties, carefully rearticulate the historical and ideological significances of places
to bear on the import of the treaty. With respect to the Rome Statute, the UN realized that Europe
was the epicenter of historical events – the place for the two world wars. Also, the Nuremberg
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trials in Germany prosecuted perpetrators of war crimes — an achievement considered historic
— occasioning a globally recognized prosecution of crime under international law. In this
direction, Europe’s unique position as the site for wars and ideological conflicts guided the UN
to choose Europe for the negotiations regarding the ICC. The UN also argued that the precedents
from the Nuremberg trials, along with the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals, were moral points
that necessitated it to negotiate for world peace and the creation of an international tribunal with
universal jurisdiction.
However, using Rome as the location for negotiating international agreements like the
ICC treaty encourages us to probe further into why Rome became the site for power. La Rocca
(2007) acknowledges that Rome resembles a cosmopolitan self-representation as a metaphor to
articulate a peculiar way of life. La Roca also compares Rome to New York, which symbolizes
America’s ideological power. As a former empire, Rome represents a hub for UN activities in
Europe. This suggests that a U.S. imperial decline – which many interpret as a weakening of its
hegemonic status — will empower Europe as a world hegemony and will be a force to reckon
with due to its fervor for multilateralism. As home to numerous agencies of the UN, Rome was
determined as the favorite place for negotiations. This includes the UNICRI – the United Nations
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. This agency also provided enough support for
Rome as the choice for the ICC negotiations in 1998.
Additionally, the conditions Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe set the scene for UN’s
negotiations. The place is crucial in negotiating international agreements, peace accords, and
treaties. The rhetoric of place has been analyzed concerning the presidency, but less scholarly
attention concerning rhetoric of place in negotiating international agreements, and the signing of
peace accords between the Presidency (or presidential administrations) and foreign
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partners/multinational institutions (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011; Prasch, 2016, 2019). We must
investigate how hegemonic discourses are designed and how the rhetoric of place contributes to
their purpose. The choice of Rome was a strategic invocation of the ancient powers of Italy in
conquering the world. The reason for the success of the ICC treaty’s negotiation could be
attributed to the historical political significance of Rome and by extension, the country.
One would have thought that Manhattan, the headquarters of the UN, would have been
the ideal place to negotiate this treaty since Clinton supported an international criminal court in
his 1997 speech at the UN. The ICC treaty would not have been successful if the summit were to
be in the U.S. — because of America’s insistence to insert numerous clauses that would have
immunized Americans from ICC’s prosecutions. It is also worthy of note that within this
conjunctural moment, France, another European regional power, led negotiations of other
international treaties and the eventual signing of the Dayton Accord that lea to the peace
processes in Yugoslavia and the eventual imprisonment of the former President of Kosovo —
Slobodan Milosevic. All these actions were rhetorically sound and were within the historical
moment of the ICC treaty’s negotiation. The rhetoric of place in U.S. foreign policy also informs
how America crafts its hegemonic resistance and invokes power politics to bear on alliances and
treaties.
Presidential Rhetorical Theory
U.S. Presidential Rhetoric and Foreign Policy
Scholars such as Edwards (2006, 2008), Prasch, (2016, 2019), as well as Stuckey and
Ortega (2019), have examined the global role of the U.S. president. In terms of foreign policy,
U.S. presidents and administrations ascribe to preceding traditions that have guided U.S. global
outlook, ideologies of national identity (American exceptionalism), and actions. The Truman and
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Monroe doctrines are historical developments that inform the present U.S. foreign policy actions.
By importing age-old traditions, presidents try to frame the past hegemonic ideals to conform to
prevailing demands. While Presidents prime us to think about what benefits the nation,
Presidential action, relating to foreign policy decision, is also clouded in secrecy, which
promotes a culture of secrecy (Hallsby, 2015 Hiland, 2017, 2019). Because Presidents have
expanded the power the Constitution allotted to them, they can unilaterally make many decisions
without congressional approval. For instance, Trump issued an Executive Order to revoke the
visas of ICC officials from coming to the U.S. to obtain information needed for trials at The
Hague. Trump did this largely without the American public knowing and sidestepping Congress
during the novel coronavirus pandemic.
By engaging in secrecy this way, Trump’s actions escape public appraisal and seemingly
ossify American position with regards to his discourse on international treaties, such as the ICC
treaty. Hiding important facts also ascribes more power to the Office of the President and not to
the nation. This represents a paradox. To deconstruct how the hegemony works, we must
deconstruct the culture of secrecy that projects American common sense regarding foreign policy
decisions. This could also explain why in terms of U.S. foreign policy, we have presidential
doctrines, such as that of Presidents Jefferson, Truman, Monroe, Jackson, Bush, Obama, and
even Trump d. If America is to maintain its transnational hegemonic status, then foreign policy
decisions should be backed by Congress, so that they can become the will of the country.
Allowing the President of the U.S. to solely determine the course of the nation in foreign policy
decisions weakens America’s global standing. This is because those policies are not potent
enough and not well-thought-out. The 21st century presents enormous rhetorical resources that
must be carefully navigated by countries regarding foreign policy and diplomatic relations.
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Transnational Presidential and Political Rhetoric
Even though my analysis builds on the U.S. presidency, the discourse I examined in
relation to U.S. presidential rhetoric expands our purview to issues of how other leaders in fascist
countries and other regional powers like Russia and Iran invoke discourses that threaten the
peace of the world. Thus, my work opens us to transnational presidential rhetoric. Because of the
increasing transnational world, rhetoricians of the presidency must begin to see how leaders of
other countries, other than the U.S., employ presidential power in articulating foreign policy
strategy of their countries (Southard, 2019). Southard intimates that “Presidents and presidential
rhetoric are not bound by national contexts. Studying non-U.S. presidents’ rhetorical context is
shaped by factors abroad, can add to understandings to the inevitable diplomatic interaction of
presidents, and can point to the universal power of rhetorical strategies of invention” (p. 215). As
such, my work also opens an avenue where rhetorical scholars can examine transnational
political and presidential rhetoric.
This undertaking is crucial since understanding how nations, through their presidents,
design and articulate hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies help us to interrogate how
presidents can shape “national and global politics and negotiate different political realities”
(Southard, 2019, p. 215). Southard continues that because “non-U.S. political and presidential
discourses,” coupled with how “globalism and transnationalism have challenged the U.S.
presidency” (Southard, 2019, p. 215), expanding our inquests to cover transnational political
discourse in the twenty-first century is a useful undertaking (Dingo & Scott, 2012; Edwards,
2008). For instance, my examination exposes how we could analyze Kim Jong-Un’s rhetoric of
defiance to Nuclear Agreements, Putin’s annexation of Crimea — a move that violates
international law – along with other belligerent Russian excursions, Israel’s annexation of parts
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of Palestine, Iran’s tension with the U.S., U.S.-China relations, etc. Also, rhetorical scholars will
see new ways of problematizing the historical struggles and how these help us understand the
geopolitical climate in different historical moments.
Practical Implications
The Rome Statute must be amended to include “war of intelligence” and biological wars.
Even though investigations about the novel coronavirus pandemic continue, rhetorically, the
virus could be analyzed as an act of war and an organized crime against humanity. In the twentyfirst century, crimes of war and aggression must be extended to include espionage, spying, etc.
The ICC, through the UN, must also explore ways to include biological wars, trade wars,
technological wars, and other conflicts that threaten world peace and the future of humanity.
The UN must rebrand and revise existing international agreements to suit twenty-first
century discourses. The UN can no longer apply a decade-old statute to solving contemporary
problems. For it to be effective, it must forget the past, right its wrongs, and embrace a new
world order that is forged by working together with the U.S. The UN, most definitely, is a great
establishment. As a transnational hegemon, and competing with other hegemonic forces, the UN
must accept that counter-hegemonic forces serve as a check on its excesses. Like the UN, the
U.S. operates in many countries. Through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), U.S. development aid is expanding in almost every country in Africa,
South America, and Asia. It has military bases in many countries and strategic places all over the
world. The U.S., as well, contributes the largest troops to UN peacekeeping efforts. It has
numerous allies, which makes it very difficult for the UN to assert its superiority over the United
States. The UN, though powerful, must understand that its display of power is akin to
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establishing great legitimacy. It must, therefore, embrace the realities of this historical moment
and enact reforms that could win the support of the United States
As a rhetorical institution, the UN is losing its international appeal. Many countries have
questioned its usefulness in contemporary times. Accordingly, the U.S. has incredible soft power
that helps it attain authority and control over world issues. The U.S. has negotiated more treaties
than any other country in the world. As a result, if the U.S. is embarking on an imperial retreat, it
does not mean its influence in the world wanes (Bulmer-Thomas, 2018). Rather, it is a means to
superintend over world affairs without the threat and close monitoring by other countries,
international law, and institutions. Installing American-based beliefs is crucial toward making an
America that is strong that could dictate the pace for the world. Historically, Presidents Truman
and Eisenhower idealized the UN to assert U.S. power. In contemporary times, the unipolar
authority the U.S. enjoys makes it an international hegemon with even more power than the UN.
The U.S. has institutions that rival UN bodies. For instance, the U.S. has the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), which can act as a rival institution for the UN’s World Health Organization
(WHO). Of course, the UN occupies a strategic position, and it can easily bounce back and be
more powerful. However, its hegemonic status is weakened, and it must work with all relevant
parties. African countries too are exiting the ICC – a red flag for the UN and a situation that
deepens the UN’s hegemonic crisis. Ultimately, as all U.S. presidents (except for perhaps
Trump) indicate, the UN is crucial in world affairs. In this regard, the UN should develop
strategies to create congenial working relationships with its members, especially the
superpowers. Going so much against the desires of the United States could likely spell doom for
the UN. After all, as they say in Ghana, “it is only a ‘fool’ who waves his hand close to a sharp
knife.”
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UN and U.S. Relations
Because the UN ascribes to bureaucratic redtape measures, it has created rhetorical
chasms and gaps. It has therefore lost its footing to other transnational hegemons such as the
U.S. who capitalize on these weaknesses to translate its exceptionalism on the international
landscape. Academically, I also contribute to the discourse concerning the UN and how it
exercises its rhetoric. My work is important because only a few people have done this (Barnes,
2015; Carney 2017). Not only is there limited research about the UN’s rhetoric, but my research
also brings to the fore how international bodies refer to each other, how they jockey for power,
and how they leverage power through rhetoric vis-à-vis each other.
Polarized Discourse in the U.S.
Foreign policy issues breed divisiveness in the American political atmosphere (Zompetti,
2017). U.S. foreign policy actions create rhetorical battles between Republicans and Democrats
— a situation that ushers in rhetorical incivility into the national discourse. Hegemonic and
counterhegemonic problems and broadly ideological contestation in the U.S. regarding foreign
policy is an unnerving scene. Political blowhards, political crackpots, or intellectuals of statecraft
use this opportunity to polarize discourse in America. Mandelbaum (2016) chastises Presidents
since George H. Bush through Obama for pursuing haphazard foreign policies that dabble in
isolationism and interventionism. According to Mandelbaum, rather than pursuing the national
interest, U.S. presidents are more inclined to foreign policy programs and alliances that will
boost their approval ratings at the expense of the future and sustenance of American hegemony.
Representation of Countries of Other Continents
The non-compromising approach of the U.S. is a colonial/imperial approach to colonize
countries in Africa and Asia. Because the U.S. could insulate itself from ICC prosecutions, it
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sidesteps international law and uses force without recourse to the UN Charter and international
law to invade countries that threats its national security (e.g., Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya,
Syria under Obama, and possibly Iran under Trump).
Therefore, my thesis explains U.S. hostility to international organizations. In the
globalized world, where countries jockey for power and hegemonic statuses, it behooves other
countries to also implement strategies to counteract any moves aimed at domination. Rather,
weaker countries and international institutions should work closely with superpowers – a
rhetorical move to avoid domination from these powerful countries.
Contribution to the Discipline of Communication and Rhetoric
As rhetorical critics, it behooves us to expand our inquiry to not only engaging discourses
ephemerally but to undertake a permanent criticism (McKerrow, 1989). We can do this by
continually tracing the historical conjunctures of how power accumulates and how it is exercised,
as well as how the same is resisted within discourses. This positions us to analyze discourses and
understand how they reinforce ideologies. In terms of textual analysis, this thesis informs us that
texts for analysis go beyond speeches, documents, and letters. Rather, we need to understand
how historical configurations produce discourses. By engaging in “long preliminary soaks”
(Hall, 1975) within these discourses, we can locate the ideological assumptions inherent in these
texts/discourses.
With this thesis, our understanding of foreign policy is greatly enhanced. First, we realize
that American foreign policy lends credence to prophetic dualism that reinforces an “us vs them”
narrative. In order to advance this, the common sense rhetoric of American exceptionalism
becomes a key strategy. Also, U.S. presidential doctrines that provide rhetorical guidance to
foreign policy decisions become obvious to us. By constructing these foreign policy strategies,
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we realize how presidential action prioritizes and the realities they define for the public.
Furthermore, we understand how U.S. presidents enforce American values to bear on the global
place. This is all aided by rhetoric – the crafting of persuasive powerful discourses and dramas to
stage a scene for action. Therefore, rhetoric is everywhere. As such, we should discern the latent
meanings of discourses to reveal their “dislocations, disorientations, decenterness” (Asante,
2008, p. 34). This process is what McKerrow (1989) refers to as the “critique of domination.”
By engaging in a critique of freedom, we are also continuing a critical pedagogical
function (McKerrow, 1989). U.S. foreign policy is a never-ending endeavor. As such, the public
must come to terms with the nature of U.S. foreign policy from different perspectives — law,
political science, sociology, international relations, and more importantly, rhetoric. When they
are not exposed to different perspectives, the public is bombarded with ideological common
sense, which socializes them to appreciate that the historical U.S. foreign policy doctrines are
still being recalibrated and reinforced into 21st-century discourses. Accordingly, the public must
also be apprised with the need to highlight what constitutes moral action. Writing about the
“second persona,” Edwin Black encourages critics to be responsive to the moral evaluation of
rhetorical discourses. Black (1970) charges rhetorical critics that it is through “moral judgments
that we sort out our past, that we coax the networks and the continuities out of what has come
before that we disclose the persuasive patterns that may, in turn, present themselves to us as
potentialities, and thus extend our freedom” (p. 109).
Alternatively, by engaging in permanent criticism through exposing the discourses of
power in resistance rhetorics that shape U.S. foreign policy, we must also be guided by Condit’s
(1989) call to be guided by the “limits of polysemy.” Condit (1989) establishes that we should
situate discourses so that their meanings enunciate processes for an ethical social change.
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Accordingly, to Ceccarelli (1998), rhetorical critics should identify “resistive reading, strategic
ambiguity, and hermeneutic depth as three types of polysemy that support different scholarly
purposes…. through the adoption of new approaches” (p. 395). In this direction, I posit a neoMarxist rhetorical framework that builds on critical rhetoric and constitutive rhetoric to uncover
discourses of power and resistance that concerns U.S. relations with international institutions and
largely, the global political arena. A neo-Marxist rhetorical theory that expands Gramscian
notions enlarges the frontiers of rhetorical criticism by identifying how international relations
and historical discourses are rhetorical. Accordingly, it allows us – by engaging in rhetorical
criticism – to identify the ideological struggles of hegemons and their overall repercussions on
new global futures.
Directions for Future Research
My next projects will examine transnational presidential rhetoric. I believe this will also
help us understand how power is exercised with the aim of minimizing the inflamed discourses
in the world. We also need to investigate the rhetoric of Congress, the rhetoric of State
Departments, state institutions that have been established to fashion U.S. foreign policy, and the
rhetoric of foreign policy appointees in presidential administrations. While Presidents have a
broader vision regarding foreign policy, it is individuals like John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Susan
Rice, Madeline Albright, and others who implement some of those decisions and represent the
U.S. internationally. Furthermore, a deeper investigation of these rhetorics will allow us to
clearly understand what “U.S. interests” mean. The enthymeme, “U.S. national interest,” needs
to be unmasked for the public to understand the motives behind the actions of people leading
U.S. charge in foreign policy. This way, we would be able to determine how “U.S. national
interests” generate antagonism. We would also know how this has become a glorified national
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common sense that prompts other powerful actors and international institutions to resist U.S.
directives and hegemonic control of the world. Besides, we would also begin to uncover why a
country’s national interests (e.g., American exceptionalism and values) should dictate the pace of
global actions.
Furthermore, examining the diplomatic discourse of these professionals is very important
for us to understand how different administrations project the U.S. and the various articulatory
practices that are employed in this regard. We need to pay more attention to congressional
rhetoric because it is an area that fosters a culture of secrecy especially with issues of foreign
policy and important national documents and programs. Furthermore, we should be able to
articulate reasons why future presidents should continue to revolutionize foreign policy
approaches in line with established norms of the country. Globalization, coupled with
cosmopolitanism, has increasingly called for countries to improve relations with others as well as
international organizations and institutions. Regarding the rhetoric of place, this day of the
internet and social media can help us reconsider instead of where the rhetoric occurs, we could
also begin to examine discourses of what the rhetoric is about.
This thesis also shows that doing rhetorical criticism, and specifically, ideological
criticism, is not an unending venture. Because the U.S. continues to negotiate treaties, ratify
treaties, and form alliances, critical rhetoricians must begin to see that these inform us of
rhetorical resources that control the world and inform global futures. Rhetoricians must also
begin to recognize how U.S. presidential action shapes international discourse, cosmopolitan
citizenship, and the national character of countries, as well as international establishments. Even
though Stuckey and Ortega (2019) examined the rhetorical character of treaties, they did so as an
extension of how U.S. presidents negotiate strategic pacts, treaties, and alliances. They did not
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emphasize how the U.S. resists treaties and agreements of international organizations.
Accordingly, my next projects will examine how Trump, for example, pulled the U.S. from the
UN Human Rights Council, the Paris Climate Accord, the World Health Organization, etc. In
examining American foreign policy as dictated by American exceptionalism, rhetorical critics
should also begin to establish the link between the rhetoric of soft power and common sense
(D’Attoma, 2011).
Finally, this thesis encourages future research to situate the conjuncture of the historical
struggle between U.S. and international institutions. Accordingly, future rhetorical studies should
examine how presidential doctrines articulate these conjunctural moments and the way they help
initiate rhetorical action, international diplomacy, and articulate U.S. relationship with countries
and international organizations. This will also enable us to exact how the U.S. counterbalances
rival powers and burgeoning global hegemonies.
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